Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-2662,89-2662
• Citation: 923 F.2d 552
• Parties: 56 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 338, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,538 Jeffrey L. SOFFERIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., D.J. Nelson and H.R. Tourtellott, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 552

923 F.2d 552

56 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 338,

55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,538

Jeffrey L. SOFFERIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., D.J. Nelson and H.R. Tourtellott,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89-2662.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 9, 1990.

Decided Jan. 29, 1991.

James A. Romanyak, Lawrence T. Miller, Raymond E. Belstner and Gregory A. Stayart, Romanyak & Associates, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Peter J. Meyer, Mark E. Furlane, Debra J. Leonard, Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Jeffrey L. Sofferin brought an action alleging discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The district court granted the defendants' summary judgment motion on the Title VII claim and later dismissed Mr. Sofferin's section 1981 claims. Mr. Sofferin appealed. We reverse the grant of summary judgment on the Title VII claim and remand for further evidentiary proceedings; we affirm the district court's decision dismissing Mr. Sofferin's section 1981 claims.

I BACKGROUND

A. Title VII

Under section 706(e) of Title VII, a charge of employment discrimination generally must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the alleged discrimination. However, if a claimant initially institutes proceedings with a state or local agency that possesses the authority to grant or seek relief from the alleged discrimination, a charge can be filed up to 300 days after the discriminatory act. ¹ Section 706(c) of Title VII provides that once a claimant initiates proceedings with a state agency, he cannot refile subsequently with the EEOC earlier than sixty days after the commencement of the state proceedings unless those proceedings have been "earlier terminated." ² The sixty day provision is intended to "give States and localities an opportunity to combat discrimination free from premature federal intervention."

EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 110, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 1668, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988). Because Mr. Sofferin, at the earliest, filed his claim 299 days after the allegedly discriminatory conduct, he could not file a timely charge with the EEOC if he waited for the full sixty day deferral period to expire. Therefore, in order to file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC, Mr. Sofferin must have initiated proceedings with an appropriate state agency, and this agency must have terminated its proceedings within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. Id. at 111-12, 108 S.Ct. at 1669-70.

B. Facts

American Airlines, Inc. (American) hired Mr. Sofferin on February 17, 1986. During his first year of employment, Mr. Sofferin was a probationary employee in the positions of flight engineer and co-pilot. He was based in Chicago, Illinois. Although Mr. Sofferin was assigned to flights that originated and departed from Chicago, he was permitted to live anywhere he chose; Mr. Sofferin resided in Farmington Hills, Michigan.

On February 20, 1987, American reviewed Mr. Sofferin's performance during the prior twelve months to determine whether he should be retained or discharged. Following this evaluation, American advised Mr. Sofferin that he had failed to complete successfully his probationary period and that he was discharged. At the time of his discharge, Mr. Sofferin believed that American was discriminating against him because he was Jewish. This belief was based on the conduct of H.R. Tourtellott and D.J. Nelson, occasional members of Mr. Sofferin's flight crew--and periodic reviewers of Mr. Sofferin's skills (others also evaluated Mr. Sofferin). Mr. Sofferin contends that Mr. Tourtellott and Mr. Nelson made or tolerated derogatory remarks about the Jewish religion. All of the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred in Illinois.

Mr. Sofferin went to the Detroit office of the EEOC on December 16, 1987 (299 days after his discharge), and filed a charge of discrimination against American. He was advised by an intake person that the charge would be forwarded to the Chicago EEOC office for processing. The Chicago EEOC office apparently received the charge on December 22, 1987 (305 days after Mr. Sofferin's discharge), and referred the charge to the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) on December 24, 1987 (307 days after discharge). Pursuant to a worksharing agreement between the IDHR and the EEOC, the IDHR waived its right to initially process the claim on December 24, 1987, the day it received the charge.

