Gonzalez v. Iocovello

• Decision Date: 30 June 1999
• Citation: 93 N.Y.2d 539,693 N.Y.S.2d 486,715 N.E.2d 489
• Parties: MARIA C. GONZALEZ, Respondent, v. ANTHONY IOCOVELLO et al., Defendants, and CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant. SEAN COSGRIFF, Respondent, and DIANE COSGRIFF, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

93 N.Y.2d 539

715 N.E.2d 489

693 N.Y.S.2d 486

MARIA C. GONZALEZ, Respondent, v. ANTHONY IOCOVELLO et al., Defendants, and CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant.

SEAN COSGRIFF, Respondent, and DIANE COSGRIFF, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

Argued June 1, 1999.

Decided June 30, 1999.

Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel of New York City (Barry P. Schwartz and Leonard Koerner of counsel), for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

Majewski & Poole, L. L. P., Garden City (Michael Majewski of counsel), and Trager, Cronin & Byczek, L. L. P., for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel of New York City (Barry P. Schwartz and Leonard Koerner of counsel), for appellant in the second above-entitled action. Decolator, Cohen & DiPrisco, L. L. P., Mineola (Joseph L. Decolator of counsel), and Godosky & Gentile, P. C., New York City (Richard Godosky and Anthony Gentile of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

Michael B. Risman, Corporation Counsel of City of Buffalo (David J. State of counsel); Edward C. Farrell, Albany; Timothy G. Bax, Acting Corporation Counsel of City of Niagara Falls; Linda S. Kingsley, Corporation Counsel of City of Rochester; Frederick H. Ahrens, Jr., County Attorney of Steuben County, Bath; Gregory J. Poland, Acting Corporation Counsel of City of Binghamton; William F. Ketcham, Corporation Counsel of City of Newburgh; William M. Mooney, Corporation Counsel of City of Yonkers; John W. Dillon, Corporation Counsel of City of Utica; Robert R. Gregory, Albany, A. Kevin Crawford; Peter C. McGinnis, Corporation Counsel of City of Poughkeepsie; Gregory J. Amoroso, Corporation Counsel of City of Rome; Michael C. Brockbank, Corporation Counsel of City of Schenectady; Frederick R. Guy, Corporation Counsel of City of Syracuse; Patrick T. Morphy, Corporation Counsel of City of Troy; Jeffrey Schanback, New York City, and Wallace D. Gossett, Brooklyn, for New York State Conference of Mayors and Municipal Officials and others, amici curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.

Chief Judge KAYE and Judges SMITH, LEVINE, CIPARICK, WESLEY and ROSENBLATT concur.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, J.

These appeals by the City of New York once again present issues of municipal liability to police officers under General Municipal Law § 205-e. In Gonzalez, the question is whether that statute may support a lawsuit by an injured officer against the City based on a fellow officer's violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e). In Cosgriff, the lawsuit by the injured officer springs out of New York City Charter § 2903 (b) (2) and § 2904 and Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201 (c) and § 19-152. The common question is whether these provisions, standing alone or taken together, can also sustain a claim under General Municipal Law § 205-e.

We conclude that the statutory source of liability found in the General Municipal Law is available in both actions. Therefore, in each case, the judgment appealed from and the order of the Appellate Division brought up for review should be affirmed.

I.

New York City police officer Maria Gonzalez was injured when, in the course of her duties as a passenger in a marked police vehicle driven by her partner, she was involved in a traffic accident. Gonzalez's partner drove through a red light and collided with a civilian vehicle in an intersection while responding to a call relating to a burglary in progress.

Gonzalez sued under General Municipal Law § 205-e, alleging that her injury resulted from her partner's violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e). A jury awarded a verdict and damages to Gonzalez. The Appellate Division modified and remitted to Supreme Court as to a matter not relevant here, and as so modified, affirmed. We granted defendant City of New York leave to appeal from the final judgment of Supreme Court to review the prior nonfinal Appellate Division order. The City argues that fellow officer lawsuits are not authorized under General Municipal Law § 205-e. Alternatively, the City proposes that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) cannot serve as the predicate for this kind of liability.

In the second, unrelated case, plaintiff Sean Cosgriff was injured when, in the course of his duties as a New York City police officer, he tripped and fell on a defective sidewalk. He was pursuing individuals involved in the sale of narcotics. More than a year prior to the accident, defendant City of New York had issued a sidewalk repair notice to the owner of the abutting premises.

