Umthun v. Day & Zimmermann
| Decision Date | 14 November 1944 |
| Docket Number | 46585. |
| Citation | 16 N.W.2d 258,235 Iowa 293 |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
| Parties | UMTHUN v. DAY & ZIMMERMANN, Inc. |
J L. Thomas, of Burlington, for appellant.
Ben P. Poor, of Burlington, for appellee.
The question upon this appeal is whether plaintiff was engaged 'in the production of goods for commerce' within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, herein called 'the Act,' 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219. The case was tried to the court without a jury. The essential facts were stipulated.
At all times involved here, defendant, a private corporation, as an independent contractor and not as agent, operated the Iowa Ordnance Plant near Burlington under a contract with the United States government by which the government paid defendant a fixed fee plus all expenses. The government shipped component parts of bombs to the plant where they were painted and dried, then loaded with explosives and otherwise processed. When finished, the bombs were shipped out of the plant by the government for use by the armed forces in the war effort. The greater portion of both incoming and outgoing shipments were interstate.
From December 21, 1941, to May 29, 1943, plaintiff was employed by defendant either as a building foreman or an assistant building foreman. During many weeks of this period plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours per week for which he received no overtime compensation. He was in charge of crews engaged in processing the bombs that were shipped to and from the plant. The tools and equipment plaintiff used, the premises upon which he worked and the products with which he dealt belonged to the government. There can be no question that plaintiff was engaged in 'the production of goods.' The lower court held, however, that plaintiff was not engaged in 'the production of goods for commerce' within the meaning of the Act and on this ground dismissed the petition. We are unable to agree. We conclude plaintiff was engaged in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the Act.
It is conceded the question presented is one of statutory construction. No issue of constitutionality is involved. We may observe, however, that the constitutionality of the Act was unanimously upheld in United States v. Barby, 312 U.S 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609, 132 A.L.R. 1430, Stone, J. There are also many other decisions to the same effect. See Annotations, 132 A.L.R. 1443, 1444, 130 A.L.R. 272, 273. While defendant concedes that Congress could have made the Act applicable to interstate transportation by the government, it argues there is nothing in the Act to show it intended to do so.
Defendant contends the finding below has substantial evidence to support it and is conclusive upon this appeal. Attention is called to Rule 334, Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, which states, '* * * findings of fact in jury-waived cases shall have the effect of a special verdict.' This contention is without merit. The evidence, in the form of stipulated facts, is undisputed. This appeal presents nothing but a question of law: The meaning of the Act as applied to undisputed facts. The trial judge erred not in his findings of fact but in his conclusions of law. See In re Hagan's Will, Iowa, 14 N.W.2d 638, 641, and cases cited; State v. Peisen, Iowa, 10 N.W.2d 645, 647.
It has been well established that the Act, which is remedial in character with a humanitarian end in view, is to be liberally construed. Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 8 Cir., 113 F.2d 52, 56, Gardner, J.
The Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor has interpreted the Act to include such an employment as that involved here. This construction of the statute by the administrative department charged with its enforcement, although not binding on us, should be given our respectful consideration. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 580, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 86 L.Ed. 1682, 1689, and citations note 17, Reed, J.; Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 55 S.Ct. 333, 79 L.Ed. 780, 787, and citations, Cardozo, J.; Fleming v. A. H. Belo Corp., 5 Cir., 121 F.2d 207, 213, 214, and citations, Hutcheson, J.; State v. Independent Order of Foresters, 226 Iowa 1339, 1344, 286 N.W. 425, and citations.
So much of the Act as is pertinent here provides:
Sec. 203(b). "Commerce' means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or from any State to any place outside thereof.'
Sec. 203(d). "Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United States or any State or political subdivision of a State, * * *.'
Sec. 207(a). 'No employer shall * * * employ any of his employees who is engaged * * * in the production of goods for commerce * * * (3) for a work week longer than forty hours * * * unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.'
