Robertson v. Police & Firemen's Pension Plan of Joplin

• Decision Date: 05 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. SD 32475.,SD 32475.
• Citation: 442 S.W.3d 60
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: Tom M. ROBERTSON, IAFF Local 2618, Adam Grines, Larin Trenary, and Daniel Jobe, Plaintiffs–Respondents, v. POLICE AND FIREMEN'S PENSION PLAN OF CITY OF JOPLIN, Trustees of Police and Firemen's Pension Plan of City of Joplin, and City of Joplin, Missouri, Defendants–Appellants.

442 S.W.3d 60

Tom M. ROBERTSON, IAFF Local 2618, Adam Grines, Larin Trenary, and Daniel Jobe, Plaintiffs–Respondents

v.POLICE AND FIREMEN'S PENSION PLAN OF CITY OF JOPLIN, Trustees of Police and Firemen's Pension Plan of City of Joplin, and City of Joplin, Missouri, Defendants–Appellants.

No. SD 32475.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

Feb. 5, 2014.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Feb. 27, 2014.

Application for Transfer Denied April 29, 2014.

Tyler Strodtman, Joplin MO, for Appellant.

Daniel G. Tobben and Kara D. Helmuth, St. Louis, MO, for Respondent.

Opinion

DON E. BURRELL, J.

This case is an appeal from an amended judgment (“the judgment”) entered by the circuit court after its review of the decision of an administrative agency under the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act (“MAPA”).See section 536.010 et. seq.¹ The issue in dispute is the appropriate calculation of retirement benefits due certain Joplin firefighters who suffer a job-related or “duty” disability under Joplin's city ordinance providing a retirement plan for police officers and firefighters.² Defendants Police and Firemen's Pension Plan of Joplin (“the Plan”), Trustees of Police and Firemen's Pension Plan of City of Joplin (“the Board”), and the city of Joplin (“City”) appeal the judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Tom M. Robertson, IAFF Local 2618, Adam Grimes, Larin Trenary, and Daniel Jobe on Count I of Plaintiffs' amended petition (“the petition”).

The judgment reversed the Board's determination of Robertson's pension benefit, declaring that the Plan provides that a duty disability pension benefit “is a 50% benefit[.]” In accordance with that declaration, the judgment ordered that Robertson be paid $10,978.43 for “past due duty disability benefits[,]” plus accrued interest, and “that Joplin firefighters who become disabled in the line of duty shall receive a benefit equal to 50% of their salary as calculated in accordance with the formula in the pension ordinances, but not reduced based upon years of service less than 20[.]” The Board had awarded Robertson a lower benefit amount—37.5% of his “average monthly compensation”—by reducing the benefit for years of service less than 20.

Defendants present four points of alleged error: (1) the circuit court erroneously applied the law in that “the plain and ordinary meaning of the [P]lan's language cannot reasonably be interpreted as granting an employee 50% of his average monthly compensation without an adjustment based upon years of service”; (2) alternatively, the circuit court “erroneously applied the law” in finding the Plan's language unambiguous because it “can reasonably be interpreted as requiring a reduction in duty-disability benefits for employees who have served fewer than twenty years”; (3) the circuit court “misapplied the law ... in the [P]lan and [MAPA]” by not “defer[ring] to the Board's reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous provision”; and (4) the circuit court erred in denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count III because substantial evidence “does not support a finding that the Board has violated section 5.08 of [City's] charter.”

We agree that the Plan language at issue is unambiguous, but we must reverse the judgment because that unambiguous language provides that a duty disability benefit is equal to 50% of the employee's salary reduced 1/20th for each year of service less than 20.

Background

Robertson had been a City firefighter for 15 years and 11 months as of January 2011, when he was injured while on duty. He was thereafter declared disabled, and the Board awarded him “$1,448.80 as a monthly duty-disability benefit award ... which represents 37.5% of his Average Monthly Compensation.”³ In calculating the benefit, the Board “appl[ied] a reduction of benefits clause, based upon Section 3.1 of the Plan.” We set forth and review the text of the applicable sections of the Plan in the analysis portion of our opinion, infra.

The Board is composed of City's mayor, two citizens of City, two “actively employed Covered Employees of the Police Department, ... and ... [two] actively employed Covered Employees of the Fire Department[.]” The Ordinance provides that the police officer and firefighter members are to be elected by a majority vote of their respective departments. The Board “may, at any time, recommend that the Plan be amended for any reason.” Any amendment to the Plan must be “approv[ed] by the Participants^{[ 4 ]} (by majority vote of those voting with respect to the amendment), and final ratification by the City Council.”

