Ireland v. Tunis

• Decision Date: 13 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-CV-74931-DT.,94-CV-74931-DT.
• Citation: 893 F. Supp. 724
• Parties: Billie M. IRELAND, Plaintiff, v. Gary L. TUNIS, Richard Thompson, John Meiers and Richard D. Kuhn, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

893 F. Supp. 724

Billie M. IRELAND, Plaintiff, v. Gary L. TUNIS, Richard Thompson, John Meiers and Richard D. Kuhn, Defendants.

No. 94-CV-74931-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

July 13, 1995.

Frank Eaman, Harper Woods, MI, for plaintiff.

Thomas P. Vincent, Detroit, MI, John M. Skruyuski, Pontiac, MI, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT KUHN'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RULE 11 SANCTIONS

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Billie M. Ireland, Mayor of the City of Rochester Hills since 1985, brought this action against Defendants Gary L. Tunis, Richard Thompson, John Meiers, and Richard D. Kuhn on December 8, 1994. Defendants Tunis, Thompson and Meiers are, respectively, an Assistant Prosecuting Attorney for Oakland County, the Oakland County Prosecutor (an elected official), and an investigator for the Prosecutor's office. Defendant Richard D. Kuhn (also elected) is a Circuit Court Judge for Oakland County. Plaintiff brought her claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by all Defendants.

After submitting to a deposition, Defendant Kuhn filed motions for summary judgment and Rule 11 sanctions on April 25, 1995. Plaintiff responded on May 4, and Kuhn replied on June 5. Kuhn argues that he is protected from suit by absolute judicial immunity, and seeks dismissal of the claims against him. In addition, he asks this Court to impose sanctions, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, against Plaintiff and/or her attorney for Plaintiff's pursuit of an allegedly frivolous claim. After reviewing the papers filed by the parties and the arguments made by their counsel at a hearing held on June 20, 1995, the Court is now prepared to rule on Defendant Kuhn's motions. This memorandum opinion and order sets forth that ruling.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 5, 1993, Defendant Kuhn, who was at that time the Chief Judge of the Oakland County Circuit Court¹, signed an arrest warrant presented to him by Defendant Tunis. The supporting complaint accused Plaintiff, in essence, of a scheme to misappropriate public funds. The following day, Plaintiff surrendered to authorities. Subsequently, a Michigan district court judge found the warrant to have been issued without probable cause, and, after a preliminary hearing, dismissed all charges against Plaintiff. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Kuhn issued the warrant "in a non-judicial proceeding during which no finding was made as to probable cause ..." (Complaint, ¶ 23).

In his deposition, Kuhn indicated that he had no personal relationship with any of his co-defendants, and had no animus towards Plaintiff. When Defendant Tunis presented him with the complaint, he swore Tunis in and questioned him about the complaint's truthfulness. He then examined the complaint for probable cause, and concluded that it was present. No record was made of the proceeding.

Normally, in Michigan, arrest warrants are issued by district court judges. However, Kuhn testified that the Chief Judges of the Oakland County Circuit Court have a long-standing practice, of at least 20 years duration, of issuing arrest warrants (1) if no district court judge is available, (2) "if it was a political situation and they the prosecutor wanted to keep some confidentiality until it was done," (Kuhn Deposition, p. 8), and (3) if the alleged crimes occurred in more than one district. Kuhn testified that he had issued many warrants during his tenure as Chief Judge.

III. ANALYSIS

A. THE STANDARDS GOVERNING CONSIDERATION OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Three 1986 Supreme Court decisions — Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) — ushered in a "new era" in the standards of review for a summary judgment motion. These cases, in the aggregate, lowered the movant's burden on a summary judgment motion.² According to the Celotex Court:

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

After reviewing the above trilogy, the Sixth Circuit established a series of principles to be applied to motions for summary judgment:

* Cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment.

* The movant must meet the initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" as to an essential element of the non-movant's case.

* This burden may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.

* * * * * *

* The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."

* The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.

* The trial court has more discretion than in the "old era" in evaluating the respondent's evidence. The respondent must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Further, "where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent's claim is "implausible."

See Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir.1989) (footnotes with citations omitted). The Court will apply the above principles in deciding Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

B. DEFENDANT KUHN IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL IMMUNITY.

Judicial immunity attaches only to actions undertaken in a judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 544-45, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). In determining whether an action is "judicial," this Court must consider whether it is a "function normally performed by a judge." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1107, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). However, even if the action is judicial, immunity does not attach if it was taken in "`clear absence of all jurisdiction.'" Id. at 357, 98 S.Ct. at 1105 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)).

Issuance of an arrest warrant clearly is a "function normally performed by a judge." See Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417-18 (6th Cir.1988) (issuance of an arrest warrant, even when non-discretionary, is a judicial function). In spite of this, Plaintiff argues that Judge Kuhn's failure to follow proper procedures renders his issuance of the warrant against her a non-judicial act. Plaintiff relies, in part, on an Oregon case, Utley v. Independence, 240 Or. 384, 402 P.2d 91 (1965), in which the Oregon Supreme Court refused to extend judicial immunity to a part-time judge who had issued an arrest warrant in the absence of a sworn complaint. According to Plaintiff, at the time Judge Kuhn "signed this arrest warrant, he had no case pending in front of him in which the plaintiff was involved, no case in the circuit court was started as a result of the issuance of this warrant, and the warrant was not a ruling on any case pending in his court nor an order disposing of the rights of parties in any adversary matter." (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 13).

Plaintiff's argument that the circumstances surrounding Judge Kuhn's issuance of the warrant against her were improper goes more to the second component of the Stump test — whether or not Judge Kuhn had jurisdiction to issue the warrant. Analysis of the two components should not be confused. Whether a particular act is judicial in nature must be considered separately from the question of jurisdiction. Issuance of an arrest warrant is clearly a judicial act.

The closer question is whether or not Judge Kuhn was acting within his jurisdiction when he issued the warrant for the Plaintiff's arrest. Relying on Michigan case law and statutes, Plaintiff argues that he was not. In particular, Plaintiff directs the Court to People v. Farmilo, 137 Mich.App. 378, 358 N.W.2d 350 (1984). In Farmilo, the Oakland County Prosecutor appealed a decision of the Oakland County Circuit Court denying his request that the judge in that case hear witnesses swear to a complaint and issue an arrest warrant. The judge found "that jurisdiction rested with the district court to hear the complaint and issue a warrant." Id. 358 N.W.2d at 351.

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that, pursuant to M.C.L. § 600.8511(b), "district court magistrates are vested with jurisdiction to issue warrants for the arrest of a person upon the written authorization of the prosecuting or municipal attorney." Furthermore, M.C.L. § 600.8311(a) confers on district courts jurisdiction to try certain misdemeanor charges, and to conduct preliminary examinations for all other misdemeanors and felonies. Finally, the court noted that circuit court jurisdiction in criminal matters is limited:

Except in cases brought before the circuit court by indictment or appeal from a lower court, the jurisdiction of the circuit court in

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