Habitat Wallpaper & Blinds v. KT Scott Ltd., Civ. No. 92-CV-5771.
Decision Date | 01 December 1992 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 92-CV-5771. |
Citation | 807 F. Supp. 470 |
Parties | HABITAT WALLPAPER AND BLINDS, INC., Plaintiff, v. K.T. SCOTT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, K.T. Scott Ltd., Stephen C. Wener, and Malcolm L. Sherman, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
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John Louis Alex, Daniel Robert Pastirik, Lockwood, Alex, Fitzgibbon & Cummings, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff.
Christopher A. Kreid, Gorham, Metge, Bowman & Hourigan, Chicago, IL, H. Joseph Hameline, Rosemary M. Allen, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, Boston, MA, for defendants.
Before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, or in the alternative, to transfer. For the following reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied and the motion to transfer is granted.
Plaintiff, Habitat Wallpaper and Blinds, Inc. ("Habitat"), is a Michigan corporation that owns and operates home fashion retail outlets throughout Illinois. Defendant K.T. Scott Limited Partnership ("K.T. Scott") is involved in the retail sale of home decorating goods and services in Massachusetts. Habitat claims that K.T. Scott offers goods and services identical to those offered by Habitat in retail outlets having the same distinctive decorative and architectural themes as those found in Habitat's outlets. Furthermore, Habitat alleges that K.T. Scott promoted its goods and services with a brochure that incorporated many features copied directly from Habitat's brochure. Based on defendant K.T. Scott's decoration of its stores and the design and content of its brochures, Habitat has asserted claims against the defendants under federal trademark laws and state laws1 for alleged trademark and trade dress infringement and unfair business practice.
The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the present cause of action for lack of personal jurisdiction over any of the defendants. As plaintiff, Habitat bears the burden of proving sufficient facts to establish personal jurisdiction. Grafon Corp. v. Hausermann, 602 F.2d 781, 783 (7th Cir.1979); United States Ry. Equip. Co. v. Port Huron & Detroit R.R. Co., 495 F.2d 1127, 1128 (7th Cir.1974). The jurisdictional allegations in the complaint are taken as true, unless controverted by defendants' affidavits, and any conflicts between affidavits are normally resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Turnock v. Cope, 816 F.2d 332, 333 (7th Cir.1987).
Unless authorized by a federal statute or a federal rule of civil procedure, this court has personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants only if an Illinois court would have jurisdiction over such defendants. FMC Corp. v. Varonos, 892 F.2d 1308, 1310 (7th Cir.1990). To conclude that Illinois has personal jurisdiction, the court must affirmatively answer the following questions: (1) do the facts as alleged bring the defendants within the reach of Illinois' long-arm statute, and (2) is the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants consonant with due process?
The Illinois long-arm statute provides in relevant part:
Habitat is a Michigan corporation that operates several stores in this district; as such, Habitat will suffer injury in Illinois for any infringement of Habitat's intellectual property rights. Furthermore, Habitat has claimed that the defendants obtained Habitat's allegedly protected property by visiting its Illinois outlets and "spiriting" such property away.2 Habitat has properly stated a claim for intellectual property infringement against the defendants, and since such infringement is considered a tort, the defendants fall within the ambit of § 2-209(a)(2).
The demands of due process are met when there are "minimum contacts" between the forum and the defendants so that "maintenance of the suit in such forum does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Due process is satisfied when "a defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).
Habitat's asserted cause of action against the defendants arises out of their tortious conduct in violating Habitat's intellectual property rights. The defendants allegedly copied Habitat's intellectual property in Illinois, and allegedly having obtained such protected property of a company transacting business in Illinois, the defendants would be aware that any infringement upon Habitat's intellectual property would register an injury in Illinois. As such, the defendants cannot be heard to complain that they could not reasonably anticipate being haled into an Illinois court to defend against a complaint by Habitat for intellectual property infringement. Consequently, the conduct that forms the basis of Habitat's complaint provides the necessary "minimum contacts" with Illinois. See Rose v. Franchetti, 979 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.1992) ( ). Accordingly, this court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants, and defendants motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) is denied.
As an alternative to their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the defendants have filed a motion to transfer this case to the District of Massachusetts. Transfer is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) where the moving party demonstrates (1) venue is proper in the transferor district, (2) venue and jurisdiction are proper in the transferee district, and (3) the transfer is for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. See Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1986); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Brown, 587 F.Supp. 1067, 1069 (N.D.Ill.1984). Though § 1404(a) is derived from the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, the moving party under § 1404(a) has a lesser burden of showing inconvenience than is required under the common law doctrine. See Northern Ind. Public Serv. Co. v. Envirotech Corp., 566 F.Supp. 362, 364 (N.D.Ind.1983). Moreover, because § 1404(a) does not specify the weight to be accorded each factor, it is left to the discretion of the court. See Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219; see generally 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice §§ 3844-47 (1986).
Habitat has allegedly suffered injury in this district, and the defendants have allegedly committed acts in this district that lead to the claimed infringement of Habitat's intellectual property. Therefore, this court has proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) ( ). Because all defendants reside in Massachusetts, venue is proper in the District of Massachusetts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) ( ) and § 1400(a) ( ). Accordingly, the court has the power to transfer the instant case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Once it has been determined that the court has the power to transfer an action under § 1404(a), both the private interests of the...
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