Collins Moving & Storage Corp. v. Kirkell

• Decision Date: 03 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 4D02-4806, No. 4D03-996.
• Citation: 867 So.2d 1179
• Parties: COLLINS MOVING & STORAGE CORPORATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, d/b/a Collins Moving & Storage, Appellant, v. Ira Michael KIRKELL and Sandra Kirkell, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

867 So.2d 1179

COLLINS MOVING & STORAGE CORPORATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, d/b/a Collins Moving & Storage, Appellant, v. Ira Michael KIRKELL and Sandra Kirkell, Appellees.

Nos. 4D02-4806, 4D03-996.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 3, 2004.

Rehearing Denied March 30, 2004.

Bard D. Rockenbach of Sellars, Marion & Bachi, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Donna M. Greenspan of Edwards & Angell, LLP, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

HOROWITZ, ALFRED J., Associate Judge.

The Defendant Collins Moving & Storage of South Carolina (Collins) appeals judgments awarding the Kirkells pre- and post-judgment interest calculated according to Florida law and further awarding them attorney's fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Kirkells claimed that certain household goods shipped through Collins were damaged and others were missing. They sought damages pursuant to a strict liability claim brought under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (Carmack). The jury found Kirkells' damages pursuant to the Carmack Claim were $64,031.

The Kirkells then filed a motion for final judgment in accordance with the verdict in which they asked the trial court to award pre- and post-judgment interest at the rate set by section 55.03, Florida Statutes (2002). They also asserted that because Collins had not disclosed that they had a right to seek arbitration, and a decision resolving the dispute had not been rendered through arbitration, the trial court should award attorney's fees pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14708. The trial court entered final judgment for $64,031 plus $14,004 in pre-judgment interest calculated at the Florida statutory rate. It also awarded the Kirkells attorney's fees in the amount of $120,000.

This case was brought under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act which governs the liability of inland common carriers for losses, damages, or injuries to goods during shipment. King Ocean Cent. Am., S.A. v. Precision Cutting Servs., Inc., 717 So.2d 507, 511 (Fla. 1998).

That the (Carmack Amendment) supersedes all the regulations and policies of a particular state upon the same subject results from its general character. It embraces the subject of the liability of the carrier under a bill of lading which he must issue, and limits his power to exempt himself by rule, regulation, or contract. Almost every detail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of the subject, and supersede all state regulation with reference to it. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505-506, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314 (1913).

Collins argues that, because the Carmack Amendment preempts state law, the trial court was required to utilize the federal interest rate set in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 when calculating the pre- and post-judgment interest rather than the Florida interest rate set in section 55.03, Florida Statutes. This court reviews the trial court's choice of law determination de novo. Henry v. Windjammer Barefoot Cruises, 851 So.2d 731, 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

Collins acknowledges that the Carmack Amendment does not expressly address the issue of pre- and post-judgment interest. It argues, however, that federal law has preempted state law on the issue of pre- and post-judgment interest, because the Carmack Amendment has preempted state law regarding "all damages resulting from any failure to discharge a carrier's duty." Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28, 29, 57 S.Ct. 73, 81 L.Ed. 20 (1936). Collins reasons that because prejudgment interest is an element of damages in Florida, the assessment of same should be pursuant to federal law.

Regarding post-judgment interest, Collins relies on Fine Foliage of Florida, Inc. v. Bowman Transportation, Inc., 698 F.Supp. 1566, 1571 (M.D.Fla.1988), in which the district court reasoned that applying the uniform federal rate established in 28 U.S.C. § 1961, rather than the Florida rate, complied with the goal of the Carmack Amendment to establish consistent federal law in the commerce area. We disagree with that decision. 28 U.S.C. § 1961, provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court. Execution therefor may be levied by the marshal, in any case where, by the law of the State in which such court is held, execution may be levied for interest on judgments recovered in the courts of the State. Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1 year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding [.] the date of the judgment....

* * *

(c) (4) This section shall not be construed to affect the interest on judgment of any court not specified in this section.

Section 1961 does not control the issue of post-judgment interest when a case is tried in state court. First, it limits its application to "any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court" and does not apply to "any judgment of any court not specified in the section." Second, the statute acknowledges the partial preeminence of state law on the issue, by limiting the award of post-judgment interest to district courts in states where interest is allowed by state law.

The award of pre-judgment interest is within the sound decision of the trial court and not addressed in 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See Jones v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 223 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.2000); See Sec. Ins. Co. v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 2003 WL 22416139, *1, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18922, 3-4 (S.D.N.Y.2003).

Collins argues that applying state interest laws defeats one purpose of the Carmack Amendment which is to provide a uniform measure of damages in interstate commerce, and that the use of state interest rates for pre- and post-judgment interest creates a potential disparity between states that encourages forum shopping. The specific statutory scheme created by Congress, however, has been in existence almost 100 years, and Congress has had ample opportunity to amend it to make it clear that it intended to preempt state legislation on interest. The only arguable reference to state interest rates in the legislation relevant to this case is in 28 U.S.C. § 1961, and it limits the award of post-judgment interest to states where state law provides for such recovery. This is an acknowledgment of the states' rights to control the issue of interest awards rather than a preemption of such right.

We therefore find no error in awarding pre- and post-judgment interest under state law, on a claim brought under the Carmack Amendment.

Collins next contends that the trial court erred by awarding the...