Liriano v. Hobart Corp.

• Decision Date: 31 August 1998
• Parties: , 700 N.E.2d 303, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 7541 Luis LIRIANO, Plaintiff, v. HOBART CORPORATION, Defendant, 616 Melrose Meat Corporation, Sued Herein as Super Associated, Third-Party Defendant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 764

677 N.Y.S.2d 764

92 N.Y.2d 232, 700 N.E.2d 303, 1998

N.Y. Slip Op. 7541

Luis LIRIANO, Plaintiff, v. HOBART CORPORATION, Defendant 616 Melrose Meat Corporation, Sued Herein as Super Associated, Third-Party Defendant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Aug. 31, 1998.

Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & De Cicco, New York City (Brian J. Isaac, of counsel), and Trolman Glaser & Lichtman, P.C. (Abby J. Resnick, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, New York City (James A. Henderson, Jr., Steven B. Prystowsky and Saul Wilensky, of counsel), and Thompson Hine & Flory, L.L.P., OH, for defendant.

William M. Kimball and James P. O'Connor, New York City, for third-party defendant.

Standard Weisberg, P.C., New York City (Anthony J. McNulty and Arthur J. Liederman, of counsel), for Otto Martin Maschinenbau GmbH & Co., amicus curiae.

Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., New York City (Michael Hoenig, Aaron D. Twerski and Miriam Skolnik, of counsel), and Hugh F. Young, Jr., of the Virginia Bar, admitted pro hac vice, for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CIPARICK, Judge.

In Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 475, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 403 N.E.2d 440, we held that a manufacturer is not responsible for injuries resulting from substantial alterations or modifications of a product by a third party that render the product defective or otherwise unsafe. The present case certifies the issue of whether a plaintiff, whose design claim is barred by the substantial modification defense stated in Robinson, may nevertheless maintain a claim for failure to warn of the consequences of such modification. Finding the issue to be an open one, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified the following question to our Court:

"Can manufacturer liability exist under a failure to warn theory in cases in which the substantial modification defense would preclude liability under a design defect theory, and if so, is such manufacturer liability barred as a matter of law on the facts of this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff?"

We answer the first part of the certified question in the affirmative and decline to answer the second part of the question in deference to the Second Circuit's review and application of existing principles of law to the facts, as amplified by the full record before that Court.

I

The facts as presented by the Circuit Court are as follows:

"Luis Liriano, a seventeen-year-old employee in the meat department at Super Associated grocery store ('Super'), was injured on the job in September 1993 when he was feeding meat into a commercial meat grinder whose safety guard had been removed. His hand was caught in the 'worm' that grinds the meat; as a result, his right hand and lower forearm were amputated.

"The meat grinder was manufactured and sold in 1961 by Hobart Corporation ('Hobart'). At the time of the sale, it had an affixed safety guard that prevented the user's hands from coming into contact with the feeding tube and the grinding 'worm.' No warnings were placed on the machine or otherwise given to indicate that it was dangerous to operate the machine without the safety guard in place. Subsequently, Hobart became aware that a significant number of purchasers of its meat grinders had removed the safety guards. And in 1962, Hobart began issuing warnings on its meat grinders concerning removal of the safety guard.

"There is no dispute that, when Super acquired the grinder, the safety guard was intact. It is also not contested that, at the time of Liriano's accident, the safety guard had been removed. There is likewise no doubt that Hobart actually knew, before the accident, that removals of this sort were occurring and that use of the machine without the safety guard was highly dangerous. And Super does not question that the removal of the guard took place while the guard was in its possession.

"Liriano sued Hobart under theories of negligence and strict products liability for, inter alia, defective product design and failure to warn. He brought his claims in the Supreme Court, Bronx County, New York. Hobart removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and also impleaded Super as a third-party defendant, seeking indemnification and/or contribution. The District Court (Shira A. Scheindlin, Judge) dismissed all of Liriano's claims except those based on failure to warn. Following trial, the jury concluded that the manufacturer's failure to warn was the proximate cause of Liriano's injuries and apportioned liability 5% to Hobart and 95% to Super. On partial retrial, limited to the extent of Liriano's responsibility, the jury assigned him 33 1/3% of the responsibility. On appeal, Hobart and Super argue, inter alia, that the question of whether Hobart had a duty to warn Liriano should have been decided in their favor by the court, as a matter of law. It is this question that gives rise to the current certification."

