SOUTHERN & CENT. LABORERS v. ILLINOIS HEALTH FAC. PLANNING BD.

• Decision Date: 01 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 5-01-0134.,5-01-0134.
• Citation: 331 Ill. App.3d 1112,772 N.E.2d 980,265 Ill.Dec. 609
• Parties: SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL ILLINOIS LABORERS' DISTRICT COUNCIL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The ILLINOIS HEALTH FACILITIES PLANNING BOARD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

772 N.E.2d 980

331 Ill. App.3d 1112

265 Ill.Dec. 609

SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL ILLINOIS LABORERS' DISTRICT COUNCIL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The ILLINOIS HEALTH FACILITIES PLANNING BOARD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5-01-0134.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

July 1, 2002.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, Richard S. Huszagh, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, for Appellant.

Patrick J. O'Hara, Cavanagh & O'Hara, Springfield, for Appellee.

Justice CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the circuit court's denial of the motion to transfer venue filed by the Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board (defendant). The issue for review is whether the circuit court erred in denying defendant's motion to transfer. We affirm.

I. FACTS

Defendant is a regulatory body of the State of Illinois pursuant to the Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act (20 ILCS 3960/1 et seq. (West 2000)), and it is charged with regulating the construction, modification, and establishment of health care facilities in the state. On May 21, 1999, defendant approved the application of Marion Hospital Corp. (the hospital) to construct a 92-bed hospital in Williamson County to replace the hospital's existing facility, also located in Williamson County. On June 9, 1999, defendant issued the hospital a permit for the construction of the replacement hospital. The permit required the hospital "to reach a fair resolution with respect to current local union issues and * * * use union labor to construct the replacement hospital."

On June 21, 2000, before the hospital began construction, the Southern and Central Illinois Laborers' District Council (plaintiff) provided defendant with a written notice claiming that the hospital had failed to comply with the conditions of its construction permit relating to local union issues. Plaintiff informed defendant that an April 29, 1999, order issued by an administrative law judge of the National Labor Relations Board found that the hospital had engaged in unfair labor practices. Further, plaintiff claimed that the hospital continued the same unfair labor practices while the administrative law judge's ruling was on appeal. In response to plaintiffs claims, defendant put the matter on the agenda for its August 24, 2000, scheduled meeting. At this meeting, held in Cook County, defendant heard testimony from two representatives of the hospital on the union issues but refused to recognize plaintiffs representative, who was seated in the audience.

On September 25, 2000, plaintiff sent defendant a letter communicating its dissatisfaction with the manner in which the meeting was conducted, citing specific instances it considered procedurally and substantively deficient. In the letter, plaintiff urged defendant to follow its statutory mandate and pursue the allegations that the hospital had breached conditions of its construction permit. On November 14, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint for mandamus, alleging that defendant did not comply with the procedures and substance of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq. (West 2000)) when conducting the August 24, 2000, meeting. In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to recognize that the allegations of noncompliance against the hospital required a contested case under the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs complaint asserted that the commencement of construction by the hospital violated the conditions of the hospital's permit and that defendant failed to ensure that the hospital was in compliance with the terms of the permit. Plaintiffs mandamus action seeks to require defendant to hold a hearing under the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act to determine the contested case as to whether the hospital was in compliance with its permit prior to the start of construction.

On December 6, 2000, the individual members of defendant (who had also been named as defendants in plaintiffs complaint) filed a motion to transfer venue to Sangamon County pursuant to section 2-104 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-104 (West 2000)). On December 26, 2000, defendant itself filed a motion to transfer venue to Sangamon County. The venue hearing was held on January 30, 2001, at which time plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claims against the individual members of defendant, and on January 31, 2001, the court denied defendant's motion to transfer venue. Defendant made a timely appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We first address defendant's contention that a de novo standard should be employed in this review of the circuit court's denial of its motion to transfer venue. Defendant relies heavily on Lake County Riverboat L.P. v. Illinois Gaming Board, 313 Ill.App.3d 943, 246 Ill.Dec. 499, 730 N.E.2d 524 (2000), and Reichert v. Court of Claims, 327 Ill.App.3d 390, 261 Ill.Dec. 432, 763 N.E.2d 402 (2002), in support of a de novo review of the instant matter. We recognize the different standard of review established by the Second District's decision in Lake County Riverboat L.P. but also call attention to the more recent Second District decision of Johnson v. Compost Products, Inc., 314 Ill.App.3d 231, 247 Ill.Dec. 175, 731 N.E.2d 948 (2000), where the same court rejected the de novo standard in reviewing the denial of a motion to transfer venue. Likewise, we are familiar with this court's decision in Reichert, which followed Lake County Riverboat L.P.'s application of a de novo review. However, we decline to adopt a de novo standard of review and instead follow the abuse-of-discretion standard of review previously enunciated by our supreme court in Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co., 102 Ill.2d 250, 80 Ill.Dec. 28, 464 N.E.2d 1011 (1984), and adhered to in the Johnson decision.

