Goins v. State
Decision Date | 22 March 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 33,33 |
Citation | 293 Md. 97,442 A.2d 550 |
Parties | Henry Joseph GOINS v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Gary W. Christopher, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
Maureen O. Gardner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, * ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON and RODOWSKY, JJ.
Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 591, implemented by Maryland Rule 746, requires that in a circuit court criminal case, a trial date shall be set which shall not be later than 180 days after the appearance or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of the defendant pursuant to Rule 723. The statute further provides that "(t)he date established for the trial of the matter shall not be postponed except for good cause shown by the moving party ...." 1 Furthermore, the change in trial date must be made by or approved by the county administrative judge or a judge designated by him. 2
In State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356, on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334, 403 A.2d 368 (1979), this Court held that the 180-day 3 time limit for trying a case was mandatory, and that where the case is not tried within such period, and where there is no postponement of the trial date complying with the requirements of § 591 and Rule 746, "dismissal of the criminal charges is the appropriate sanction," 285 Md. at 318, 403 A.2d 356. The Court in Hicks further held that there was one circumstance where dismissal of the criminal charges would not be the appropriate sanction for a violation of the 180-day time limit for trying a case. That circumstance "is where the defendant, either individually or by his attorney, seeks or expressly consents to a trial date in violation of Rule 746." Id. at 335, 403 A.2d 368.
In the present case, the defendant's trial commenced more than 180 days from the appearance of his counsel in the circuit court. The question to be decided is whether the criminal charges should have been dismissed under Art. 27, § 591, and Rule 746, as applied in Hicks v. State, supra. In light of the issue before us, the relevant facts concern the procedural history of the case rather than the alleged offenses.
On October 2, 1979, a ten-count criminal information was filed in the Circuit Court for Howard County charging the defendant, Henry Joseph Goins, with first degree rape, second degree rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, robbery, unlawful carrying of a handgun, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, theft, battery and assault. 4 On the same day, the appearance of counsel was entered. Consequently, the 180-day period for trying the case would expire on March 31, 1980.
Two days after the information was filed, on October 4, 1979, Goins, by his attorney, filed a petition for a reverse waiver to the juvenile court, alleging that he was 17 years of age, that he had never previously been convicted of a crime or adjudicated a delinquent, that, therefore, he had never received the benefit of juvenile rehabilitation programs, and that a transfer to the juvenile court would be in his interest and in the interest of society. Thereafter, the circuit court ordered the Juvenile Services Administration to conduct a waiver investigation and file a report with the court. Before the report was filed, the assignment office of the circuit court notified the parties on October 29, 1979, that the case was scheduled for trial on January 21, 1980.
The report from the Juvenile Services Administration was filed on November 23, 1979, and an addendum was filed on November 27, 1979. On November 30, 1979, the circuit court held a hearing on the reverse waiver petition, and at the conclusion of the hearing the court indicated that the petition would be denied. By a written opinion and order dated December 10, 1979, and filed on December 11, 1979, the court denied the petition to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court. Also on December 11th, upon the State's motion, the trial date was moved from January 21, 1980, to January 30, 1980.
Just two days after the entry of the written order denying the requested transfer to juvenile court, on December 13, 1979, Goins by his attorney filed a plea interposing the defense of insanity. The circuit court, by written order of the county administrative judge filed on December 21, 1979, directed that the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene perform a medical examination of Goins with particular reference to his present mental condition and his mental condition at the time of the alleged offense. The circuit court's order required that the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene submit a report to the court "before 8 February, 1980, pursuant to the provisions of § 26, Art. 59 of the Annotated Code of Md." 5 Although this order of the administrative judge necessarily postponed the previously scheduled January 30th trial date, the order itself made no express reference to the trial date.
Next, on January 25, 1980, the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene sent a letter to the court requesting a sixty-day extension to examine the defendant and submit a report. The county administrative judge, on January 29, 1980, signed an "amended" order which stated as follows:
The amended order, like the earlier order of December 21, 1979, made no express reference to the trial date in the case. Nevertheless, by extending the time beyond March 31, 1980, for the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to furnish its report on the defendant's mental condition, the amended order necessarily had the effect of postponing the trial date beyond the 180-day limit prescribed by § 591 and Rule 746.
The report on the defendant's mental condition from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene was received by the court on April 10, 1980, and the trial began four days later, on April 14, 1980. This was two weeks beyond the 180-day period set forth in § 591 and Rule 746.
Following extensive argument, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court (Nissel, J.). Because Clifton T. Perkins Hospital is part of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, a state agency, the trial judge viewed the January 25th letter from the hospital requesting an extension for filing its report as a motion by a party, i.e. the State, to postpone the trial date. In addition, the trial judge viewed the county administrative judge's order extending the time until April 8, 1980, for filing the hospital report as an order postponing the trial date. Finally, the trial court held that the administrative judge's order granting the extension was based upon extraordinary cause. Consequently, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that Art. 27, § 591 and Rule 746 were fully complied with.
The trial of the case proceeded, and the defendant Goins was found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twelve years on the first count (first degree rape), twelve years on the third count (kidnapping), twelve years on the fourth count (armed robbery) and five years on the seventh count (use of a handgun in the commission of a felony). There were no sentences imposed upon the remaining counts because of the doctrine of merger.
The defendant appealed, raising only the contention that the charges should have been dismissed under Art. 27, § 591, and Rule 746, as applied in State v. Hicks, supra. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, although for different reasons than the trial court. Goins v. State, 48 Md.App. 115, 425 A.2d 1374 (1981). Initially, the Court of Special Appeals stated "that it was his (the defendant's) own dereliction in allowing 72 days to lapse before filing his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity that was the effective cause for not meeting the projected January 1980 trial date that was well within the 180-day guideline." 48 Md.App. at 116, 425 A.2d 1374. Quoting from State v. Hicks, supra, 285 Md. at 310, 403 A.2d 356, the intermediate appellate court went on to say that it would " 'be entirely inappropriate for the defendant to gain advantage...
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