Tennessee Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville

• Decision Date: 24 August 1990
• Citation: 798 S.W.2d 254
• Parties: The TENNESSEE MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION and Billy Parker, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. The METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE and Davidson County, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 254

798 S.W.2d 254

The TENNESSEE MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION and Billy Parker, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. The METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE and Davidson County, Defendant/Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee Middle Section, at Nashville.

Aug. 24, 1990.

Published in Accordance with Tenn.Ct.App.R. 11.

George A. Dean, Parker, Lawrence, Cantrell & Dean, Nashville, for plaintiffs/appellants.

James L. Murphy, III, Metropolitan Legal Dept., Nashville, for defendant/appellee.

OPINION

KOCH, Judge.

This appeal involves a landowner's efforts to place a double-wide manufactured home on property zoned for single-family residences. After his application for a building permit was denied, the landowner and an advocacy group promoting manufactured housing filed an action in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a declaration that the city's prohibition against locating manufactured housing in residential districts violated state law and was unconstitutional. ¹ The trial court held that state law did not protect double-wide manufactured homes from exclusion from residential districts. The landowner and the advocacy group have appealed. We find that the state law protects double-wide manufactured homes. However, we also find that the zoning ordinance does not violate state law because it does not prohibit placing double-wide manufactured homes in residential districts.

I.

Billy Parker and his wife own a tract of land in Davidson County near Goodlettsville. In 1987, he purchased a manufactured home from Larry Dalton, intending to place it on his property and to use it as his residence. The home, commonly known as a "double-wide" manufactured home, consisted of two sections, each larger than eight feet wide and forty feet long with complete plumbing and electrical systems.

In July, 1987, Mr. Parker applied to the Metropolitan Department of Codes Administration for a building permit. The department considered his manufactured home to be a mobile home for the purposes of the zoning ordinance and declined to issue the permit because his property was located in an R-20 district ² where mobile homes were not permitted as a matter of right.

Mr. Parker requested the Metropolitan Council to rezone his property to an AR2a district because mobile homes could be located in these districts as a matter of right. ³ The Metropolitan Council turned down Mr. Parker's request even though Mr. Parker had obtained the approval of the planning commission.

Having no alternative, Mr. Parker and his wife placed their manufactured home in a trailer park. There they are required to pay rent on the space where their home is located. Relocating their home would cost between $3,000 and $5,000 because it is no longer readily transportable. However, the Parkers would move their home to their property if they could because they prefer living on their own property to living in a trailer park.

II.

The parties' dispute centers around their conflicting interpretations of Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-24-201 (1987), a statute enacted in 1980 ⁴ to prevent local zoning ordinances from excluding certain types of manufactured "residential dwellings" from residential districts. Mr. Parker asserts that his manufactured home was protected by Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-24-201 and could not, therefore, be excluded from an R-20 district. The city, on the other hand, insists that Mr. Parker's manufactured home was not protected by Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-24-201. Accordingly, we must decide whether a double-wide manufactured home is a structure entitled to Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-24-201's protection.

Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-24-201 provides:

Notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary, no power or authority granted by this Code to regulate zoning or land use planning shall be used to exclude the placement of a residential dwelling on land designated for residential use solely because the dwelling is partially or completely constructed in a manufacturing facility; provided, however, that the term "residential dwelling" as used in this part shall not apply to factory-manufactured mobile homes constructed as a single self-contained unit and mounted on a single chassis, and as further defined in § 68-36-202(2), (4), and (8), nor shall this chapter have any effect whatsoever upon any zoning or other regulations whether state or local concerning such factory-manufactured mobile homes as herein defined.

The sole purpose of construing statutes is to ascertain and to give the fullest possible effect to the General Assembly's intentions. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. King, 678 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tenn.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1075, 105 S.Ct. 1830, 85 L.Ed.2d 131 (1985); Brooks v. Fisher, 705 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985). Courts must take statutes as they find them, Watts v. Putnam County, 525 S.W.2d 488, 494 (Tenn.1975), and must construe them as a whole in light of their general purpose. Oliver v. King, 612 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tenn.1981).