A trial court has broad discretion when determining where venue is proper, and its decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Long v. Gray, 306 Ill.App.3d 445, 449, 239 Ill.Dec. 744, 714 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (1999) (citing Stambaugh, 102 Ill.2d at 263, 80 Ill.Dec. 28, 464 N.E.2d at 1016-17 (1984)). "The role of this court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, or even to determine whether the trial court exercised its discretion wisely, but rather our role is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion." Niepotter v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 303 Ill.App.3d 632, 636, 236 Ill.Dec. 708, 707 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (1999). A circuit court abuses its discretion when it "acts arbitrarily, fails to employ conscientious judgment] and ignores recognized principles of law." Hernandez v. Karlin Foods Corp., 322 Ill.App.3d 805, 807-08, 255 Ill. Dec. 933, 751 N.E.2d 27, 29 (2001) (citing Elling v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 291 Ill.App.3d 311, 317, 225 Ill.Dec. 426, 683 N.E.2d 929, 935 (1997)).

III. ANALYSIS

The sole issue in the instant appeal is whether the circuit court erred in denying defendant's motion to transfer venue from Williamson County. Under section 2-101 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-101 (West 2000)), a suit must be brought (1) in the county of residence of any defendant or (2) in the county in which the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose. Section 2-103(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-103(a) (West 2000)) sets forth provisions for actions against a public, municipal, governmental, or quasi-municipal corporation. Section 2-103(a) provides that actions must be brought against a governmental body in the county in which its principal office is located or in the county in which the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose. 735 ILCS 5/2-103(a) (West 2000). When a defendant files a motion to transfer venue, it has the burden of proving that the plaintiffs selection of venue was improper. Weaver v. Midwest Towing, Inc., 116 Ill.2d 279, 285, 107 Ill.Dec. 685, 507 N.E.2d 838, 840 (1987). "In doing so, the defendant must set out specific facts, not conclusions, and show a clear right to the relief asked for." Weaver, 116 Ill.2d at 285, 107 Ill.Dec. 685, 507 N.E.2d at 840 (citing Taylor v. Southern Ry. Co., 350 Ill. 139, 143, 182 N.E. 805, 806-07 (1932), and Winn v. Vogel, 345 Ill. App. 425, 430, 103 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1952)). "Any doubts arising from the inadequacy of the record will be resolved against the defendant." Weaver, 116 Ill.2d at 285, 507 N.E.2d at 840; 107 Ill. Dec. 685, Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill.2d 389, 391-92, 76 Ill.Dec. 823, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984).

Defendant argues that venue is improper in Williamson County because defendant is a State governmental agency with its principal office located in Sangamon County. Defendant contends that the only possible basis for venue in Williamson County is under the transactional portion of section 2-103(a) but that the transaction about which plaintiff complains did not occur in Williamson County. Plaintiff argues that Williamson County is a proper venue because a part of the transaction that led to the cause of action occurred in that county. Plaintiff contends that the relief sought in its mandamus action arises out of its initial complaint concerning the conditions of the construction permit issued by defendant for the hospital in Williamson County and that the outcome of the action will affect the rights and conditions of employment of its represented employees in Williamson County.

Because plaintiff does not challenge defendant's assertion that it is a governmental body covered under section 2-103(a), we focus upon the transactional portion of section 2-103(a). "`Transaction' has been defined to include every fact which is an integral part of a cause of action." Kenilworth Insurance Co. v. McDougal, 20 Ill.App.3d 615, 617, 313 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1974). The term "transaction" should not be so narrowly interpreted to include only those immediate facts out of...