GOLDRING & LYLES v. State

• Decision Date: 18 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 100,100
• Citation: 750 A.2d 1,358 Md. 490
• Parties: Wilmer Anthony GOLDRING and Clarence Lyles v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

750 A.2d 1

358 Md. 490

Wilmer Anthony GOLDRING and Clarence Lyles v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 100, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 18, 2000.

Claudia A. Cortese, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioners.

Gary E. Bair, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.

BELL, Chief Judge.

This is yet another case in which this Court is required to consider the proper sanction for violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1999 Repl.Vol.) Article 27, § 591¹ and Maryland Rule 4-271.² In this case, it is contended by Wilmer Anthony Goldring and Clarence Lyles, the petitioners, that the continuance that resulted in a trial date beyond the 180 day period prescribed by the statute and the rule, was not properly granted because the trial judge who granted it had been improperly designated by the county administrative judge, and thus was not authorized to do so. Judge Henderson, one of the three Charles County judges expressly designated to grant postponements of the Circuit Court trial dates, rejected the respondent's challenge, concluding that there was good cause for the continuance and that when that is the case, "[a]nyone can grant a continuance." The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, in an unreported opinion. Having granted the petitioners' petition for writ of certiorari to address this important issue, Goldring v. State, 356 Md. 495, 740 A.2d 612 (1999), we shall reverse.

I

Article 27, § 591 and Maryland Rule 4-271 "codify and implement the chief legislative objective that `there should be a prompt disposition of criminal charges in the circuit courts.'" Dorsey v. State, 349 Md. 688, 700, 709 A.2d 1244, 1249 (1998), quoting State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356, on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334, 403 A.2d 368, 369 (1979). We have explained the rationale for their operation:

"Consistent with, and to facilitate the achievement of, their objective, both § 591 and Rule 4-271, `set forth a definite time requirement for the trial of criminal cases and an explicit procedure for postponing a case beyond the 180-day limit.' [Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 109, 442 A.2d 550, 556 (1982)]. Both mandate that a criminal defendant must be brought to trial within 180 days after the earlier of the arraignment of the defendant or the appearance of defense counsel. In the event that a defendant cannot be brought to trial within 180 days, the county administrative judge or his designee must make a finding of good cause justifying the postponement of the trial date beyond the prescribed time limit. Accordingly, postponements that cause the scheduling of a criminal trial beyond the 180 day period must be granted by the county administrative judge or his designee and must be supported by good cause. State v. Brown, 307 Md. 651, 657-58, 516 A.2d 965, 968 (1986). `Neither the accused nor the prosecution nor the trial court are empowered to dispense with the mandates of § 591 and Rule [4-271].' Id. Hence, we have determined that the mechanism established by the statute and the rule meet the intended objectives as it affords reasonably prompt trials, and eliminates excessive scheduling delays and unjustifiable postponements. See id.; Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 41, 472 A.2d 452, 456 (1984). Additionally, the mechanism of the Hicks Rule serves as a means of protecting society's interest in the efficient administration of justice. The actual or apparent benefits of § 591 and Rule 4-271 confer upon criminal defendants are purely incidental. See Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1, 11-12, 472 A.2d 436 (1984); Curley v. State, 299 Md. 449, 460, 474 A.2d 502 (1984); [State v.] Frazier, 298 Md. [422,]456, 470 A.2d [1269,] 1286-87 [ (1984) ]; Marks v. State, 84 Md.App. 269, 277, 578 A.2d 828, 832 (1990)."

Dorsey, 349 Md. 688, 701, 709 A.2d 1244, 1250 (1998).

As we have seen, both the statute and the rule require a finding of good cause by the county administrative judge, or that judge's designee, to change the Circuit Court trial date. In implementation of the statute and the rule, Maryland Rule 16-101.d.3 (ii) prohibits a county administrative judge from authorizing more than one judge at a time to postpone the trial date of cases originating in the Circuit Court.³ Despite this prohibition, the Charles County Administrative judge, by Administrative Order No. 97-1, applicable during the times at issue in this case,⁴ designated all of the other Charles County Circuit Court judges, three in number, as well as "any other judge assigned to sit in the stead of any of them," for the purpose of changing Circuit Court trial dates.

