Santiago-Rodríguez v. Puerto Rico
Decision Date | 01 July 2021 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 20-1658 (FAB) |
Citation | 546 F.Supp.3d 155 |
Parties | Ricardo SANTIAGO-RODRÍGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Victor Manuel Rivera-Rios, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Josue N. Torres-Crespo, Departamento De Justicia, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Defendants Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Police Department ("PRPD"), Mabel Oliveras-Colón ("Oliveras"), Luis García-Castro ("García"), and Bermaliz Mártir-Sostre ("Mártir") (collectively, "defendants") move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (" Rule 12(b)(6)"). (Docket Nos. 6 and 14) Plaintiff Ricardo Santiago-Rodríguez ("Santiago") moves to amend the complaint. (Docket No. 9) For the reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART . Additionally, Santiago's motion to amend the complaint is GRANTED .
Santiago joined the PRPD in 1994, serving as a police officer for more than 17 years. Id. at p. 6. García and Oliveras are Santiago's supervising officers. Id. Mártir is also employed by the PRPD, but the complaint does not specify her rank or position. Id.
Santiago sustained a work-related injury in 2017, rendering him permanently disabled. Id. Subsequently, he repeatedly requested a reasonable accommodation from García. Id. at p. 7. García denied these requests, "[causing further physical injury to [Santiago's] leg and back." Id. García also fabricated reasons to provide Rivera with negative evaluations. Id. at p. 8.
Santiago filed concurrent complaints with the PRPD and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in January, 2019. Id. Subsequently, García and Oliveras embarked on a campaign "to isolate [Rivera] from being able to work with other coworkers" in retaliation for filing the PRPD and EEOC complaints. Id. at p. 9. Moreover, Mártir falsely accused Rivera of sexual harassment. Id.
García, Oliveras, and Mártir commenced administrative and criminal proceedings against Santiago based on alleged misrepresentations in these complaints. Id. at p. 10. Both complaints were dismissed. Id.
The EEOC "determined that the Defendants discriminated and retaliated against [Santiago] due to his disability, his request for reasonable accommodations and his participation in protected activities." Id. Consequently, the EEOC referred the matter to the Department of Justice "to issue a Notice of Right to Sue" on September 3, 2020. Id. at p. 11.
Santiago commenced this action on November 20, 2020, setting forth two federal causes of action for discrimination based on disability and retaliation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. sections 12101 et seq. , and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. sections 2000e et seq. , respectively. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 12–20) He also asserts four causes of action pursuant to Puerto Rico law: (1) disability discrimination, Law No. 44 of July 2, 1985, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, sections 501 et seq. ; (2) retaliation, Law No. 115 of December 20, 1991, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, section 194 et seq. and Section 16 of Article II of the Puerto Rico Constitution ("Article II"); (3) defamation, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, sections 3141–3149; and (4) malicious prosecution, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, section 5141. Id.
Santiago seeks $1,000,000.00 for the ADA and Law 44 violations, an additional $1,000,000.00 for the Title VII and Law 155 violations, $500,000.00 for the remaining Puerto Rico law violations, and attorneys’ fees. Id. The defendants move to dismiss the complaint because Santiago "failed to exhaust the statutorily required administrative remedies prior to the filing for the instant action." (Docket No. 6 at p. 4; Docket No. 14)2
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), defendants may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Court must decide whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In doing so, the Court is "obligated to view the facts of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and to resolve any ambiguities in their favor." Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2011).
The ADA "does not provide for individual liability, but only for employer liability." Cardona-Román v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 799 F. Supp. 2d 120, 128 (D.P.R. 2011) (Domínguez, J.); see also Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2010). Moreover, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that there is "no individual employee liability under Title VII" because individuals are not encompassed within the statutory definition of employer." Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the ADA and Title VII claims against Oliveras, García, and Mártir are DISMISSED .
Law No. 44 is an analogue to the ADA. Because the "ADA does not provide for individual liability, neither should Law 44." Pizarro-Correa v. Puerto Rico Internal Revenue Dep't, 267 F. Supp. 3d 369, 374 (D.P.R. 2017) (Besosa, J.) (citation omitted). Likewise, Law 115 contains no provision imposing individual liability. Torres v. House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 858 F. Supp. 2d 172, 193 (D.P.R. 2012) () (Gelpí, J.). Consequently, the Law 44 and Law 115 claims against Oliveras, García, and Mártir are DISMISSED . The Article II, defamation, and malicious prosecution claims against the individual defendants remain before the Court.
The defendants move to dismiss the complaint, relying exclusively on Santiago's purported failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Docket No. 6) This argument is irrelevant, however, without the existence of federal jurisdiction. Santiago is suing the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the PRPD for money damages pursuant to the ADA and Title VII, requiring the Court to examine whether sovereign immunity precludes judicial relief. Because sovereign immunity is a "jurisdictional defect," the Court may conduct an Eleventh Amendment inquiry sua sponte. Hydrogen Tech. Corp. v. United States, 831 F.2d 1155, 1162 n.6 (1st Cir. 1987) () (internal quotation and citation omitted).
The Eleventh Amendment "prevents private individuals from bringing suit against non-consenting states." García-Hicks v. Vocational Rehab. Admin., 25 F. Supp. 3d 204, 209 (D.P.R. 2014) (Besosa, J.) (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) ).3 This proscription protects a state's treasury and its dignitary interests. See Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Pagán, 748 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2014). Sovereign immunity also serves to "protect the arms or alter egos of the state." García-Hicks, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 210 (citing Ainsworth Aristocrat Int'l Pty. Ltd. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 818 F.2d 1034, 1036 (1st Cir. 1987) ).
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is considered a state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 939 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993). The PRPD is an arm of the state, falling within the purview of the Eleventh Amendment. Bonilla v. Vivoni, 259 F. Supp. 2d 135, 141 (D.P.R. 2003) (Pieras, J.); see Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 477 (1st Cir. 2009) ().
A state is subject to federal suit, however, in certain circumstances. For instance, the Eleventh Amendment is not applicable when: (1) the state consents to suit; (2) the state waives its immunity by statute; (3) Congress abrogates state immunity; or (4) constitutional imperatives warrant federal liability. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 991 F.2d at 938 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has provided an additional route to relief in federal court pursuant to the Ex Parte Young doctrine, precluding states from invoking the Eleventh Amendment as a defense "where prospective injunctive relief, not involving damages or property transfer, is sought against named state officials for a violation of federal law." Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).
Although Santiago fails to specify is the sections of the ADA from which his claims arise, employment discrimination is prohibited by ADA's Title I. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 - 12117. While Congress fully intended to abrogate sovereign immunity when enacting the ADA, the Supreme Court held in Garrett that "Title I of the ADA was not a valid congressional abrogation" and that Eleventh Amendment immunity remained intact. García-Hicks, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 210 (citing Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374, 121 S.Ct. 955 ). Consequently, the ADA...
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