Del., Lack., &C., Railroad Co. v. Napheys

• Decision Date: 05 May 1879
• Citation: 90 Pa. 135
• Parties: Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co. <I>versus</I> Napheys
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

90 Pa. 135

Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co. versus Napheys

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 2, 1879.

May 5, 1879.

April 2d 1879.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, WOODWARD, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ.

Error to the court of Common Pleas of Monroe county: Of July Term 1878. No. 149.

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William Davis, W. H. Jessup and Henry Green, for plaintiff in error.—The control of the defendant over the person and movements of the plaintiff ceased when the train reached its destination and the further act of leaving the car was that of the defendant alone. Their height of steps which general experience demonstrates as being safe and secure for persons to alight from, ought to be the criterion by which the rule of duty should be determined, as a railroad is only bound to give a reasonable opportunity to alight in safety: Fairmount and Arch Street Railway Co. v. Stutler, 4 P. F. Smith 375; Johnson v. West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad Co., 20 Id. 357; Empire Transportation Co. v. Wamsutta Oil Refining and Mining Co., 13 Id. 14; Meier v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 14 Id. 225; Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad Co. v. McClurg, 6 Id. 294.

The practical meaning of the instruction of the court was, that if all other human beings were able to descend from the steps of our car without fracturing a knee-cap, nevertheless if Mrs. Napheys was so constituted that she could not do so without that consequence happening, we were guilty of negligence. In other words, the test of our legal duty is the ability, or disability rather, of this one person. This was error: Railroad Co. v. McClurg, supra; Bogle v. Winslow, 5 Phila. 136; Tennery v. Pippinger, 1 Id. 543. A railroad company, in the performance of its duty, is not to be held to the impracticable, nor to results out of an ordinary or natural sequence: Tuller v. Talbot, 23 Ill. 357; Pittsburgh, Cinn. & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Thompson, 56 Id. 138: McGrew v. Stone, 3 P. F. Smith 441; Ford v. London and Southwest Railroad Co., 2 F. & F. 730; Le Barron v. East Boston Ferry Co., 11 Allen 312; Curtis v. Rochester & Syracuse Railway, 18 N. Y. 534: 2 Redfield on Railways 430; Frankford & Bristol Turnpike Co. v. Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Co., 4 P. F. Smith 345. We were entitled to an explicit answer to our point in regard to Mrs. Napheys's physical condition: Noble v. McClintock, 6 W. & S. 58; Carpenter v. Mayer, 5 Watts 483; Tenbrooke v. Jahke, 27 P. F. Smith 392; Hood v. Hood, 2 Grant 229. The evidence upon which this case was submitted was clearly insufficient and ought therefore to be rejected: Altwell v. Wilcox, 8 Haines 117; Lower v. Clement, 1 Casey 63; Silveus v. Porter, 24 P. F. Smith 448; Cauffman v. Long, 1 Norris 72; Smith v. Bank, 98 Mass. 605.

E. J. Fox and S. Holmes, for defendants in error.—The question is whether there was negligence in the construction of the platform. A railroad company is bound to provide safe and convenient places of ingress and egress to and from its trains: Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Zebe, 9 Casey 326: Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 11 Harris 149; McDonald v. C. & N. W. Railroad Co., 26 Iowa 124; Knight v. P. S. & P. Railroad Co., 56 Maine 234; Memphis & Charleston Railroad Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466; Sherman & Redfield on Negligence, sects. 275, 277: Wharton on Negligence, sect. 77; Hulbert v. New York Central Railroad Co. 40 N. Y. 145. The burden was on defendant to disprove negligence: Sullivan v. Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Co., 6 Casey 234. A sick or disabled person is entitled to more care than one in good health: Sheridan v. Brooklyn City and Newtown Railroad Co., 36 N. Y. 39; O'Mara v. Hudson River Railroad Co., 38 N. Y. 445. A passenger is entitled to the greatest possible care: The New World v. King, 16 Howard 469; Longmore v. Great Western Railway Co., 19 C. B. (N. S.) 183. An omission to charge upon a particular point, for which there was no request, cannot be assigned for error: Lilly v. Paschal, 2 S. & R. 394: Poorman v. Smith, Id. 464; Kean v. McLaughlin, Id. 469; Carothers v. Dunning, 3 Id. 373; Fisher v. Larick, 7 Id. 99; Morris v. Travis, Id. 220; Rahn v. McElrath, 6 Watts 151; Dennis v. Alexander, 3 Burr 50; Fisher v. Filbert, 6 Id. 61; Klein v. Franklin Insurance Co., 1 Harris 247; Davis v. Bigler, 12 P. F. Smith 242; Cooper v. Altimus, Id. 486.

A railway company using cars, the steps of which are elevated much above the ground, is undoubtedly bound to provide platforms upon which passengers may step, and which are long enough to accommodate all the cars of an ordinary train, so that a passenger in any car may easily reach the platform; Shear. & Red. on Neg., sect. 277; Foy v. L. B. & S. C. Railroad Co., 18 C. B. (N. S.) 225. See to same effect; Nicholson v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co., 3 Hurls. & Colt. 534; Burgess v. Great Western Railway Co., 6 C. B. (N. S.) 923; Jeffersonville, Madison & Ind. Railroad Co. v. Riley, Adm'x., 39 Ind. 569: Knight v. P. S. & P. Railroad Co., 56 Maine 234.

Mr. Justice STERRETT delivered the opinion of the court, May 5th 1879.

The claim of the defendants in error for damages in this case is based on an accident of rather extraordinary character. The train on which they were passengers arrived safely at its destination in daylight. The other passengers had left the car, and Mr. and Mrs. Napheys were the last to go out. He alighted first and assisted her down the steps from the front platform of the car. While her right foot rested on the lower step and just as her left touched the ground, her right pattella or knee-cap was fractured and she was thus suddenly disabled. The fracture was transverse and entirely across the bone. At the same place and under similar circumstances, thousands of passengers had before alighted from the cars in safety, and, so far as appears, without inconvenience; but it so happened that Mrs. Napheys unfortunately met with the singular accident which undoubtedly caused her a great deal of inconvenience and suffering. Whether the injury resulted wholly from the negligence of the railroad company, without any fault on her part, or whether it was one of those fortuitous events, against which in the exercise of reasonable and proper care it is impossible to guard, and for which neither party is to blame was the question to be determined by the jury; and while we think there was sufficient in the facts and circumstances disclosed by the testimony to justify their submission to the jury, it is not so clear that they would have reached the conclusion they did if it had not been for the instructions complained of in the fourth and fifth assignments of error. In the latter the jury were told that if Mrs. Napheys, without any negligence on her part, received an injury in descending from the car, the company was prima facie guilty of negligence, and the burthen of proof was on the defendant to show that it was not guilty. The fourth point was in substance the same, with the exception of assuming, as an uncontradicted fact, that there was no negligence on her part. This assumption of fact the learned judge refused to adopt, but...