Pizarro-Correa v. P.R. Internal Revenue Dep't

• Decision Date: 31 July 2017
• Docket Number: Civil No. 16–2598 (FAB)
• Citation: 267 F.Supp.3d 369
• Parties: Luz PIZARRO–CORREA, Plaintiff, v. PUERTO RICO INTERNAL REVENUE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

267 F.Supp.3d 369

Luz PIZARRO–CORREA, Plaintiff,

v.PUERTO RICO INTERNAL REVENUE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 16–2598 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

July 31, 2017

Humberto F. Cobo–Estrella, Cobo–Estrella H. Law, LLC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Ivan Solares–Nunez, Puerto Rico Insurance Commissioner's Office Management Department, Guaynabo, PR, Susana I. Penagaricano–Brown, Yadhira Ramirez–Toro, Department of Justice Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER¹

BESOSA, District Judge.

Plaintiff Luz Pizarro–Correa ("Pizarro") brought this action against the Puerto Rico Internal Revenue Department, also known as Departamento de Hacienda ("Hacienda"), the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Commonwealth"), and Alberto Cardona–Crespo ("Cardona") (collectively "defendants") alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). Pizarro also invokes the supplemental jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate her claims pursuant to Puerto Rico Law 44 ("Law 44"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, §§ 501 et seq. ; Puerto Rico Law 115 ("Law 115"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 194 et seq. ; and Puerto Rico Law 100 ("Law 100"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146 et seq. Defendants move to dismiss² Pizarro's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (" Rule 12(b)(6)"). (Docket No. 19.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), defendants may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Court must decide whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In doing so, the Court is "obligated to view the facts of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and to resolve any ambiguities in their favor." Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2011). Although "the elements of a prima facie case may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim," it is "not necessary to plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case" in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Rodriguez–Reyes v. Molina–Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013). The prima facie analysis in a discrimination case is an evidentiary model, not a pleading standard. Id. at p. 51 ("the prima facie case is not the appropriate benchmark for determining whether a complaint has crossed the plausibility threshold."). A complaint that adequately states a claim may still proceed even if "recovery is very remote and unlikely." Ocasio–Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 13 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court takes the following facts as true, as pled in the complaint. (Docket No. 1.) Pizarro worked for Hacienda as a revenue collections officer for approximately five and a half years. Id. at p. 1. Pizarro "suffered from mental illness" and was diagnosed with major severe depression and bipolar disorder

. Id. Hacienda received notice of Pizarro's mental health condition on or about September 4, 2013, when she submitted medical notes from her psychologist to her supervisor.³

Id. at p. 2. Pizarro claims one of her supervisors, Carmen Mercado, was fully aware of her medical conditions. Id.

Pizarro avers that in 2015 defendant Cardona, a male coworker at the Arecibo office, made sexually explicit and derogatory comments to Pizarro. Id. at p. 5. Cardona's unwelcomed comments included telling Pizarro to dance on a stripper pole.⁴ Id. Pizarro informed her supervisor, Sylvia Serrano, of Cardona's remarks, but Hacienda took no action. Id. Instead, Serrano allegedly notified Cardona of Pizarro's intention to file a sexual harassment complaint so that Cardona could pre-emptively file his own complaint against Pizarro. Id. Subsequently, Cardona filed a sexual harassment complaint against Pizarro. Id. While Hacienda investigated Cardona's claim, Pizarro was transferred to the Bayamon office. Id. Meanwhile, Pizarro's sexual harassment complaint against Cardona was not investigated. Id.

Pizarro alleges that her transfer to the Bayamon office exacerbated her mental health condition; consequently, she requested a return to the Arecibo office as an accommodation. Id. at p. 6. During Pizarro's time at the Bayamon office, Hacienda allegedly shared her mental health condition with another coworker who looked for an opportunity to discredit her and remove her from the workplace. Id. Pizarro was suspended without pay when a co-worker informed Hacienda that she was afraid to share the breakroom with Pizarro during meals. Id. While at the Bayamon office, Pizarro applied for long-term disability benefits through MetLife insurance because she needed "periodic medical evaluations and rehabilitation" for her illness. Id. at p. 7. MetLife notified Hacienda that her application was accepted on November 11, 2015. Id.

