901 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2018), 17-15111, United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Institute
|Citation:||901 F.3d 1124|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES ex rel. Scott Rose; Mary Aquino; Mitchell Nelson; Lucy Stearns, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STEPHENS INSTITUTE, dba Academy of Art University, Defendant-Appellant.|
|Attorney:||Steven M. Gombos (argued), Jacob C. Shorter, and Gerald M. Ritzert, Gombos Leyton PC, Fairfax, Virginia; Leland B. Altschuler, Law Offices of Leland B. Altschuler, Woodside, California; for Defendant-Appellant. Michael von Lowenfeldt (argued), Kenneth Nabity, Brady R. Dewar, and James M. Wagstaff...|
|Judge Panel:||Before: Susan P. Graber and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges, and Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge. GRABER, Circuit Judge: Graber; Judge Dissent by Judge N.R. Smith N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:|
|Case Date:||August 24, 2018|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
Argued and Submitted December 6, 2017— San Francisco, California
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. 4:09-cv-05966-PJH.
Steven M. Gombos (argued), Jacob C. Shorter, and Gerald M. Ritzert, Gombos Leyton PC, Fairfax, Virginia; Leland B. Altschuler, Law Offices of Leland B. Altschuler, Woodside, California; for Defendant-Appellant.
Michael von Lowenfeldt (argued), Kenneth Nabity, Brady R. Dewar, and James M. Wagstaffe, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, San Francisco, California; Stephen R. Jaffe, The Jaffe Law Firm, San Francisco, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Charles W. Scarborough (argued) and Michael S. Raab, Appellate Staff; Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae United States of America.
John P. Elwood and Ralph C. Mayrell, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Washington, D.C.; Warren Postman and Steven P. Lehotsky, U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America.
Justin S. Brooks, Reuben A. Guttman, and Elizabeth H. Shofner, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Asher S. Alavi and David A. Bocian, Kessler Topaz Meltzer and Check LLP, Radnor, Pennsylvania; Daniel Miller, Berger & Montague P.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; David S. Stone, Stone & Magnanini LLP, Berkeley Heights, New Jersey; for Amicus Curiae National Nurses United— California Nurses Association, et al.
Claire M. Sylvia, Phillips & Cohen LLP, San Francisco, California; Jacklyn N. DeMar, Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, Washington, D.C.; Jennifer M. Verkamp, Morgan Verkamp LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio; for Amicus Curiae Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund.
Brandon J. Mark, Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Amicus Curiae Veterans Education Success.
Before: Susan P. Graber and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges, and Jennifer G. Zipps,[*] District Judge.
False Claims Act
The panel affirmed the district court's order denying defendant's motion for summary judgment in a qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act.
Relators, former admissions representatives for Academy of Art University, an art school in San Francisco, alleged that the school violated an incentive compensation ban included in its program participation agreement with the Department of Education, through which it qualified for federal funding in the form of federal financial aid to its students under Title IV of the Higher Education Act.
A claim under the False Claims Act requires: (1) a false statement or fraudulent course of conduct, (2) made with scienter, (3) that was material, causing (4) the government to pay out money or forfeit moneys due.
In Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2010), this court held that the falsity requirement can be satisfied either by express false certification or by implied false certification, which requires a showing that (1) the defendant explicitly undertook to comply with a law, rule, or regulation that was implicated in submitting a claim for payment and that (2) claims were submitted (3) even though the defendant was not in compliance with the law, rule, or regulation. In Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989 (2016), the Supreme Court held that a showing of implied false certification requires the satisfaction of two conditions: "first, the claim does not merely request payment, but also makes specific representations about the goods or services provided; and second, the defendant's failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements makes those representations misleading half-truths." The panel held that under two post-Escobar Ninth Circuit cases, relators must satisfy Escobar's two conditions to prove falsity. The panel concluded that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Academy of Art's actions met the Escobar requirements for falsity.
In Escobar, the Supreme Court also clarified that whether a provision is labeled a condition of payment is relevant to but not dispositive of the materiality requirement; therefore, even when a requirement is expressly designated a condition of payment, not every violation of that requirement gives rise to liability. Instead, materiality looks to the effect on the likely or actual recipient of the alleged misrepresentation, meaning the government. The panel concluded that Escobar did not overrule United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), which held that, with regard to materiality, the question is whether the false certification was relevant to the government's decision to confer a benefit. Applying the Escobar standard of materiality, the panel concluded that a reasonable trier of fact could find materiality because the Department of Education's payment was conditioned on compliance with the incentive compensation ban, because of the Department's past enforcement activities, and because of the substantial size of the forbidden incentive payments.
The panel further held that, on summary judgment, Academy of Art did not show that any violations of the incentive compensation ban fell within the Department of Education's now-repealed safe harbor provision, which required, among other things, that any adjustment in compensation was not based solely on the number of students recruited, admitted, enrolled, or awarded financial aid.
Dissenting in part, Judge N.R. Smith agreed with the majority's opinion through its discussion of falsity. Judge Smith disagreed with the majority's analysis of materiality because the majority failed to recognize that Hendow's materiality holding is no longer good law after Escobar; failed to fully articulate the Supreme Court's materiality standard as outlined in Escobar; and applied its erroneous legal standard to the facts at hand, reaching an erroneous conclusion. Judge Smith wrote that he would reverse the district court's materiality finding, vacate the judgment, and remand for additional discovery and further briefing.
GRABER, Circuit Judge:
This qui tam action, brought under the False Claims Act, comes to us on interlocutory appeal from the district courts denial of summary judgment so that we can settle questions of law posed in the wake of Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 195 L.Ed.2d 348 (2016). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant Stephens Institute, doing business as Academy of Art University, is an art school in San Francisco that offers undergraduate and graduate degrees. Defendant receives federal funding— in
the form of federal financial aid to its students— through various funding programs available under Title IV of the Higher Education Act. To qualify for that funding, Defendant entered into a program participation agreement with the Department of Education ("Department"), in which it pledged to follow various requirements, including the incentive compensation ban. The incentive compensation ban prohibits schools from rewarding admissions officers for enrolling higher numbers of students. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(20); 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22).
In 2006, Defendants admissions department instituted a new policy to encourage admissions representatives to enroll more students. The policy established an enrollment goal for each admissions representative. If a representative succeeded in enrolling that number of students, he or she would receive a salary increase of up to $30,000. Conversely, a representative could have his or her salary decreased by as much as $30,000 for failing to reach the assigned enrollment goal. Defendant characterized those adjustments as dependent on both quantitative success, meaning a representatives enrollment numbers, and qualitative success, meaning the representatives non-enrollment performance. But, in practice, the employees understood that their salary adjustments rested entirely on their enrollment numbers. Defendant rewarded one team of representatives with an expense-paid trip to Hawaii. The team received that reward solely because of their enrollment numbers.
That enrollment incentive policy remained in place until 2009, when...
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