Valente v. Textron, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 08–CV–4192 (MKB).,08–CV–4192 (MKB).
• Citation: 931 F.Supp.2d 409
• Parties: Matthew J. VALENTE and James Valente, Plaintiffs, v. TEXTRON, INC. and E–Z Go Division of Textron Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

931 F.Supp.2d 409

Matthew J. VALENTE and James Valente, Plaintiffs,

v.TEXTRON, INC. and E–Z Go Division of Textron Inc., Defendants.

No. 08–CV–4192 (MKB).

United States District Court,

E.D. New York.

March 18, 2013.

Patricia A. Sullivan, David Harlan Schultz, Barry, McTiernan & Moore, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

David S. Osterman, Princeton, NJ, Andrew John Scholz, Michael D. Shalhoub, White Plains, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Matthew Valente and James Valente filed the instant products liability action in New York state court against Defendants Textron and the E–Z Go Division of Textron. Matthew Valente was seriously injured while operating a golf cart made by Defendants and alleges that Defendants are liable under a theory of strict liability, negligence, breach of implied warranty and failure to warn.¹ Matthew Valente's father, James Valente, brings a claim for loss of consortium. Plaintiffs allege that the golf car at issue was defectively designed because it only had a rear-wheel braking system and did not have a seatbelt restraint system.² Defendants removed the action to this Court and now move to preclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' experts, Kristopher Seluga and Bruce Gorsak, and for summary judgment. Plaintiffs also move to preclude the testimony of Defendants' experts, Matthew Schwall and David Bizzak, and for summaryjudgment. The Court held a Daubert hearing on January 31 and February 1, 2013 with respect to Plaintiffs' experts.³ The Court heard argument on the parties' motions on February 28, 2013. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants' motions to preclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' experts and for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' motions to preclude the testimony of Defendants' experts and for summary judgment are denied.

I. Background

In August of 2007, plaintiff Matthew Valente (“Matthew”) ⁴ was working as a cart and range attendant at La Tourette Golf Course (“La Tourette”) on Staten Island. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 1, 4.) Matthew was 18 years old at the time. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 4.) As an attendant, Matthew was responsible for, among other things, driving golf cars between the pen and the area where golfers picked them up. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 5; Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶ 5.) Matthew was trained at La Tourette regarding how to operate a golf car. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶ 6.)

On August 18, 2007, the day of the accident, Matthew was driving an E–Z–Go golf car. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 3; Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶ 3.) Textron manufactures E–Z–Go golf cars. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 2.) Matthew was driving on the path to the 10th hole, and his hat blew off. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 10.) Along the left side of the path, there was a series of posts connecting a rope. (Deposition of Matthew Valente (“M. Valente Dep.”) 88:21–89:11.) Defendants claim that Matthew reached back to retrieve his hat, removing his foot from the accelerator and stepping on the brake in an effort to stop the car. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 11.) Matthew claims that, when his hat blew off, he did not attempt to reach for his hat or turn his body. (Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶ 11.) According to Matthew, the path turned slightly to the left and the only adjustment to the steering that he made was to turn the steering wheel slightly “to maintain a straight course on the path.” ⁵ (Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶ 14.) He simply applied the brakes, and the golf car yawed, or fishtailed. (Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶¶ 17–18.) Matthew remembers the car sliding, coming out of his seat and hitting his head. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 12; Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶ 12.) The golf car rolled over onto its passenger side. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 13; Tr.⁶ 25:2–8.) The parties agree that the golf car did not have any mechanical difficulties the day of the accident. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 8; Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶ 8.) Matthew suffered serious injuries, including a spinal fracture, and is paralyzed below the waist with partial paralysis in his upper body. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 13.)

II. Admissibility of Expert Testimony

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimonyis based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed.R.Evid. 702. The proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden of “establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the admissibility requirements of Rule 702 are satisfied.” United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir.2007) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n. 10, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). However, “the district court is the ultimate ‘gatekeeper.’ ” Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 158 (2d Cir.2011), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 833, 181 L.Ed.2d 542 (2011) (“The law assigns district courts a ‘gatekeeping’ role in ensuring that expert testimony satisfies the requirements of Rule 702.” (citation omitted)).

Before permitting a person to testify as an expert under Rule 702, the court must make the following findings: (1) the witness is qualified to be an expert; (2) the opinion is based upon reliable data and methodology; and (3) the expert's testimony on a particular issue will “assist the trier of fact.” Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396–97 (2d Cir.2005); see also United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir.2004) (the court is tasked with “ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand” (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786)). In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court set forth a list of factors, in addition to the criteria set forth in Rule 702, that bear on the determination of reliability: “(1) whether a theory or technique has been or can be tested; (2) ‘whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;’ (3) the technique's ‘known or potential rate of error’ and ‘the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation;’ and (4) whether a particular technique or theory has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” Williams, 506 F.3d at 160 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94, 113 S.Ct. 2786);see also Zaremba v. Gen. Motors Corp., 360 F.3d 355, 358 (2d Cir.2004) (same). The Daubert inquiry for reliability is a “flexible one” and does not “constitute a definitive checklist or test,” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (citation omitted), and, thus, the Daubert factors “neither necessarily nor exclusively appl[y] to all experts or in every case,” id. at 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167.

The district court is afforded “broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys [with] respect to its ultimate reliability determination.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (emphasis in original). Expert testimony should be excluded if it is “speculative or conjectural.” Major League Baseball Prop., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 311 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir.1996)). When an expert's opinion is based on data or methodologies “that are simply inadequate to support the conclusions reached, Daubert and Rule 702 mandate the exclusion of that unreliable opinion testimony.” Ruggiero v. Warner–Lambert Co., 424 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir.2005) (citation omitted); see also Nimely, 414 F.3d at 396 (“[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” (alteration in original) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997))). Nevertheless, “in accordance with the liberal admissibility standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence, only serious flaws in reasoning or methodology will warrant exclusion.” In re Fosamax Products Liab. Litig., 645 F.Supp.2d 164, 173 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (citing Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir.2002)).

a. Defendants' Motion to Preclude

Defendants seek to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' experts, Kristopher Seluga and Bruce Gorsak. Defendants do not dispute the expert qualifications of Seluga but contend that Seluga's computer simulation model is not reliable because it has not been validated and uses flawed input values. (Def. Mem. 5–18.) With respect to Gorsak, Defendants argue that he lacks the requisite qualifications to testify as an expert and that his opinions are unreliable and manufactured for the purpose of litigation. (Def. Mem. 19–22.) For the following reasons, the Court finds that neither Seluga nor Gorsak meet the requirements of Rule 702, and, therefore, Defendants' motion to preclude the testimony of Seluga and Gorsak is granted.

i. Kristopher Seluga

Kristopher Seluga is a forensic engineer and accident reconstructionist. (Tr. 4:2–5.) Seluga has a master's degree and a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (Tr. 4:21–23.) He is a licensed professional engineer in Connecticut and New York. (Tr. 5:5–7.) Seluga has previously published four articles related to golf car safety, and in a 2006 article he addressed the yaw instability of a golf car during rear-wheel braking. (Tr. 8:2–5, 9:24–10:6.) Seluga testified that, based on his prior research and study of braking systems, he believes that rear-wheel brakes are unstable...