CF & I STEEL, LP v. USWA

• Decision Date: 10 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97CA2045.,97CA2045.
• Citation: 990 P.2d 1124
• Parties: CF & I STEEL, L.P., a limited partnership, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA (USWA); United Steel Workers of America Locals 2102; United Steel Workers of America Locals 3267; Jack Golden, Director—District 12 USWA; David Kins, Sub-District Director Sub-District 6 of District 12 USWA; Ernie Hernandez, President, Local 2102; Joey Padilla, Financial Secretary, Local 2102; Jeanne Landreth, President, Local 3267; Jim Hartford, Vice President, Local 3267; Sam Pierce; Tom Genetta; Richard Martinez; Henry LeFabre, USWA; and John Does and Jane Does, whose names are unknown, individually as officers, agents, and members of the aforesaid Union, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

990 P.2d 1124

CF & I STEEL, L.P., a limited partnership, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA (USWA); United Steel Workers of America Locals 2102; United Steel Workers of America Locals 3267; Jack Golden, Director—District 12 USWA; David Kins, Sub-District Director Sub-District USWA; Ernie Hernandez, President, Local 2102; Joey Padilla, Financial Secretary, Local 2102; Jeanne Landreth, President, Local 3267; Jim Hartford, Vice President, Local 3267; Sam Pierce; Tom Genetta; Richard Martinez; Henry LeFabre, USWA; and John Does and Jane Does, whose names are unknown, individually as officers, agents, and members of the aforesaid Union, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 97CA2045.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV.

June 10, 1999.

Certiorari Granted January 18, 2000.

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & McRae, L.L.P., Marla S. Petrini, Mary L. Will, Denver, Colorado; Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, Thomas M. Triplett, Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Brauer, Buescher, Valentine, Goldhammer & Kelman, P.C., Ellen M. Kelman, Dennis E. Valentine, Denver, Colorado; Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Jeremiah A. Collins, Leon Dayan, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellants.

Opinion by Judge ROTHENBERG.

Defendants, United Steelworkers of America, Local Nos. 2102 and 3287, (the union) and several individual union members appeal the trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining them from certain unfair labor practices, including residential picketing, which occurred during a labor dispute with plaintiff, CF&I Steel, L.P. (CF&I). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.

The union authorized its members to strike against CF&I in the course of a labor dispute. Several incidents of improper and coercive conduct were directed at employees who chose to cross the picket line. The improper conduct included threatening phone calls to employees' residences, following vehicles of employees who chose to cross the picket line, interfering with ingress to and egress from CF&I's property for employees and customers, making verbal threats and harassing non-striking employees, damaging property, and picketing the domiciles of non-striking employees.

CF&I sought and was granted a temporary restraining order and then a preliminary injunction enjoining the union and its members from engaging in violent, intimidating, threatening, and harassing conduct. In so ruling, the trial court clarified that it was "not in any way finding that [the union had] authorized, ratified or condoned" the misconduct of certain union members. But, it found that the public was unable to distinguish between authorized and unauthorized union conduct, and on that basis, it enjoined the union from engaging in the improper behavior.

Further, the trial court enjoined all residential picketing at the homes of company employees, including peaceful residential picketing, as an unfair labor practice under the Colorado Labor Peace Act, § 8-3-101, et seq., C.R.S.1998.

Pursuant to C.A.R. 1(a)(3), the union appealed the order granting the preliminary injunction.

I.

The union and union members first contend the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin any residential picketing because the issue was preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. (1998). We disagree.

Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction will be overturned only if it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair. If the issue being reviewed concerns only legal questions, the ruling is subject to de novo appellate review. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.1993); Board of County Commissioners v. Fixed Base Operators, Inc., 939 P.2d 464 (Colo.App.1997).

When a state attempts to regulate activities protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1998), or acts which constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1998), due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959).