II

A manufacturer who places a defective product on the market that causes injury may be liable for the ensuing injuries (see, Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622). A product may be defective when it contains a manufacturing flaw, is defectively designed or is not accompanied by adequate warnings for the use of the product (see, Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622, supra; Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 348 N.E.2d 571; Torrogrossa v. Towmotor Co., 44 N.Y.2d 709, 405 N.Y.S.2d 448, 376 N.E.2d 920; see also, Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 478, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 403 N.E.2d 440, supra ). A manufacturer has a duty to warn against latent dangers resulting from foreseeable uses of its product of which it knew or should have known (Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 79 N.Y.2d 289, 297, 582 N.Y.S.2d 373, 591 N.E.2d 222). A manufacturer also has a duty to warn of the danger of unintended uses of a product provided these uses are reasonably foreseeable (see, Lugo v. LJN Toys, 75 N.Y.2d 850, 552 N.Y.S.2d 914, 552 N.E.2d 162; McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62; , 226 N.Y.S.2d 407, 181 N.E.2d 430 1 Weinberger, New York Products Liability, § 17:07, at 17-10 [2d ed.] ).

A manufacturer is not liable for injuries caused by substantial alterations to the product by a third party that render the product defective or unsafe (Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 403 N.E.2d 440, supra ). Where, however, a product is purposefully manufactured to permit its use without a safety feature, a plaintiff may recover for injuries suffered as a result of removing the safety feature (Lopez v. Precision Papers, 67 N.Y.2d 871, 873, 501 N.Y.S.2d 798, 492 N.E.2d 1214).

Several intermediate appellate courts have interpreted Robinson to mean that, where a substantial alteration of a product occurs, an injured party is also precluded from asserting a claim for failure to warn (see, e.g., Bonilla v. Schjeldahl, Inc., 242 A.D.2d 651, 662 N.Y.S.2d 782; Ernest v. S.M.S. Eng'g, 223 A.D.2d 801, 803, 635 N.Y.S.2d 799; Frey v. Rockford Safety Equip. Co., 154 A.D.2d 899, 546 N.Y.S.2d 54). Relying on Robinson and these lower court decisions, Hobart urges that the plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim should be barred as a matter of law. Robinson, however, did not resolve the issue of whether preclusion of a claim for defective design because of substantial alteration by a third party should also bar a claim for failure to warn.

This Court's rationale in Robinson stemmed from the recognition that a manufacturer is responsible for a "purposeful design choice" that presents an unreasonable danger to the user (see, Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., supra, 49 N.Y.2d, at 480, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 403 N.E.2d 440). This responsibility derives from the manufacturer's superior position to anticipate reasonable uses of its product and its obligation to design a product that is not harmful when used in that manner. However, this duty is not open-ended, and it is measured as of the time the product leaves the manufacturer's premises. Thus, a manufacturer is not required to insure that subsequent owners and users will not adapt the product to their own unique uses. That kind of obligation is much too broad and would effectively impose liability on manufacturers for all product-related injuries (id., at 480-481, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 403 N.E.2d 440).

While this Court stated that principles of foreseeability are inapplicable where there has been a substantial modification of the product, that discussion was limited to the manufacturer's responsibility for defective design where there had been a substantial alteration of a product by a third party (id., at 479, 480, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 403 N.E.2d 440). Thus, this Court stated that a manufacturer's duty "does not extend to designing a product that is impossible to abuse or one whose safety features may not be circumvented" and the manufacturer need not trace its "product through every link in the chain of distribution to insure that users will not adapt the product to suit their own unique purposes" (id., at 480-481, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 403 N.E.2d 440 [emphasis added] ). ¹

Hobart and amici argue that the rationale of Robinson is equally applicable to failure-to-warn claims where a substantial modification of the product occurs and that application of the failure-to-warn doctrine in these circumstances would undermine Robinson's policy justification and destroy its purpose. This Court is not persuaded that the existence of a substantial modification defense precludes, in all cases, a failure to warn claim.

The factors militating against imposing a duty to design against foreseeable post-sale product modifications are either not present or less cogent...