Powers v. Grinnell Corp.

• Decision Date: 07 February 1990
• Docket Number: Nos. 89-1687,89-1724,s. 89-1687
• Citation: 915 F.2d 34
• Parties: 53 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1814, 54 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,262 C. Roland POWERS, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. GRINNELL CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellant. C. Roland POWERS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. GRINNELL CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 34

915 F.2d 34

53 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1814,

54 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,262

C. Roland POWERS, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. GRINNELL CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellant.

C. Roland POWERS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. GRINNELL CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee.

Nos. 89-1687, 89-1724.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Feb. 7, 1990.

Decided Sept. 24, 1990.

William P. Robinson III with whom Judith Colenback Savage, Jon M. Anderson, Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., and Edwards & Angell were on briefs for defendant, appellant.

James H. Reilly with whom Terrence G. Simpson and Kelly, Kelleher, Reilly & Simpson were on briefs for plaintiff, appellee.

Before BREYER, ALDRICH and CYR, Circuit Judges.

CYR, Circuit Judge.

Erstwhile employee C. Rowland Powers instituted the present civil action after being discharged from employment by Grinnell Corporation in alleged violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (RIFEPA). Ultimately, Powers recovered judgment for $52,351 on the common ADEA and RIFEPA back pay awards, $52,351 in liquidated damages on the ADEA claim, attorney fees, and costs, but no award of prejudgment interest. ¹

I BACKGROUND

Powers's employment with Grinnell commenced in 1946. Except for a brief layoff period in 1949-50, Powers worked for Grinnell continuously until 1984, when his employment was terminated following the elimination of Powers's "contract administration" position pursuant to a company-wide consolidation. Some months later Powers was rehired by Grinnell to work at the Jacob Javits Convention Center project, which was expected to last about two or three years. Powers initially was contacted about this position by Albert Beck, Executive Vice President of Grinnell. In the course of their discussions, Powers expressed concern about his employment future with Grinnell once the Javits Center project was completed. Beck assured Powers that there would be other employment within the company, and that he would assist Powers in obtaining another position. Beck offered Powers the position of "Contract Project Coordinator" at the Javits Center project, and Powers accepted. Powers later acquired the title "Project Manager."

With the Javits Center project nearing completion during the spring of 1986, Powers contacted Beck to discuss other employment positions with Grinnell. Over the next few months, Beck directed Powers's attention to three positions, which Powers pursued to no avail; two went to younger candidates; one was not yet established. Powers pursued a fourth position on his own, again unsuccessfully. On September 25, 1986, shortly after his fifty-seventh birthday, Powers was informed by Beck that Grinnell had no alternative but to dismiss him. Powers was discharged the next day.

On March 3, 1987, Powers filed the following age discrimination charge (administrative charge) against Grinnell with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (RICHR) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

1. On September 25, 1986, I was informed that I would be terminated the following day from my job at the GRINNELL CORPORATION. I had 2. My last position with the company was that of project manager for the Javitz [sic] Convention Center in New York. Upon accepting this post in June of 1984, I was assured by Albert Beck, executive vice president, that I would be offered other employment within the company when this project was completed. In May of 1986, I contacted Mr. Beck about other employment employment [sic] opportunities within the company, since the aforementioned project was due to end on August 1, 1986. Mr. Beck referred me to three (3) positions, none of which I received. I learned that two (2) of these jobs were given to candidates younger than I and the company postponed a hiring decision on the other. I also expressed interest in a fourth position, i.e., manager of export sales, but was advised that I did not possess the necessary international sales experience. Similarly, a younger applicant was chosen for this position. On September 25, 1986, Mr. Beck told me that the company had no other alternative but to dismiss me.

worked for the company or its predecessor corporations since 1946.

3. I believe I have been discriminated against because of my age in that:

a. I am 57 years old (date of birth 8-8-29);

b. I maintained a satisfactory employment record at the company for many years in varied managerial positions;

c. My attempts to secure continued employment within the company after my project was completed were entirely unsuccessful;

d. Younger candidates, with less experience and/or tenure than myself, were chosen for the positions I sought. In fact, two (2) successful applicants had no relevant job experience.

e. Because I did not obtain one of the aforementioned jobs, I was terminated;

f. These discriminatory actions will cause me to suffer a loss of income and other work-related benefits.