Cosgriff sued the owner of the premises and its management company, as well as the City. The private defendants settled their case with Cosgriff. His claim against the City proceeded under theories of common-law negligence and General Municipal Law § 205-e. The latter rested on violations of New York City Charter § 2903 (b) (2) and § 2904 and Administrative Code § 7-201 (c) and § 19-152. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, but the Appellate Division modified by reinstating the claim under General Municipal Law § 205-e. This Court granted the City leave to appeal from the final judgment of Supreme Court awarding damages to plaintiff, to review the prior nonfinal Appellate Division order. It contends— comparably to its theory in the Gonzalez case—that the City Charter and Administrative Code provisions cannot support a claim under General Municipal Law § 205-e.

II.

General Municipal Law § 205-e provides some avenues of redress for injured police officers or their representatives. As relevant to these two appeals, the statute provides:

"1. In addition to any other right of action or recovery under any other provision of law, in the event any accident, causing injury, death or a disease which results in death, occurs directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal, state, county, village, town or city governments or of any and all their departments, divisions and bureaus, the person or persons guilty * * * shall be liable to pay any officer, member, agent or employee of any police department injured, or whose life may be lost while in the discharge or performance at any time or place of any duty imposed by the police commissioner, police chief or other superior officer of the police department, or to pay to the spouse and children, or to pay the parents, or to pay the brothers and sisters, being the surviving heirs-at-law of any deceased person thus having lost his life, a sum of money * * * provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be deemed to expand or restrict any right afforded to or limitation imposed upon an employer, an employee or his or her representative by virtue of any provisions of the workers' compensation law. * * *

"3. This section shall be deemed to provide a right of action regardless of whether the injury or death is caused by the violation of a provision which codifies a common-law duty and regardless of whether the injury or death is caused by the violation of a provision prohibiting activities or conditions which increase the dangers inherent in the work of any officer, member, agent or employee of any police department."

General Municipal Law § 205-e was initially enacted to overrule this Court's extension of the Firefighter's Rule to police officers (see, Santangelo v State of New York, 71 NY2d 393

; L 1989, ch 346, Sponsor's Mem in Support, 1989 NY Legis Ann, at 180; Governor's Mem approving L 1989, ch 346, 1989 NY Legis Ann, at 182). The statute has been amended several times since its passage ten years ago (see, L 1990, ch 762; L 1992, ch 474; L 1994, ch 664; L 1996, ch 703). The successive amendments, for the most part, have been in response to restrictive judicial interpretations of the statute and varying factual circumstances. Each enactment has been promoted as being for the express purpose of clarifying and emphasizing the legislative intent that General Municipal Law § 205-e be applied "expansively" (see, L 1990, ch 762; L 1992, ch 474; L 1994, ch 664; L 1996, ch 703).

As this Court recently stated in a related context but different circumstance, "an expansive interpretation is consistent with the over-all goal of this legislation, as demonstrated by the Legislature through its numerous amendments to the statute" (Schiavone v City of New York, 92 NY2d 308, 317; see also, Ruotolo v State of New York [Ruotolo II], 83 NY2d 248

). Indeed, the most recent amendment to the statute, which added subdivision (3) to General Municipal Law § 205-e was, in part, a direct response to the Appellate Division decision in St. Jacques v City of New York (215 AD2d 75, affd on different grounds 88 NY2d 920). There, the court had held that a statute which merely codifies a common-law duty cannot form the basis for a General Municipal Law § 205-e claim (L 1996, ch 703 [replacing that holding]).

III.

Despite these consistent legislative actions and developments, the City urges this Court to clamp down on General Municipal Law § 205-e applications, so as to preclude lawsuits derived from fellow officer conduct. General Municipal Law § 205-e contains no such categorical exemption in favor of the City. Indeed, had the Legislature chosen to insert a fellow officer lawsuit block, it had many opportunities to do so over the course of its virtual biennial amendments to the statute—all designed, notably, to benefit officers and to preserve their opportunities for redress in the courts.

Most pertinently, in the very same 1996 enactment by which the Legislature added subdivision (3) to General Municipal Law § 205-e, it simultaneously enacted General Obligations Law § 11-106. The General Obligations Law created a distinct right of...