State v. Delmar Jockey Club.

• Citation: 92 S.W. 185,200 Mo. 34
• Parties: STATE ex inf. HADLEY, Atty. Gen., v. DELMAR JOCKEY CLUB.
• Decision Date: 22 December 1905
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

92 S.W. 185

200 Mo. 34

STATE ex inf. HADLEY, Atty. Gen., v. DELMAR JOCKEY CLUB.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

December 22, 1905.

1. QUO WARRANTO — DEMURRER TO INFORMATION—EFFECT.

A demurrer to an information, in the nature of a quo warranto, to oust a corporation from the exercise of its franchises, admits every material allegation in the information, other than mere conclusions of the pleader.

2. SAME—MISUSE OF CORPORATE FRANCHISE— CRIMINAL ACTS.

A corporation may be proceeded against by quo warranto for misuse or perversion of its franchise, notwithstanding its officers and agents may at the same time be amenable to the criminal law for the offense committed by them in the perversion of such franchise; the proceeding against the corporation being no bar to that against the officers and vice versa.

3. SAME—TRIAL OF AGENTS.

Where the agents of a corporation are guilty of a criminal offense in the prosecution of the corporation's business, the trial and conviction of such agents is not a condition precedent to a trial of a quo warranto proceeding to oust the corporation from the use of its franchises because of such offense.

4. CORPORATIONS — FRANCHISES — MISUSE — FORFEITURE.

Where a corporation was formed to encourage agriculture, to establish and maintain suitable fair grounds and a race track with necessary buildings, erections, and improvements, to give on such grounds public exhibitions of agricultural products and stock, and of speed or races between horses, to charge a public admission fee to the race track, and to engage in pool-selling, book-making, and the registration of bets on races, etc., but the only use made of its franchise was to maintain a race track for the purpose of gambling, there was a substantial failure to fulfill the purpose of its organization rendering it subject to a forfeiture of its franchises.

5. EVIDENCE—JUDICIAL NOTICE.

The Supreme Court will not take judicial notice of the fact that a racing association has created and paid over annually a certain fund for the making of agricultural exhibitions at the state fair, when no such exhibitions were held by such association.

6. GAMING — POOL SELLING — OBJECTION BY STATE—ESTOPPEL.

Acts 1895, p. 8, § 40, appropriating $8,715 received into the state treasury from pool-selling and book-making, constituted a legislative recognition of the validity of Rev. St. 1899, § 7419, authorizing book-making, and therefore estopped the state to demand the forfeiture of the franchise of a corporation, because it engaged in such business as it was authorized to do by its charter.

7. CORPORATIONS—POWERS—POOL SELLING — BETS WITH MINORS.

Under Rev. St. 1899, § 2193, prohibiting the sale of pools to, and registering bets with, minors, and declaring that any person doing so shall be punishable as for a misdemeanor, a corporation authorized to sell pools and register bets on horse races had no power to sell such pools to, and book bets with, minors.

8. INFANTS — PROTECTION OF MORALS — GAMING—OFFENSES.

Under Rev. St. 1899, § 2193, prohibiting the selling of pools to, and booking bets with, minors, and punishing any person doing so as for a misdemeanor, it is immaterial that the officers of a corporation selling pools to, and booking bets with, minors had no knowledge that their customers were in fact minors.

9. STATUTES—TITLE—SUBJECTS.

Act March 21, 1905 (Laws 1905, p. 131), entitled "an act prohibiting book-making and pool-selling and prescribing a penalty therefor," is not in violation of Const. art. 4, § 28, prohibiting such acts from containing more than one subject, in that "book-making" and "pool-selling" are not germane, but in discord with each other.

In Banc. Information in the nature of quo warranto by Herbert S. Hadley, Attorney General, against the Delmar Jockey Club. Demurrer to the information sustained on the first ground, and overruled as to the others, with leave to plead over.

The Attorney General and John Kennish, for the State. Chester H. Krum and Bond & Bond, for respondent.

BURGESS, J.

This is an original proceeding begun in this court by the Attorney General by filing herein, ex officio, an information in the nature of a quo warranto against the defendant corporation, the purpose of which is to oust it of its franchises and corporate privileges, to have the same declared forfeited, and all of the property, real and personal, of said defendant, for feited, to the state.

The information filed by the Attorney General, leaving off the formal parts, is as follows:

"Comes now Herbert S. Hadley, Attorney General of the state of Missouri, who in this behalf prosecutes for the state, and informs the court that the Delmar Jockey Club was organized as a corporation under the provisions of article 1 and article 9 of chapter 12 of the Revised Statutes of the state of Missouri for 1899, and the acts amendatory thereof, on or about the 18th day of January, 1901; that the capital stock of said corporation, as stated in the articles of association thereof, was one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) divided into one thousand (1,000) shares of the par value of one hundred dollars ($100.00) each, and the purposes for which said corporation was formed, as alleged in said articles of association, were as follows: "The purposes for which this corporation is formed are to encourage and promote agriculture and the improvement of stock, particularly running, trotting, and pacing horses, by giving exhibition of agricultural products and exhibitions of contests of speed and races between horses, for premiums, purses, and other awards and otherwise; to establish and maintain suitable fair grounds and a race track in the city and county of St. Louis, with necessary buildings, erections, and improvements, and to give or conduct on said grounds and race track, public exhibitions of agricultural products and stock, and of speed, or races, between horses, for premiums, purses, or other awards made up from fees or otherwise, and to charge the public for admission thereto, and to said grounds and track; to engage in pool selling, book making, and registering bets on exhibitions of speed or races at the said race track and premises, as provided by law, and to let the right to others to do the same; to conduct restaurants, cafés, and other stands, for the sale of food and other refreshments to persons on said premises; and to do and perform all other acts necessary for fully accomplishing the purposes hereinbefore specifically enumerated.'

"Your informant further states that, since the organization of said Delmar Jockey Club, it has become the owner of, and is now, and at all times hereinafter mentioned was, the occupant of and in charge of a certain tract of land, known as the `Delmar Race Track,' lying partly in the city of St. Louis and partly in the county of St. Louis, upon which said land there was located a race track, and besides other buildings, erections, and improvements, a certain shed or building, known as the `betting ring' or `shed,' for the purpose of having conducted therein pool-selling, book-making, recording and registering of bets upon contests of speed or powers of endurance between certain horses, upon said race track, and of which said shed or building said respondent, through its officers, agents, and representatives, is now, and at all times hereinafter mentioned was, the occupant of and in charge of.

"Your informant further states that said respondent, ever since its organization, has continuously, notoriously, and willfully, within this state and at the county and city of St. Louis aforesaid, offended against and violated the laws of this state, and has grossly perverted, abused, and misused its corporate authority, franchises, and privileges, and has unlawfully assumed and usurped franchises and privileges not granted to it by the laws of the state of Missouri, and especially in the following particulars, to wit: That from the 18th day of January, 1901, up to the 16th day of June, 1905, said respondent, through its officers, agents, and employés, conducted within the building, known as the betting ring or shed, hereinbefore mentioned, on the Delmar race track, the business of book-making and pool-selling, registration of bets, and the acceptance of bets, and that, during said period, said respondent, acting through its officers, agents, and employés in charge of its said business, continuously, notoriously, and willfully violated the laws of this state, in that it sold pools and accepted and registered bets from minors upon the result of contests of speed or power of endurance, known as horse races between horses, run on the track of said respondent. That since said 16th day of June, 1905, the said respondent, acting through the officers, agents, employés, and representatives in charge of the business of said respondent, has further continuously, notoriously, and willfully offended against and violated the laws of this state, in this, to wit: It has continuously kept and occupied within this state its said shed or building, known as the betting ring or shed, above described, located upon said Delmar race track, with certain books, instruments, or devices for the purpose of recording or registering bets and wagers upon the result of trials or contests of speed or power of endurance of horses, which were made and took place upon said race track of said respondent; and it has, through its officers, agents, employés, and representatives in charge of the conduct of its business, continuously recorded and registered bets and wagers upon the result of trials or contests of speed and power of endurance between certain horses, which were made and took place upon said race track of said respondent. The said respondent, acting through its officers, agents, employés, and representatives in charge of its said business, and being the owner, occupant, and person in charge of said shed or building, known as the betting ring...