Unable to secure a settlement or reconciliation agreement, the RICHR issued a "right to sue" letter to Powers on September 22, 1987.

On September 24, 1987, Powers filed a four-count complaint with the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, alleging parallel claims under the ADEA and RIFEPA. Counts I and II charged Grinnell with age discrimination in discharging Powers from employment. Counts III and IV alleged age discrimination in Grinnell's refusals to hire Powers for the "numerous open positions" for which he applied. During late 1987 and 1988, the parties engaged in extensive discovery, which revealed that there were several employment openings at Grinnell during the relevant period, about which Beck had never advised Powers, and that, under an informal Grinnell policy, project managers were reassigned to other positions within the company after completion of their projects.

Since an early stage in the litigation, Grinnell has challenged the scope of the present action as overly broad in relation to the administrative charge. In July 1988, Grinnell sought partial summary judgment under counts I and II on the ground that the discriminatory termination claims exceeded the scope of the administrative charge. Powers opposed the motion, on the ground that the agency investigation reasonably could have been expected to probe whether age was a factor in Grinnell's termination decision. The district court denied the motion.

On the day before trial, Grinnell unsuccessfully attempted to prevent Powers from introducing evidence relating to any employment openings with Grinnell other than the four openings detailed in the administrative charge. During trial, the district court admitted evidence concerning: (1) nine job openings in addition to the four mentioned in the administrative charge; (2) the unwritten Grinnell policy relating to the reassignment of project managers upon completion of their projects; and (3) matters outside the June-September 1986 period covered in the administrative charge The jury returned verdicts for Powers on all counts, awarding $52,351 in back pay and $52,351 in liquidated damages. Judgment entered for $104,702 in back pay and liquidated damages, $37,436.25 in attorney fees, $3,038.55 in costs, and directing allowance of prejudgment interest as well. On Grinnell's motion to strike the prejudgment interest award, the district court directed Powers to elect either liquidated damages on the ADEA claims or prejudgment interest on the RIFEPA claims. Powers elected prejudgment interest on the ADEA claims, and the amended judgment was entered. These cross-appeals ensued.

including job openings and the ages of the persons selected to fill the openings.

II DISCUSSION

A. Grinnell Appeal

On appeal, Grinnell complains that it was unfairly surprised and prejudiced by various district court rulings which effectively required that it defend against age discrimination claims outside the scope of the administrative charge. ²

As a prerequisite to the commencement of a civil action under the ADEA, an aggrieved employee must file an administrative charge with the EEOC and with the parallel state agency designated by law in "deferral states." ³ 29 U.S.C. Secs. 626(d), 633(b). The administrative charge "provides the [agencies] with information and 'an opportunity to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices through informal methods of conciliation,' " Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (quoting H.R. Conf.Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 528, 534), and affords "formal notice to the employer and prospective defendant of the charges that have been made against it," id. See also Caldwell v. National Ass'n. of Home Builders, 771 F.2d 1051, 1054 (7th Cir.1985); Bihler v. Singer Co., 710 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1983); Less v. Nestle Co., 705 F.Supp. 110, 112 (W.D.N.Y.1988).

"The scope of the civil complaint is accordingly limited by the charge filed with the EEOC and the investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of that charge." Id. at 112; Johnson v. General Electric, 840 F.2d 132, 139 (1st Cir.1988) ("complaint ... must reasonably be expected to have been within the scope of the EEOC's investigation"); Miller v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 23-24 (2d Cir.) ("No action based on a claim of age discrimination may be brought in federal court unless the claim was properly raised with the EEOC ... and [is] within the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of that filing."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851, 106 S.Ct. 148, 88 L.Ed.2d 122 (1985). See also Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir.1970). Thus, ADEA claims are cognizable "if they are 'like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and grow[ ] out of such allegations.' " Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534, 544 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual...