Lee v. Hoffman
| Decision Date | 05 March 1918 |
| Docket Number | No. 32325.,32325. |
| Citation | 166 N.W. 565,182 Iowa 1216 |
| Parties | LEE ET AL. v. HOFFMAN ET AL. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Lawrence De Graff, Judge.
The plaintiffs and others in the same class, and all minors, were by the defendants excluded from the benefits of a public school under a rule adopted by the defendant board. A petition seeking a mandatory order to restore the plaintiffs to admission in said schools was dismissed, and the plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.O. M. Brockett, of Des Moines, for appellants.
Stipp, Perry, Bannister & Starzinger, of Des Moines, for appellees.
I. The argument of appellant assumes that legislative enactments are open to every objection that may be made to a mere rule or to an ordinance. And, in support of attack upon the statute upon which appellees rely for authority to do what they did, appellant refers us to cases which nullify mere rules and ordinances and to general language in these cases which, broad as it is, must still be limited to rules and ordinances. See Yick v. Hopkinds, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220;Bear v. City, 147 Iowa, 341, 126 N. W. 324, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1150;Lumber Co. v. Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 L. R. A. 696, 68 Am. St. Rep. 155;City v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112, 28 N. E. 312, 13 L. R. A. 587, 28 Am. St. Rep. 180;State v. White, 82 Ind. 286, 42 Am. Rep. 496.
[1] Some objections good as to ordinances or rules are not valid objections to a statute. Wherefore we will at this time deal with the objections made by appellant as though they were addressed to the statute alone. This eliminates two objections often lodged against ordinances or rules, to wit, that grant from the Legislature is lacking, and mere unreasonableness. An ordinance or a rule may be void because the Legislature has not authorized it. Manifestly, every statute is authorized by the Legislature; and no statute is invalid because no other statute grants power to enact it. Again, no legislative enactment is void merely because it is unreasonable. It is a universal rule that unreasonableness in a statute is of no importance except on the question of what was intended by the Legislature; that if there is no room for construction the law is what the act says, no matter how unreasonable that is. The remedy is not to substitute what the courts deem reasonable, but an appeal to the Legislature. That a law is unreasonable merely does not make it unconstitutional.
II. Appellants contend that the statutes in question are invalid because they delegate certain powers. It is true they do in a sense delegate both legislative and judicial power, and we think that this is permissible. As far back as Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat, 1, 6 L. Ed. 253, Chief Justice Marshall said that Congress can delegate “what powers it may rightfully exercise itself”; and grants of legislative power to municipal corporations and administrative boards have uniformly been sustained. See Martin v. Witherspoon, 135 Mass. 175;Sabre v. Railway, 86 Vt. 347, 85 Atl. 694, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1269;State v. Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37, 120 Pac. 861, L. R. A. 1915C, 287, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 78; Denney's Case, 143 Iowa, at 474, 121 N. W. 1066; Re Stockyards, 149 Iowa, 5, 11, 127 N. W. 1102. Acts have been upheld which authorized medical boards to refuse or revoke certificates of qualification for certain causes. France v. State, 57 Ohio St. 1, 47 N. E. 1041. It is competent for the Legislature to delegate to a county auditor the power to determine the character of the security to be given for damages resulting from the taking of private property for drainage purposes. Sisson v. Supervisors, 128 Iowa, 443, 104 N. W. 454, 70 L. R. A. 440.
If there be involved a delegation of judicial power, such delegation will not avoid the statute. See Re Stockyards, 149 Iowa, 5, 11, 127 N. W. 1102;State v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98, 5 N. E. 228;Hunter v. Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 310, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803;State v. Railway, 85 Iowa, 516, 52 N. W. 490;State v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 437, 132 Pac. 755; Re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 17 Sup. Ct. 444, 41 L. Ed. 813;Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367, 51 L. Ed. 523;President v. U. S., 216 U. S. 177, 30 Sup. Ct. 356, 54 L. Ed. 435.