Courts should also limit their consideration of an unambiguous statute to the words of the statute itself. Neff v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 704 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn.1986); Montgomery v. Hoskins, 222 Tenn. 45, 47, 432 S.W.2d 654, 655 (1968). In doing so, they should presume that the General Assembly chose its words carefully, Tidwell v. Servomation-Willoughby Co., 483 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Tenn.1972), and they should give these words their natural and ordinary meaning. State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517, 529 (Tenn.1985); Mercy v. Olsen, 672 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tenn.1984).

Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-24-201 does not afford protection to

"factory-manufactured mobile homes constructed as a single self-contained unit and mounted on a single chassis, and as further defined in § 68-36-202(2), (4), and (8)." ⁵

According to Mr. Parker's interpretation of these words, the exclusion does not apply to his double-wide manufactured home because it is not "constructed as a single self-contained unit and mounted on a single chassis." The city, on the contrary, insists that Mr. Parker's mobile home is excluded because it is a "manufactured home" as defined in Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-36-202(4).

The parties' differing interpretations of this exclusion are based on their differing interpretations of the "and" between "chassis" and "as." Under Mr. Parker's interpretation, it is conjunctive; under the city's, it is disjunctive. Thus, we are called upon to decide whether the General Assembly intended to exclude from Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-24-201's protection mobile homes constructed as a single, self-contained unit and mounted on a single chassis that fit within Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-36-202(4)'s definition of "manufactured home" or whether, in addition to mobile homes constructed as a single, self contained unit, the General Assembly intended to exempt all the structures coming within Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-36-202(4)'s definition of "manufactured home."

The rules of grammar and punctuation favor Mr. Parker's interpretation because "and" is a conjunctive article indicating that the portions of the sentence it connects should be construed together. See 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 241 (1974); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 335 (1953). However, the courts should not base their construction of statutes solely on the technical rules of grammar and punctuation. Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tenn.1975); Cavender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn, 471, 478, 239 S.W. 767, 769 (1922).

Since the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that the word "and" can be construed as a disjunctive article in order to give effect to the General Assembly's intent, City of Knoxville v. Gervin, 169 Tenn. 532, 541, 89 S.W.2d 348, 352 (1936), Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-24-201 provides some support for both Mr. Parker's and the city's interpretations. In this situation, we would be well advised to consult the statute's legislative history to ascertain the General Assembly's intent. University Computing Co. v. Olsen, 677 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tenn.1984); Chapman v. Sullivan County, 608 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tenn.1980); City of Oak Ridge v. Roane County, 563 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tenn.1978).

The House of Representatives discussed the language at issue in this case prior to the bill's final passage on March 17, 1980. During the debate, Representative David Copeland attempted to amend the bill to exclude "factory-manufactured mobile homes, all as defined in Chapter 48, Title 53, Tennessee Code Annotated." ⁶ He explained the purpose of his amendment as follows:

The bill that we have before us, though, goes further than what's really intended because the law does not adequately distinguish when it talks about pre-fabricated structures between mobile homes and modular homes. The only thing this amendment does is to cite the existing section of the law which defines what a mobile home is, what a recreational vehicle is, and says that those things can't be placed there despite the passage of this Act.

The effect of Representative Copeland's amendment would have been to exclude from the bill's protection all structures defined as a "manufactured home" in Tenn.Code Ann. 53-4822(2). ⁷

The bill's sponsor, Representative John Steinhauer, objected to Representative Copeland's amendment, claiming that it would "totally destroy the intent of the legislation." Thereafter, the following discussion ensued between Representatives Steinhauer and Copeland and another member of the House concerning the effect of Representative Copeland's amendment:

REP. WALLACE: ... When this bill passed through [the] State and Local Government [Committee], and what I think the intent of at least some of us in State and Local Government was, was to prevent the zoning out of modular homes, but we did not intend to allow what we normally think of as mobile homes to be ... located in a residential area. Now if your amendment passes, is it your belief that we will permit modular homes and that a zoning board can't outlaw modular homes but can still prevent mobile homes, as distinguished...