Count I of the petition sought a declaration that “Robertson is entitled to a 50% benefit, which would result in a monthly payment to [him] of $1,931.74 [,]” that Robertson be awarded a judgment for unpaid benefits, and that the circuit court declare “that firefighters who become disabled in the line of duty shall receive a benefit equal to 50% of their salary” which is “not reduced based upon years of service less than 20[.]” Count II of the petition was stated in the alternative to Count I, and it sought a determination of benefits based upon 15 years and 11 months of service as opposed to 15 years of service.

Count III of the petition sought a declaration that Defendants' interpretation of the Plan was invalid as it violated City's charter, and it sought damages for City's “wrongful actions[.]” Counts IV and V sought declarations that City had violated Robertson's contractual rights under, respectively, article VI, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, and sought damages for said violations.

Count IV further averred that there was a 1993 vote on the Plan that “changed the duty disability provisions from those previously existing and as described in all the actuarial valuation reports to the position that has now been advocated by [City's attorney] to the [Board]” and if such an interpretation is correct, then there would be “an interference with [Robertson]'s constitutionally protected contractual rights to his proper pension benefits.” Count V incorporated this additional allegation and further contended that City was acting as a state actor for purposes of Title 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

Plaintiffs and Defendants each sought summary judgment on counts I and III, and Robertson sought “summary judgment on liability only on [c]ounts IV and V [.]” After the filing of statements of uncontroverted facts and responses thereto, the parties argued their positions to the circuit court, and their counsel agreed that there were no disputed facts. In their earlier proceedings before the Board, the parties had agreed “that only legal issues were present, and that there was no need for an evidentiary hearing before the [Board], but the matter would be decided as a matter of law following presentations to the Board by legal counsel.”

Both sides argued in their pleadings that the terms of the Plan were unambiguous, but they differed as to whether section 3.1(A)(1)(b) controlled the determination of Robertson's duty disability retirement benefits. Relying on section 5.1(B) of the Plan, Robertson claimed that duty-disabled retirees were “entitled to receive a duty-disability benefit equal to 100% of their normal retirement benefit without any reduction in benefits based upon years of service.” Plaintiffs argued that their position was “further bolstered” by comparing section 5.1(B)'s provision “for duty disability benefits to the language for the calculation of non-duty disability benefits under [section] 5.2(B)” because “[a]ny other interpretation ... renders no difference in the amount of benefits for a participant who suffered a duty disability versus a non-duty disability.”

In the judgment, the circuit court found that the Plan was “not ambiguous, is clear, and can be interpreted as a matter of law without reference to outside facts and without reference to other documents.” It entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on Count I, and it found counts II and III to be moot as a result of its resolution of Count I. The circuit court did not decide counts IV and V “given the Declaratory Judgment awarded regarding Count I.” This appeal timely followed the entry of the judgment.

A preliminary matter regarding appellate jurisdiction

“Rule 74.01(b)^{[ 5 ]} permits the circuit court to designate a final judgment ‘as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.’ ” Duncan v. Missouri Alliance for Children & Families, 387 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Mo.App.W.D.2012). The trial court made that express determination here, but “[t]his court must independently decide whether the judgment certified under Rule 74.01 actually qualifies as a final judgment for purposes of appeal.” Id. The trial court's “designation is effective only when the order disposes of a distinct ‘judicial unit.’ ” First Cmty. Credit Union v. Levison, 395 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Mo.App.E.D.2013) (quoting Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. banc 1997) ).

Here, the circuit court found that there was “no just reason for delay” and certified the judgment as final for purposes of appeal pursuant to Rule 74.01(b). In support of its certification, the trial court found, inter alia, that

c. The Court's judgment was based solely upon the language of the [Plan] and no extrinsic evidence was considered.

....

e. The only claims remaining for the court's consideration are Counts IV and V which allege [Robertson] has suffered an unconstitutional impairment of his contractual rights under the federal and state constitutions.

....

h. Determination of the constitutional claims will require consideration of additional facts which the Court has not yet considered including whether [Robertson] had a contractual right that is protected by the federal and state constitutions, and if so, whether and to what extent Defendants have impaired this

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