Perkins v. Bd. of Dirs. of the Indep. Sch. Dist. of W. Des Moines

• Decision Date: 20 June 1880
• Citation: 56 Iowa 476,9 N.W. 356
• Parties: PERKINS, BY HIS NEXT FRIEND, v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT OF WEST DES MOINES.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

56 Iowa 476

9 N.W. 356

PERKINS, BY HIS NEXT FRIEND,

v.BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT OF WEST DES MOINES.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed June 20, 1880.

Appeal from Polk circuit court.

Mandamus to compel defendants to admit plaintiff into the public school of their district. A demurrer to plaintiff's petition was sustained and judgment rendered for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.Barcroft & McCaughan, for appellant.

Brown & Dudley, for appellees.

BECK, J.

The petition alleges that the plaintiff is a minor, of the age of 12 years, and resides within the bounds of the school district of which defendants are directors; that, under the law, he has a right to attend defendants' school, and did so attend until the superintendent, in obedience to an order of defendants, refused him admittance thereto; and that he is a person of good moral character, and has not been guilty of gross immorality nor of the persistent violation of any rule of the school. The petition shows that plaintiff was expelled from the school upon the following grounds:

1. “That on or about the twentieth day of September, 1880, while he, in company with other pupils of said school, was engaged in playing ball, at a proper time, in the neighborhood of said school-house, he unintentionally and by accident batted a ball through one of the windows of the school-house, breaking a glass of the value of about three dollars; that the defendants had made a rule as follows: ‘Scholars who shall be guilty of defacing or injuring any school property shall be required to pay for all damages. Notice of such damage shall be sent to the parents or guardians of the pupil, and, in default of payment, the case shall be reported to the president of the board, who may proceed with it according to law. Scholars thus reported to the president shall not afterwards be allowed to attend until payment of damages shall have been made, or the case otherwise adjusted;’ that in pursuance of such rule, payment of said damages was demanded, and notice thereof sent to plaintiff's parents, but plaintiff says that he is a child without means, and unable to earn means to pay such damage, and as a minor is not legally bound to pay the same; that his parents refused to pay for said glass; and that for such non-payment, and for no other cause or excuse, or pretence of cause, the said Parish [the superintendent of the school] refused, and refuses, him admittance to said school, and the defendants ratified his refusal, and have directed him, as aforesaid, not to admit plaintiff into said school until the payment of such damage.” The plaintiff alleges that defendants have no authority to enforce the rules under which he was excluded from the school, and that the action of the defendants in expelling him is unjust and oppressive, and in violation of his rights. To the petition defendants demurred on the grounds (1) that the court has no jurisdiction of the cause of action set out in the petition, the law creating a special tribunal to which plaintiff should appeal from the action of the board of directors; (2) the facts stated in the petition do not show the rule under which plaintiff was expelled from school to be unreasonable or unlawful, and in excess of the authority of the defendants in the government of the school.

2. We shall first inquire whether the circuit court has jurisdiction of this action. The statute provides that any person aggrieved by any order or decisionof the directors of a school district may appeal to the county superintendent, and from him an appeal may be prosecuted to the superintendent of public instruction. Code, §§ 1829, 1835. We need not inquire to what class of cases, wherein the directors may make decisions and orders, appeals to the county superintendent are limited. That they are limited is very plain. It cannot be held that decisions and orders refusing the allowance and payment of claims against the district, or construing contracts, or affecting the possession of or right to property, when the interest of a citizen is affected thereby, may not be questioned except upon appeal. That many such decisions and orders cannot be reviewed under the statutes quoted, upon appeal, must be conceded. It is not necessary to inquire just what class may be appealed to the county superintendent, and in what cases original actions may be prosecuted in the courts. It is very plain that in one class of cases appeals are not the exclusive remedy for reviewing or assailing the decisions and orders of the school directors.

This class includes all cases wherein the jurisdiction and power of the directors are brought in question, and wherein questions arise involving the construction of statutes conferring power upon school officers. The courts of the state are the arbiters of all questions involving the construction of the statutes conferring authority upon officers and jurisdiction upon special tribunals. It was certainly never the intention of the legislature to confer upon school boards, superintendents of schools, or other officers discharging quasi judicial functions, exclusive authority to decide questions pertaining to their jurisdiction and the extent of their power. All such questions may be determined in the courts of the state. Hence, when the rights of a citizen are involved in the exercise of authority by a school officer, the...