Their cases previously having been consolidated for trial, the petitioners and their co-defendant, a Mr. Heard, appeared for trial on September 9, 1997. Mr. Heard's counsel was ill and thus unavailable. The cases were continued over the petitioners' objection, not by the Administrative judge, but by Judge Henderson, who had been designated along with all of the other Charles County judges for that purpose. Judge Henderson found in each case that the "unfortunate illness of one of the defense counsel," coupled with its order consolidating the cases, to be "good cause" for the continuance. The cases were rescheduled for November 17, 1997.

On that date, the petitioners moved to dismiss the charges against them. The basis for the motion was their contention that the continuance was granted in violation of § 591 and Rule 4-271. They argued that, because he was not the only Charles County judge designated by the county administrative judge to grant continuances, Judge Henderson "did not have authority to act as the administrative judge's designee and grant a continuance for purposes of Rule 4-271 and § 591" and, thus, the continuance he granted was invalid. Rejecting the petitioners' argument, Judge Henderson concluded, relying on the Court of Special Appeals' decision in State v. Dorsey, 114 Md.App. 678, 691 A.2d 730 (1997),aff'd on other grounds,349 Md. 688, 709 A.2d 1244 (1998), that when there is good cause for continuance, "[a]nyone can grant a continuance." He also found "(a), I had the authority to continue the case, (b) we were missing an attorney, and (c), it really doesn't matter because there was good cause to continue it from September 9, so we are going to deny the motion."

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court, but on somewhat different grounds. To be sure, the intermediate appellate court did not condone the practice of designating all of the Circuit Court judges in a County for the purpose of changing trial dates and it did suggest that dismissal may not be the proper sanction for such a violation. But that was not the basis for its decision. Although not raised by the State, the Court of Special Appeals held that the petitioners waived their argument that Judge Henderson did not have the authority, even for good cause, to grant the continuance which postponed the case beyond the 180 day limit. In support of that holding, it noted its careful review of the transcript of the September 9, 1997 hearing and its "conclu[sion] that violation of Rule 16-101.d.3 (ii), the precise ground on which appellants subsequently sought to rely, both prior to trial, at sentencing, and on appeal, was not raised at that time and, thus, was waived." The court explained:

"[T]he purpose to be served by requiring a party to bring fully and fairly their position to the trial court is so that the trial court can pass upon and possibly correct any error or irregularity in the proceedings.... In this case, if expressly confronted with the Rule 16-101.d.3 (ii) requirement, the trial court at least would have had the opportunity to advise the County Administrative Judge of the situation and perhaps resolved the matter. By not raising the issue until trial on the date agreed to at the critical Hicks hearing, the opportunity for compliance was lost. Although the trial court later determined that his actions as a designee of the County Administrative Judge was appropriate, this after-the-fact determination was made when the Hicks calendar could not be turned back. An after-the-fact argument does not promote fairness or the orderly administration of the law." (Citation omitted)

II

The petitioners argue that, to preserve the matter for appellate review, it is not necessary that an objection to the authority of the judge to postpone their trial date past the 180 day period prescribed by § 591 and Rule 4-271 be made at the time the postponement is granted. Stated differently, they maintain that those provisions of the statute and the Rule requiring postponements to be granted by the County Administrative judge or his designee may not be waived. They rely on State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984), State v. Brown, 307 Md. 651, 516 A.2d 965 (1986) and Dorsey, supra. They are correct.

It is well settled that the requirements of § 591 and Rule 4-271 are mandatory. Hicks, 285 Md. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360. ("The provisions of Rule 746 are of mandatory application, binding upon the prosecution and defense alike; they are not mere guides or bench marks to be observed, if convenient."). Their interpretation does not relate to the fact-finding determination of whether a defendant did the act, but, like an exclusionary rule, is a prophylactic measure designed to insure compliance with the requirements imposed on the State regarding prompt trials of criminal cases. Id. at 337, 403 A.2d at 370. Thus, the applicability of § 591 and Rule 4-271 simply does not depend upon the action or inaction of the defendant. In one of the cases decided with Frazier, in addition to arguing full compliance with the statute and the Rule, the State placed some reliance on the defense...