Facey v. Dickhaut
| Decision Date | 30 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 11–10680–MLW. |
| Citation | 91 F.Supp.3d 12 |
| Parties | Valentino FACEY, Plaintiff, v. Thomas DICKHAUT, Anthony Mendonsa, and R. Raymond, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Victoria E. Thavaseelan, Evan D. Panich, Matthew L. Knowles, McDermott Will & Emery, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.
Joan T. Kennedy, Richard Elkins Gordon, Jr., Department of Correction, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Valentino Facey brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Thomas Dickhaut, Anthony Mendonsa, and Ronald Raymond. All three defendants are or were officials at the Souza–Baranowski Correctional Center (“SBCC”), operated by the Massachusetts Department of Correction (“DOC”). At the time of the complaint, Dickhaut was the Superintendent of SBCC, Mendonsa was Deputy Superintendent, and Raymond was the assignment officer who made inmate housing recommendations, subject to Mendonsa's approval. Facey, who is currently serving a life sentence in SBCC for murder, alleges that the three defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they knowingly placed him in danger by assigning him to a housing unit, known as the H–1 cell block, where he was isolated from his fellow gang members, leading to an injurious attack by members of a rival gang.
On September 25, 2012, the court allowed in part and denied in part the defendants' Motion to Dismiss. See Facey v. Dickhaut, 892 F.Supp.2d 347 (D.Mass.2012). The court dismissed all claims against the defendants in their official capacities on the grounds of sovereign immunity, and dismissed all claims against Dickhaut because the plaintiff had not adequately alleged that Dickhaut had violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The claims against Mendonsa and Raymond in their individual capacities, however, survived the motion to dismiss.
Following the completion of discovery, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment. The defendants argue that, based on the evidence developed in discovery, there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that they are, therefore, entitled to have the constitutional question summarily decided in their favor. They also argue that, even if there are facts sufficient to support a claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, they are nevertheless shielded by qualified immunity.
The defendants have also filed a Motion to Strike Affidavit in Support of Motion, asking the court to strike Exhibit 11, an article from the Boston Globe, from the plaintiff's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The defendants argue that because this article is hearsay and would not be admissible at trial, the court may not consider it in evaluating the motion for summary judgment.
In addition to his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff has filed a Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Anthony Mendonsa. The plaintiff contends that Mendonsa's affidavit, which was filed with the defendant's memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment, contains information about which Mendonsa lacks “personal knowledge” and, therefore, the court should exclude it for failure to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4), which specifies the kinds of evidence a court may consider in deciding a motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff also objects to the defendants' use of various prison records, which were not provided in discovery and which were first mentioned in the defendants' reply brief.
For the reasons explained below, the court is allowing the defendants' motion to strike, allowing in part and denying in part the plaintiff's motion to strike, allowing the defendants' assented-to motion for leave to file late, allowing the defendant's motion for leave to file under seal, and denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Facey is an inmate at Souza–Baranowski Correctional Center (“SBCC”), where he is serving a life sentence without possibility of parole for murder. On April 14, 2011, Facey filed a pro se complaint against three defendants in their official and individual capacities. As indicated earlier, they were: Dickhaut, then the Superintendent of SBCC; Mendonsa, then the Deputy Superintendent or SBCC; and Raymond, then a sergeant and Assignment Officer at SBCC. The complaint alleges a single count pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Facey's rights under the Eighth Amendment, stemming from the defendants' alleged failure to protect Facey from severe injuries sustained in an attack by other inmates on June 7, 2010. Facey's complaint seeks damages and other relief.
All three defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, raising several arguments. The defendants asserted that the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as is required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The defendants also argued that the doctrine of sovereign immunity protected them from being sued in their official capacities for damages, that the complaint did not allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment, and that they were entitled to qualified immunity.
The court allowed the motion in part and denied the motion in part. See Facey v. Dickhaut, 892 F.Supp.2d 347, 359–60 (D.Mass.2012). The court first rejected the argument that the case should be dismissed because of any failure by the plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies. Although the court agreed that exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory under the PLRA, see id. at 392, the court also explained that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense and that a plaintiff need not plead or demonstrate exhaustion in his complaint. See id. at 354 (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) ). Furthermore, the court stated that even if it could consider Facey's administrative review process, “the records are not inconsistent with Facey's claim that he did not receive a response to his initial grievance,” which would support his contention that any failure to exhaust would not bar his claim. See id. at 355.1
Second, the court found that the sovereign immunity preserved by the Eleventh Amendment protected the defendants from the claims for money damages against them in their official capacities. See id. (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) ).
Third, the court found that the complaint was sufficient to state a claim against defendants Mendonsa and Raymond, explaining that:
The complaint alleges that “[t]he Defendants” were aware of the feud between the Bloods and the Gangster Disciples, that the plaintiff is a “known member” of the Bloods, that “[a]ll prisoners” are checked for enemy situations before being housed, and that “[t]he Defendants” placed him on the South Side of the facility, where all the Gangster Disciples reside. It further alleges that Mendonsa assigns “all prisoners” to their housing areas, and that Raymond is the Assignment Officer and carries out his orders. Although the plaintiff might have more artfully stated a claim against these officials by alleging that Mendonsa and Raymond assigned him to be housed on the South Side, both of these allegations can be readily inferred from the complaint itself. “[L]iberally construed,” the pro se complaint sufficiently alleges that Mendonsa and Raymond knowingly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff by housing him in an area with his known enemies.
Facey, 892 F.Supp.2d at 356 (alterations in original) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ).
However, the court found that the plaintiff had not adequately stated a claim against Superintendent Dickhaut. Noting that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to alleged constitutional violations, see id. at 357 (citing Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir.2009) ), the court concluded that the complaint's minimal “allegations of [Dickhaut's] knowledge and direct participation [were] too ‘threadbare’ and ‘speculative’ to be accorded the presumption of truth, particularly given the absence of any other allegation specifically linking Dickhaut to the events of the case,” id. (quoting Penalbert–Rosa v. Fortuno–Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir.2011) ). Accordingly, the court dismissed the claims concerning Dickhaut. See id.
Finally, the court rejected the defendants' argument that the complaint should be dismissed because the defendants were shielded by qualified immunity, which “prevents suits against federal and state officials for money damages ‘unless (1) the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right and (2) such right was clearly established at the time of the defendants' alleged violations.’ ” Id. (quoting Feliciano–Hernandez v. Pereira–Castillo, 663 F.3d 527, 532 (1st Cir.2011) ).
The court found that, because the inquiry under the first prong was identical to the inquiry into whether the complaint had stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment, it was satisfied with respect to Mendonsa and Dickhaut. Next, the court concluded that the pleadings were adequate to satisfy the second prong, finding that the right the defendants were alleged to have violated was clearly established and that if the alleged facts were proven, “a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct violated the [plaintiff's] constitutional rights.” Id. at 359 (alteration in original) (quoting Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir.2009) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In summary, the court...
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