C. Worksharing Agreement

As it has done with a majority of the state and local agencies that combat discrimination, the EEOC has entered into a worksharing agreement with IDHR. See Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. at 112, 108 S.Ct. at 1669. The agreement is intended "to minimize duplication of effort in the handling of deferred charges ... and to achieve maximum consistency of purpose and results." Appellees' App. at 1 (Work Sharing Agreement). The worksharing agreement between the IDHR and the EEOC provides that the IDHR "hereby waives its exclusive [sixty day] right to process those charges [initially processed by the EEOC], ... so that the EEOC can take immediate action on such charges." Id. at 5. The agreement also establishes procedures for referral of charges filed with one agency that also meet the jurisdictional requisites of the other agency.

The agreement specifically provides that all charges received by the EEOC "shall be initially processed by the IDHR" by an EEOC employee in the Chicago District Office designated by the IDHR as its agent. Charges determined by the agent to fall within the waiver provision of the agreement must be forwarded to the IDHR for further review. Unless IDHR notifies the EEOC in writing that it has revoked its decision to terminate activity on the charge, "the determination of the IDHR's agent that such activity is terminated is final." Id. at 1-3.

The charge in this case was filed with the EEOC 299 days after the allegedly discriminatory acts; the filing cannot be timely unless, before the 300th day, IDHR proceedings were both initiated and terminated.

D. District Court Opinion

The district court addressed Mr. Sofferin's argument that the IDHR, through its worksharing agreement with the EEOC, relinquished its control over the initial processing of Mr. Sofferin's charge. The court recognized that "[a] state agency's waiver of its exclusive 60-day period for initially processing a discrimination charge, pursuant to a worksharing agreement with the EEOC, is termination within the meaning of Sec. 706(c) and thereafter the EEOC may deem the charge filed." Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc., 713 F.Supp. 1219, 1224 (N.D.Ill.1989). The worksharing agreement between the IDHR and the EEOC, noted the district court, requires that all charges within the waiver provision be forwarded to the IDHR's office. Therefore, a charge could not be effectively filed with the EEOC until first referred to the IDHR. Because his charge was referred to the IDHR 307 days after his discharge, the district court found that Mr. Sofferin failed to file a timely charge. Id. at 1226. ³

On July 10, 1989, the district court, sua sponte, dismissed Mr. Sofferin's remaining section 1981 claims pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989). The district court found that Patterson limits the application of section 1981 to claims alleging discrimination during contract formation or contract enforcement. It held that, because Mr. Sofferin based his section 1981 claims solely upon allegations of discrimination occurring after the formation of his employment contract, his claims were not actionable under Patterson. Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc., 717 F.Supp. 597 (N.D.Ill.1989).

II ANALYSIS

A. Title VII Claim

The use of worksharing agreements between state and local agencies and the EEOC has been encouraged by Congress and approved by the Supreme Court. Congress has authorized the EEOC to cooperate with state and local agencies by entering into "written agreements" with those agencies in order to promote "effective enforcement" of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-8(b); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-4(g)(1); see also Green v. Los Angeles City Superintendent of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir.1989). The Supreme Court has found the use of worksharing agreements consistent with these statutory sections. See Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. at 122, 108 S.Ct. at 1675 ("These sections clearly envision the establishment of some sort of worksharing agreements between the EEOC and state and local agencies, and they in no way preclude provisions designed to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort or waste of time.").

In this case, we must determine whether a discrimination claim can be both "initiated" and "terminated" by a state agency solely by the terms of a worksharing agreement that waives the state agency's jurisdiction over certain types of claims. In practical terms, we must ascertain the degree of state agency involvement required before a particular claim can be considered "initiated" or "terminated" by the state agency for the purposes of this statutory scheme.

In analyzing this issue, logic would appear to dictate that we ought to deal with the issue of "initiation" before we deal with the issue of "termination." Our approach, however, must be dictated not so much by abstract logic as by the requirement that, as a lower federal court, we draw the rationale of our decision from existing precedent. Since both the Supreme Court and our colleagues in other circuits have addressed more squarely the issue of "termination," we begin, as did the district court, with that requirement. Indeed, our exploration of that issue,...