Hamblen County Educ. Ass'n v. Hamblen County Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 14 October 1994
• Citation: 892 S.W.2d 428,97 Ed.LawRep. 958
• Parties: 97 Ed. Law Rep. 958 HAMBLEN COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The HAMBLEN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee, and Wendell Francis, et al., Intervenors-Appellees.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 428

892 S.W.2d 428

97 Ed. Law Rep. 958

HAMBLEN COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The HAMBLEN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee, and Wendell Francis, et al., Intervenors-Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee,

Eastern Section.

Oct. 14, 1994.

Application for Permission to Appeal

Denied by Supreme Court

Jan. 30, 1995.

Charles Hampton White, Kurtis J. Winstead, Cornelius & Collins, Nashville, for plaintiff-appellant.

H. Scott Reams, Taylor, Reams, Tilson & Harrison, Morristown, for defendant-appellee.

C. Dwaine Evans, Morristown, for intervenors-appellees.

OPINION

SUSANO, Judge.

This case involves a dispute between ¹ The Hamblen County Board of Education (Board), and the Hamblen County Education Association (Association), the latter being the duly recognized exclusive representative of all of the Board's professional employees pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. § 49-5-601, et seq., the Education Professional Negotiations Act (EPNA). At issue is whether an early retirement incentive program unilaterally adopted and implemented by the Board is a mandatory subject of negotiations under the provisions of T.C.A. § 49-5-611(a) ²; and whether the Board violated the EPNA when it unilaterally adopted and implemented such a program during the course of negotiations between the Board and the Association regarding a new labor agreement. The Chancellor, sitting without a jury, found that the early retirement incentive program adopted by the Board was not a mandatory subject of negotiations under T.C.A. § 49-5-611(a), and thus concluded that the Board's unilateral action in adopting the program was "a valid and binding enactment." This appeal followed. We are asked to review the Chancellor's determinations.

I

In 1978, the General Assembly enacted the EPNA. Chapter No. 570, Public Acts of 1978. The caption sets forth the thrust of the Act:

... to provide for a framework of school board-professional employee negotiations by establishing uniform and orderly methods for recognition and negotiating between professional employee organizations and boards of education; establishing unlawful acts; and remedies for violation of the act.

Since its enactment, the EPNA has been amended ³ twice, but neither amendment is relevant to the issues before us. There are few reported appellate decisions construing the EPNA, and none which address the main subject of this litigation.

The Association is the exclusive representative of the Board's professional employees pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. § 49-5-606. ⁴ In early 1992, the Board and the Association were involved in negotiations regarding a new labor contract. During these negotiations, the Board presented ⁵ an early retirement incentive program to the Association's negotiators. The Board subsequently withdrew its incentive proposal. Negotiations continued during the remainder of 1992. In December, 1992, the Association asked for a mediator in accordance with T.C.A. § 49-5-613. ⁶

On March 8, 1993, while negotiations and mediation were ongoing, the Board, at its regular meeting and over the objection of the Association, adopted a "Voluntary Professional Retirement Incentive Program" (Program) which closely resembles the early retirement incentive program the Board had offered to the Association. The Program is an offer of a cash incentive to the current employees of the Board to induce them to retire. The only employees eligible for the Program are those "currently actively employed by the school system." In order to be eligible, an employee must have ten years of service in the Hamblen County School System and must either be age 55 or older by August 15 or have thirty or more years of experience credited as service under the Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System (TCRS). A teacher who wishes to accept the inducement to retire must notify the superintendent's office of that election by May 1 of the year in which that teacher expects to retire. Under the terms of the Program, such an employee will receive three cash payments of $3,000 each, paid in successive years, for a total cash inducement of $9,000 in exchange for the employee's decision to retire early. These payments are in addition to retirement benefits due under the TCRS. The Board may, at its discretion, discontinue or review the Program by the end of any year.

The Program was adopted by the Board pursuant to the authority granted in T.C.A. § 49-2-203(b)(9):

The local board of education shall have the power to:

* * * * * *

(9) Offer and pay a bonus or other monetary incentive to encourage the retirement of any teacher or other employee who is eligible to retire. For purposes of this subdivision, "local board of education" means the board of education of any county, municipal or special school system.