States retain the power to regulate where the activity regulated is merely a peripheral concern of the Labor Relations Act, or where the regulated conduct touches interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it cannot be inferred that Congress deprived the states of the power to act. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra. See Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154 (1942) (Congress' intent to exclude states from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested).

In Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, supra, the Supreme Court clarified that the federal Labor Relations Act was not designed to preclude states from enacting legislation limited to the prohibition or regulation of employee or union activity involving the following: mass picketing; threatening employees with physical injury or property damage; obstructing ingress and egress to a company; obstructing the streets and public roads surrounding a company; and picketing homes of employees.

More recent cases have affirmed the holding in Allen-Bradley that states are not precluded from exercising their police power over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the use of streets and highways. Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977); Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976).

Because we conclude that the regulation of public safety, including preclusion of residential picketing, is a matter of local concern, we reject the union's and union members' assertion that the issue of residential picketing has been preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980) (fn.10) ("Appellant does not go so far as to suggest that the National Labor Relations Act preempts the State from enacting a law prohibiting the picketing of residences involved in labor disputes. Such an argument has dubious merit."); Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228 (1953) (states' powers not preempted in cases of mass picketing, threatening of employees, obstructing streets and highways, or picketing homes). See also City of Golden v. Ford, 141 Colo. 472, 348 P.2d 951 (1960) (states retain certain power to regulate picketing and to protect public safety); United Mine Workers v. Golden Cycle Corp., 134 Colo. 140, 300 P.2d 799 (1956) (trial court had jurisdiction to enjoin mass picketing, threats of bodily injury and property damage, obstruction of ingress to and egress from plaintiff's property, and the picketing of employees' homes, together with coercion, harassment, and threats to employees); K-T Marine, Inc. v. Dockbuilders Local Union 1456, 251 N.J.Super. 107, 597 A.2d 540 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1991) (power to enjoin picketing at private residence not preempted by National Labor Relations Act); State ex rel. Utility Workers Union v. Macelwane, 116 Ohio App. 183, 187 N.E.2d 901 (1961) (absent United States Supreme Court decision preempting jurisdiction over peaceful picketing of private homes, jurisdiction remains with the states).

II.

The union and union members also contend the anti-injunction provision, § 8-3-118(1)(e), C.R.S.1998, of the Labor Peace Act denied the trial court jurisdiction to enjoin their peaceful picketing and, for that reason, the injunction should not have been granted. Again, we disagree.

As pertinent here, the anti-injunction provision states that:

Except as otherwise provided in this article, no court has jurisdiction to issue in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction which in specific or general terms prohibits any person from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:

....

(e) [g]iving publicity to and obtaining or communicating information regarding the existence of or the facts involved in any dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, without intimidation or coercion, or by any method not involving fraud, violence, breach of the peace, or threat thereof....

Section 8-3-118(1), C.R.S.1998 (emphasis added).

Initially, we note the § 8-3-118(1)(e) only divests a court of jurisdiction to enjoin conduct that is peaceful, free from intimidation or coercion, and not a breach of the peace. The statute does not affect the court's power to enjoin conduct properly within the purview of the state's police power, which may include residential picketing. See Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, supra; United Mine Workers v. Golden Cycle Corp., supra.

Additionally, § 8-3-108, C.R.S.1998, sets forth actions which constitute unfair labor practices under the Colorado Labor Peace Act. Specifically, § 8-3-108(2)(a), C.R.S.1998, makes it an unfair labor practice for an employee to picket the domicile of another employee.

Section 8-3-110(1), C.R.S.1998, provides concurrent jurisdiction to the courts and the Division of Labor for the prevention of unfair labor practices, and a claimant can seek equitable or legal relief in the courts without exhausting administrative remedies. See Ruff v. Kezer, 199 Colo. 182, 606 P.2d 441 (1980) (administrative remedies need not be exhausted before an unfair labor practice may be raised as such in court proceeding). We conclude that the language, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this article" in § 8-3-118(1), when read together with §§ 8-3-108(2)(a) and 8-3-110(1), conferred jurisdiction upon the trial court to enjoin...