Sec. 216(b). 'Any employer who violates the provisions of section * * *207 of this title shall be liable to the * * * employees affected in the amount of their * * * unpaid overtime compensation, * * * and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.'
Determination of whether the Act is applicable depends not on the nature of the employer's business but upon the character of the employee's activities. Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 63 S.Ct. 494, 498, 87 L.Ed. 656; Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 63 S.Ct. 125, 87 L.Ed. 83; A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 62 S.Ct. 1116, 86 L.Ed. 1638, 1648; Clyde v. Broderick, 10 Cir., 144 F.2d 348, 351, and cases cited.
The meaning of the Act should in the first instance at least be sought in its language and if that is plain, the sole function of the court is to give it effect. Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 8 Cir., 113 F.2d 52, 55, Gardner, J. The Act itself defines 'commerce.' The common understanding of a term, if it were at variance with this definition, is not to be substituted for it. Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 55 S.Ct. 333, 79 L.Ed. 780, 787, Cardozo, J. See also State v. City of Des Moines, 221 Iowa 642, 644, 648, 266 N.W. 41; Sandberg Co. v. Iowa State Board, 225 Iowa 103, 107, 278 N.W. 643, 281 N.W. 197: Kistner v. Iowa State Board, 225 Iowa 404, 410, 280 N.W. 587.
The definition of 'commerce' found in section 203(b) includes 'transportation * * * from any State to any place outside thereof.' The plain meaning of this language seems to include the movement of these bombs to and from this ordnance plant. Defendant argues, however, that the shipment of the bombs is not commerce because made by the government. Reliance is placed upon the much quoted statement of Justice Story in United States v. Hoar, Fed.Cas. No. 15,373, 2 Mason 311, to the effect that the government is not included within the terms of a general statute unless it is 'clear from the nature of the mischiefs to be redressed, or the language used, that the government itself was in contemplation of the legislature.'
Defendant's argument cannot be sustained. In the first place, it would seem to be 'clear from the nature of the mischiefs sought to be redressed, or the language used' that the mere fact the government ships these bombs does not mean that their transportation is not commerce. See, as bearing on this question, State v. City of Des Moines, 221 Iowa 642, 647, 266 N.W. 41. The evils which the Act was designed to improve have been repeatedly pointed out. Indeed, sections 202(a) and 202(b) of the statute itself provide that it was intended to eliminate, in industries engaged in the production of goods for commerce, labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and well-being of workers, and the removal of the burdens on commerce caused by such substandard labor conditions.
Among decisions which recognize these purposes of the Act are United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609, 614, 132 A.L.R. 1430, Stone, J.; Fleming v. Warshawsky & Co., 7 Cir., 123 F.2d 622, 626, Major, J.; Fleming v. A. H. Belo Corp., 5 Cir., 121 F.2d 207, 215, Hutcheson, J. Assuming the wisdom of the Act, a matter with which we are not concerned, it seems clear that the evils at which the legislation is aimed will more probably be improved if the Act is not held inapplicable merely because the government is the shipper of the ammunition. Such a holding would deny to large numbers of employees the advantages of the Act.
The statement of Justice Story in the Hoar case is by no means a hard and fast rule by which the sovereign is excluded from general terms of a statute; the purpose, subject matter, context, legislative history and executive interpretation are aids to construction which may indicate an intent to bring the sovereign within the scope of the law. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071, 1074, 1075, Roberts, J.
Cases in which the doctrine of the Hoar case have been applied are of two classes: (1) Those where the act, if the sovereign were not excluded, would deprive it of a recognized or established prerogative title or interest. A classic example of these cases is United States v. Hoar itself, holding the sovereign is exempt from general statutes of limitations. (2) Those where the act would work obvious absurdity if the public or its officers were not held to be impliedly excluded, as, for example, the application of a speed statute to a policeman pursuing a criminal or to a fire department responding to a fire alarm. Nardone v. United States, ...
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