A.P. Moller–Maersk A/S v. Safewater Lines (1) PVT, Ltd., Civ. A. H–13–1726
| Decision Date | 23 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. H–13–1726 |
| Citation | 276 F.Supp.3d 700 |
| Parties | A.P. MOLLER–MAERSK A/S, TRADING AS MAERSK LINE, Plaintiff, v. SAFEWATER LINES (1) PVT, LTD., Samrat Container Lines, Inc. and Atni, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Richard Lee Gorman, Richard Gorman Law, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.
Rahul Wanchoo, Attorney at Law, Upper Saddle River, NJ, J. Stephen Simms, Marios J. Monopolis, Simms Showers LLP, Baltimore, MA, for Defendants.
Samrat Container Lines, Inc., pro se.
Admiralty—Rule 9(h)
Pending before the Court, in the above referenced action in admiralty, is a motion for summary judgment (# 67) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, filed by Plaintiff A.P. Moller–Maersk A/S, Trading as Maersk Line ("Maersk"), based on its contract claims against Defendant Samrat Container Lines, Inc. ("Samrat"). Currently this lawsuit, grounded in admiralty ( 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) ) and/or diversity ( 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) ) jurisdiction over Maersk, a Danish corporation, and Samrat, a New Jersey corporation, with its principal place of business in Piscataway, New Jersey. Maersk asserts claims for contractual indemnity and breach of governing contract(s) of carriage, and contribution under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") against Samrat.
Initially after a cargo of hydrochloric acid was allegedly improperly packed in overfilled drums and incorrectly stowed aboard vessels by M/S Global Multichem and carried across the ocean, Maersk filed this action to force all the original Defendants to take delivery of a cargo of hydrochloric acid, shipped under a Maersk bill of lading from Pipavav, India to Houston, where it was found on offloading that the plastic totes in Container Numbers MSKU368505–9, POCU064333–3, and UXXU241719–9 were leaking the acid. Maersk has since settled with and dismissed all the Defendants other than the Samrat (i.e., # 34, ATNI, Inc., intended to be the ultimate receiver, and # 45, Safewater Lines (I) Pvt., Ltd. and Safewater Lines (India) Pvt, Ltd., which booked the containers for the voyage to Houston under a Service Contract with Maersk and issued at least one of the bills of lading in issue). Given that Defendants were jointly and severally liable under various contracts,1 in the remaining portion of this lawsuit under Maersk's bill of lading terms and conditions2 and tariff,3 Maersk seeks to recover from Samrat4 its share5 of the resulting expensive emergency clean up costs, freight demurrage,6 and other expenses arising from the spill of hydrochloric acid from the sealed shipping containers from the time the containers were offloaded in Houston from the M/V MAERSK IDAHO (after free time expired) until the time the hydrochloric acid was abandoned and sold for salvage.7
Summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the court determines that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant must offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant's claim or point out the absence of evidence supporting essential elements of the nonmovant's claim; the movant may, but does not have to, negate the elements of the nonmovant's case to prevail on summary judgment." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation , 497 U.S. 871, 885, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) ; Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc. , 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1998). "A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
If the movant meets its burden and points out an absence of evidence to prove an essential element of the nonmovant's case on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the nonmovant must then present competent summary judgment evidence to support the essential elements of its claim and to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board , 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1994). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmovant may not rely merely on allegations, denials in a pleading or unsubstantiated assertions that a fact issue exists, but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning every element of its cause(s) of action. Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc. , 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).
Conclusory allegations unsupported by evidence will not preclude summary judgment. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v.City Pub. Serv. Board , 40 F.3d at 713 ; Eason v. Thaler , 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). " ‘[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment ....’ " State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman , 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Nor is the ‘mere scintilla of evidence’ sufficient; ‘there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.’ " Id., quoting Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Fifth Circuit requires the nonmovant to submit " ‘significant probative evidence.’ " Id. ,quoting In re Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig. , 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982), and citing Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. Cajun Electric Power Co–Op. , 799 F.2d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Thomas v. Barton Lodge II, Ltd. , 174 F.3d 636, 644 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, and Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Allegations in a plaintiff's complaint are not evidence. Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ. , 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) (); Johnston v. City of Houston, Tex., 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 1994) (), citing Solo Serve Corp. v. Westowne Assoc. , 929 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmovant must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Giles v. General Elec. Co. , 245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001), citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
The court must consider all evidence and draw all inferences from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v.City Pub. Serv. Board , 40 F.3d at 712–13. The Court may not make credibility determinations. Deville v. Marcantel , 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009), citing Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center , 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).
Prior to the shipment of the allegedly improperly packaged, overfilled, and incorrectly stowed drums of hydrochloric acid from Pipava, India to Houston, Texas, Safewater Lines (I) Pvt., Ltd. and Safewater Lines (India) Pvt. (also referred to as "Safewater Defendants" or "Safewater entities"), and Maersk entered into Service Contract No. 516551 (the "Service Contract"), which established preferred rates for the carriage of marine cargo to Safewater Lines (I) Pvt., Ltd., Safewater Lines (India) Pvt., and their affiliates. The Service Contract indicated that the carriage of goods and other services provided to Maersk under the Service Contract were subject to the terms and conditions of the Maersk bill(s) of lading governing the carriage of the cargo,8 as well as the applicable tariff(s).
At issue in this case are three M/S Global Multichem ("Multichem") invoices, 102 dated January 12, 2012, 105 dated January 27, 2012, and 106 dated February 9, 2012, respectively, for the sale of the hydrochloric acid. Maersk alleges that upon information and belief, the manufacturer of the acid was Nirma, Limited, the exporter was Multichem, and the ultimate receiver was ATNI in Midland, Texas. The invoices demonstrate that the acid was carried by vessel from India to Houston, for final delivery to ATNI in Midland, Texas.
It was Multichem, as an agent for Defendants or an agent acting on Multichem's behalf, who stowed the acid in drums, which were then stowed in Plaintiff-owned Container Numbers MSKU368505–9, POCU064333–3, UXXU241719–9, and PONU754670–3 (the "containers") and sealed for the ocean carriage. The Safewater entities booked the containers for shipment under the Service Contract and assigned them Booking Numbers 863338433, 863444274, and 863494073. They also issued bills of lading for the acid (at least bill of lading SELDEL0133f2 sold under invoice 102) that states "SHIPPER LOAD STOW COUNT & CUSTOMS SEAL").
Before loading, the containers were tendered...
To continue reading
Request your trial