[2] We gather the complaint is, not that either legislative or judicial powers or both are delegated, but that the delegation is arbitrary and unregulated. For instance, it is said there is an attempt to delegate arbitrary and unregulated discretion to school boards to determine whether or not the youths who are members of certain fraternities or societies shall be admitted to the privileges and benefits of public schools; that as to any who are already admitted these statutes give unregulated and unlimited power to determine which of them having such associations shall be retained and which excluded, and because unregulated, undefined, and unlimited discretion is given to sanction or refuse to sanction certain sororities or associations. The statutes in question are section 2782a, Code Supplement 1913, as amended by Act of the 37th General Assembly. The powers delegated are not “blanket powers.” The right to act at all is limited (a) to those who are pupils; (b) to pupils who become members of or solicit other pupils to become members of any fraternity or society wholly or partially formed from pupils, or to take any part in the organization or formation of any such society; (c) to determining whether the inhibition may be waived as to some societies or associations; (d) to enforce the statutes by the adoption of rules and regulations carrying penalties which the statutes specifically describe; (e) they provide for an investigation and that the penalty shall be inflicted only after such investigation has satisfied a majority of the directors that the statute has been violated.
Whatever objection there may be to this, it is not that it is an unbridled delegation. It could not well be more specific without making it unnecessary to delegate at all. If the Legislature has power to delegate, then, of necessity, it has power to leave to others the details to effectuate the declared legislative policy. As said, if this be not so, the Legislature could do nothing but make the rules and prescribe each step to be taken. On this theory it can delegate, provided it delegates nothing.
It is true these statutes also contain broad provisions giving the board full power and authority to make, adopt, and modify all rules and regulations which in their judgment and discretion may be necessary for the proper governing of the school, and they authorize punishment for violation of any such rule. But this general language must be limited by the entire scope and purpose of the enactment, which is, not to deal with all possible rules, but with rules to enforce the provisions of these statutes. Be that as it may, nothing but an enforcement of rules in aid of these statutes is complained of. It will be time to deal with the validity of the broader provisions in these statutes when there shall be before us an attempt to enforce some rules authorized by these provisions only. We shall have occasion to speak later to what the attitude of the courts should be where unconstitutionality is asserted because of something that might be done.
[3] III. One complaint is that the statute works an arbitrary differentiation and discrimination--is arbitrary class legislation--because it authorizes exclusion for such affiliation. The argument is that there is an arbitrary grouping, in that pupils who belong to no such societies, and those that affiliate with them on sanction, are the only ones who retain the privilege of school. We do not think that such a classification constitutes inhibited “class legislation.” The statute avoids all that constitutes such legislation. It puts all who are of the class to be affected into that class. It includes no one therein who should not be. It deals with none save enrolled pupils. Only such pupils need the sanction of the board to affiliate with these societies. All of them need it. It attempts no distinctions between those who are affected. It makes no arbitrary distinctions, say, that pupils having red hair or those of English parentage may affiliate without obtaining the sanction. Waiving the distinction between statutes and rules to which we have adverted, and accepting cases nullifying rules at their broadest, and we find that when mere rules were annulled it was because of discriminations as unjustifiable as those based on the color of hair or nationality. In Clark v. Board, 24 Iowa, 266, there was a discrimination against pupils because they were negroes, and all said for the right to enjoy school privileges must be read in the light of that fact. What the case turns on is not shown by general language concerning abstract rights, but by declarations that the discretion of the board does not justify assigning to different schools because parents happen to be Irish or German or Catholic or Protestant; that if it should happen that there be one or more poorly clad or ragged children in the district, and public sentiment was opposed to the intermingling of such with the well-dressed youths of the district in the same school, “it would not be competent for the board of directors in their discretion to pander to such false public sentiment and to require the poorly clothed children to attend a separate school.” The Smith Case, 40 Iowa, 518, and the Dove Case, 41 Iowa, 689, also deal wholly with the right to exclude pupils because of their color. In Perkins v. Board, 56 Iowa, 476, 9 N. W. 356, what is, in effect, condemned is a rule which would exclude a pupil because damages for breaking a window were not paid. It is held that breaking a window glass by accident and without evil purpose will not warrant exclusion, and said that:
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