Allen v. Enbridge G&P (East Texas) L.P.
| Decision Date | 29 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 12-14-00034-CV,12-14-00034-CV |
| Parties | JOHN ALLEN AND ANGELA ALLEN, APPELLANTS v. ENBRIDGE G & P (EAST TEXAS) L.P., APPELLEE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS
John Allen and Angela Allen appeal the trial court's condemnation judgment awarding Enbridge G & P (East Texas) L.P. an easement to construct a natural gas pipeline. In two issues, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in overruling their motion for new trial and that this court should reform the trial court's judgment to comport with its summary judgment order. We modify the judgment and affirm as modified.
Pursuant to Texas Property Code, Chapter 21, Enbridge brought a condemnation action against Appellants. By its suit, Enbridge sought a fifty foot wide permanent easement and right-of-way across Appellants' land to construct a natural gas pipeline. Enbridge further sought to secure an additional twenty-five foot adjoining easement to be used as a temporary work space. The legal description of the easements as well as their underlying terms were attached to Enbridge's petition as exhibits.
The special commissioners conducted a hearing, after which Enbridge was awarded the easements. Appellants objected to the award, and the administrative proceeding was converted into a judicial proceeding.
In its original and first amended petitions, Enbridge identified itself as a "gas utility" as defined by Texas Utility Code, Section 101.003 and alleged that it was engaged in the business of constructing, maintaining, and operating pipeline facilities "to transport, measure and control the flow of natural gas, its constituents and associated products." (emphasis added). Enbridge further alleged that, pursuant to a resolution passed April 29, 2010, it determined that (1) the public convenience and necessity required it to acquire an easement for the public purpose of construction and operation of one twenty-inch natural gas pipeline and appurtenant facilities and (2) it was necessary and essential to acquire the subject easement to construct, maintain, and operate a pipeline "to transport natural gas, its constituents and associated products or by-products."
Appellants did not contest that Enbridge was a "gas utility" with the right to condemn their land for the limited purpose of constructing a pipeline to transport natural gas for public use. Instead, they argued that the inclusion of the phrase "constituents, associated products, or by-products" would allow the transportation of products separate from natural gas, thereby exceeding the scope of the statutory and condemning authority set forth in Texas Utilities Code.1
Enbridge sought summary judgment on its entitlement to the requested easements. After the hearing on its motion, Enbridge amended its petition to change "natural gas, its constituents and associated products" to "natural gas and its constituent elements." Thereafter, the trial court rendered a summary judgment order stating, in part, that (1) Enbridge had filed its Second Amended Statement and Petition for Condemnation (Second Amended Petition) to reduce its taking to the rights defined and authorized under Texas Utilities Code, Section 121.001, (2) Enbridge had met and complied with the requirements enumerated in Texas Property Code, Section 21.012, (3) Enbridge had the right to assign the easement to an assignee that qualifies as a transporter of natural gas as defined in Texas Utilities Code, Section 121.001(a), and (4) the only issues remaining for trial are the fair market value of the property to be condemned and damages to the remainder.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. The court's charge to the jury characterized the easement as a "permanent conveyable easement for a natural gas pipeline." The term "naturalgas" was not defined in the charge. The charge also included an instruction that Enbridge was acquiring a nonexclusive permanent easement in order to construct, operate, and maintain a twenty-inch O.D. pipeline and appurtenant facilities in, over, through, across, under, and along land owned by Appellants. The instruction contained verbatim Paragraphs I-XI of the Terms of the Permanent Easement, which was attached as Exhibit B to Enbridge's Second Amended Petition.
After the jury returned its award, the trial court rendered a judgment that included the following pertinent language:
The foregoing easement, surface site[,] and temporary construction easement are identified in the Second Amended Statement and Petition for Condemnation attached hereto as Exhibit 1, further described in the Exhibits to the petition, all of which are attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes, and such easements and rights-of-way for use by and for the 20-inch natural gas pipeline together with rights of ingress and egress thereto and therefrom, in, along, and within said easement for the foregoing purposes be and are hereby VESTED in Defendant, ENBRIDGE G &P (EAST TEXAS) L.P. with the temporary construction easement having terminated and reverted to Plaintiffs after completion of construction[.]
Attached to and incorporated by reference into the judgment was a copy of Enbridge's Second Amended Petition and its exhibits. Exhibit A consisted of plats, surveys, and a legal description of the easements. Exhibit B comprised the terms of the permanent easement. Exhibit C set forth the terms of the temporary easement.
Appellants filed a motion to set aside the judgment, in which they objected to the addition of the phrase "and its constituent elements" contained in Enbridge's Second Amended Petition. The trial court rendered an amended judgment, which was identical to the original judgment, but for its inclusion of a handwritten footnote, which stated that "Condemnor is granted and is entitled to the right to transport only natural gas, which may include various constituent elements from the well, which comprise and/or are a part of the natural gas."
Thereafter, Appellants filed a motion for new trial, requesting that the trial court grant a new trial on damages or, alternatively, reformation of the amended judgment to (1) delete any reference to or incorporation of Enbridge's Second Amended Petition and (2) include language consistent with the trial court's summary judgment order limiting any future assignment of the easement to "a transporter of natural gas" as defined in Texas Utilities Code, Section 121.001. The court denied Appellants' motion, and this appeal followed.
In their first issue, Appellants argue that the amended judgment is inconsistent with and materially altered the trial court's summary judgment order by expanding what products could be transported through the completed pipeline. Thus, they argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for new trial.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. See Dir.
, State Emp. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1994); Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 778-79 (Tex. 1987). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, not when it exercises that discretion in a manner different than a reviewing appellate court might. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). The burden of proving an abuse of discretion is on the party assailing the trial court's ruling or action. Lutheran Soc. Servs., Inc., v. Meyers, 460 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. 1970); Green v. Kaposta, 152 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
A judgment is the official announcement of the resolution of the issues in the lawsuit. Comet Aluminum Co., Inc. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56, 58-59 (Tex. 1970). A judgment is a judicial act, the primary objective of which is to conclude controversies with the highest possible degree of exact justice. See Jackson v. Slaughter
, 185 S.W.2d 759, 761 () When a judgment is attacked, we indulge all presumptions consistent with reason to uphold its binding effect. See id.
In determining the validity of a judgment, the substance of the judgment controls, rather than its form, and no particular wording or phraseology is required. See Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Fin. Leasing Servs. v. Stanfield
, 71 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, pet. denied). Moreover, a judgment may incorporate into its terms by reference an earlier judgment or order in the same judicial proceedings. See Azbill v. Dallas Cty. Child Protective Servs. Unit of Tex. Dep't of Human & Regulatory Servs., 860 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
Further still, a judgment must be sufficiently definite and certain to define and protect the rights of the litigants. Stewart v. USA Custom Paint & Body Shop, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1994); see also Roberts v. Brittain
, 659 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ)(judgment should provide definite means of ascertaining such rights to the end that ministerial officers can carry judgment into execution without ascertainment of facts not therein stated).
Texas courts generally construe judgments under the same rules of interpretation as those applied to other written instruments. Lone Star Cement Corp. v. Fair, 467 S.W.2d 402, 404-05 (Tex. 1971). First, we are mindful that whether a judgment is ambiguous is a question of law. See Cross Timbers Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp.
, 22 S.W.3d 24, 26 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.). Thus, we need not defer to any interpretation afforded by the trial court. Id. Second, when interpreting an instrument, we strive to give effect to its intent. Id. That intent is garnered from the language of the instrument, which is considered in its entirety. See id. That is, we peruse the complete document to understand, harmonize, and effectuate all its provisions. See...
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