Hacienda completed the sexual harassment investigation regarding Cardona's accusations against Pizarro on October 8, 2016. Id. The report "exonerated the plaintiff of the alleged harassment" charge. Id. at p. 6. Pizarro, however, was not notified of this outcome until after her employment was terminated.

On December 22, 2015, Pizarro received notification of her dismissal from Hacienda, effective retroactively on October 11, 2015.⁵ Id. Hacienda premised its decision to terminate Pizarro's employment on the acceptance of her application for long-term disability benefits. Id. at p. 12.

On December 30, 2015, plaintiff filed a second claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging disability discrimination by Hacienda.⁶ Id. at p. 3. On March 30, 2016, Pizarro filed a third and final claim with the EEOC alleging sex discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation by Hacienda.⁷ Id. The EEOC closed all of Pizarro's claims in June 2016, and issued three right-to-sue letters. (Docket No. 1–3.) Pizarro filed her complaint on September 7, 2016. (Docket No. 1.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Individual Liability Pursuant to the ADA, Title VII, and Puerto Rico Law

Defendants contend that Cardona cannot be sued in his individual capacity pursuant to the ADA. (Docket No. 19 at p. 8.) Pizarro counters that the only claims brought against Cardona are for gender discrimination and for the creation of a hostile working environment.⁸ (Docket No. 20 at p. 1.) Well-established precedent establishes that there is no individual liability pursuant to the ADA or Title VII. Courts within this district and sister circuits have concluded that the language of the ADA "does not provide for individual liability, but only for employer liability." Cardona–Roman v. Univ. of P.R., 799 F.Supp.2d 120, 128 (D.P.R. 2011) (Dominguez, J.); see also Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2010) ; Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997) ; Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007 (11th Cir. 1996). The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that there is "no individual employee liability under Title VII" because individuals are not encompassed within the statutory definition of employer. Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009).

Decisions regarding the scope of liability pursuant to the Puerto Rico state law claims mirror federal case law. Law 44 was modeled after the ADA, "and as the ADA does not provide for individual liability, neither should Law 44." Cardona–Roman, 799 F.Supp.2d at 131 (D.P.R. 2011) (Dominguez, J.) (citation omitted). Law 115, which prohibits retaliation in the workplace, likewise contains no provision imposing individual liability. Torres v. House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of P.R., 858 F.Supp.2d 172, 193 (D.P.R. 2012) (Gelpi, J.) ("With regards to personal supervisor liability under Puerto Rico's statute prohibiting retaliation in the workplace, Law 115, the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals found that it stems from the text of the act that the sanctions imposed therein are only against the employer, and thus, the statute contains no provision imposing personal liability.")

Law 100 by contrast, allows individuals to be sued in their personal capacity only if they are "employees of a covered entity within [its] scope." Ortiz–Rodriguez v. Consorcio Del Noroeste, Case No. 14-1529, 2016 WL 1255694, at *13 (D.P.R. Mar. 29, 2016) (Gelpi, J.), appeal dismissed (Aug. 5, 2016). Law 100 was enacted to expand protection from discrimination to employees in the private sector. Huertas–Gonzalez v. Univ. of P.R., 520 F.Supp.2d 304, 314 (D.P.R. 2007) (Dominguez, J.). Accordingly, Law 100 does not apply to employees of the Commonwealth or its instrumentalities that do not function as businesses or private entities. See Hernandez–Payero v. Puerto Rico, 493 F.Supp.2d 215, 233 (D.P.R. 2007) (Besosa, J.) (concluding that "since the Puerto Rico Police Department is an arm of the state and does not function as a business or private entity, Law 100 is not applicable."); Alberti v. Univ. of P.R., 818 F.Supp.2d 452, 481 (D.P.R. 2011), aff'd sub nom, Alberti v. Carlo–Izquierdo, 548 Fed.Appx. 625 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that Law 100 does not apply to "the arms of the state and/or individual defendants working therein"). Hacienda, as the tax collection agency for Puerto Rico, is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth that falls beyond the purview of Law 100. Because Cardona is employed by an entity that is not covered pursuant to Law 100, he cannot be held individually liable. Because none of the asserted causes of actions could subject Cardona to individual...