The authority ⁷ for such a program was incorporated into the powers and duties of local boards of education by Chapter 367 of the Public Acts of 1983.

The Association responded to the Board's unilateral action by filing a Complaint and application for temporary injunction in the trial court requesting declaratory and injunctive relief under the EPNA. The Association alleged that the Board's action was a failure to negotiate on a mandatory subject of negotiations and that such failure was an unlawful act under the EPNA. The trial court denied the Association's application for a temporary injunction. This matter was subsequently heard on its merits with the result indicated earlier in this Opinion.

II

Our review of this non-jury case is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption that the trial court's findings are correct, unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. Tenn.R.App.P. 13(d). No presumption attaches to the trial court's conclusions of law. Rainey v. Stansell, 836 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tenn.App.1992). Where, as here, the operative facts are not in dispute, the issue before us becomes a question of law for our determination. Tennessee Farmers Mut. v. American Mut., 840 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tenn.App.1992). In a de novo review, the parties are entitled to a re-examination of the whole matter of law and fact and this Court is required to render the judgment warranted by the law and evidence. Tenn.R.App.P. 36; Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tenn.App.1980); American Buildings Co. v. White, 640 S.W.2d 569, 576 (Tenn.App.1982).

Our first task in this review is to determine whether the Program adopted by the Board is a subject of mandatory negotiations under T.C.A. § 49-5-611(a). The following matters are subjects which must be negotiated by the parties in good faith:

Salaries or wages;

Grievance procedures;

Insurance;

Fringe benefits, but not to include pensions or retirement programs of the Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System;

Working conditions;

Leave;

Student discipline procedures;

Payroll deductions. (Emphasis added)

The Association argues that the Board's Program is a subject of mandatory negotiations because it is "salaries or wages" or "fringe benefits." The Board takes the position that the Program does not fall within either category, and argues that the legislative history of the EPNA demonstrates that a program such as the one at issue in this case is not included within the listed subjects of mandatory negotiations.

In the case of Carson Creek Vacation Resorts v. Dept. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn.1993), the Supreme Court set forth the most familiar of the many rules of statutory construction:

The most basic rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature. Worroll v. Kroger Co., 545 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn.1977). Legislative intent or purpose is to be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, without forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language. National Gas Distributors, Inc. v. State, 804 S.W.2d 66 (Tenn.1991). Where the language contained within the four corners of a statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous and the enactment is within legislative competency, "the duty of the courts is simple and obvious, namely, to say sic lex scripta, and obey it." Miller v. Childress, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 319 321-22 (1841).

Id. at 2. The same subject was addressed in Austin v. Memphis Pub. Co., 655 S.W.2d 146 (Tenn.1983):

The determination of the issue before us is controlled by the most basic and fundamental rule of statutory construction. It has been expressed in many ways over the years but has always conveyed the principle that the courts are restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used by the Legislature within the four corners of the statute, unless an ambiguity requires resort elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent. (Emphasis Added).

Id. at 148. See also Dunn v. Hackett, 833 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tenn.App.1992); Laymance v. Vaughn, 857 S.W.2d 36, 37 (Tenn.App.1992); West American Insurance Co. v. Montgomery, 861 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tenn.1993).

If a statute is unambiguous, legislative intent is to be determined from the face of the statute. Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, 865 S.W.2d at 2; James Cable Partners v. Jamestown, 818 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tenn.App.1991) ("... when a statute is unambiguous legislative intent can be ascertained from the face of the statute.") It is not for the courts to question the wisdom of a legislative enactment. We "must take statutes as [we] find them." Tennessee Mfr'd Housing v. Metro. Govt., 798 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tenn.App.1990).

We believe that the language of T.C.A. § 49-5-611(a) is "plain, clear, and unambiguous." See Carson Creek Vacation Resorts v. Dept. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d at 2. We do not agree with the Appellant's contention that we should resort to the federal National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) ⁸ for guidance. On the contrary, we believe that the words "salaries" and "wages" as those words are ordinarily used both have...