Doe v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 18 March 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 12–11194.
• Citation: 932 F.Supp.2d 803
• Parties: JOHN DOES 1–4 and Mary Doe, Plaintiffs, v. Richard SNYDER and Col. Kriste Etue, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

932 F.Supp.2d 803

JOHN DOES 1–4 and Mary Doe, Plaintiffs,

v.Richard SNYDER and Col. Kriste Etue, Defendants.

Case No. 12–11194.

United States District Court,

E.D. Michigan,

Southern Division.

March 18, 2013.

Validity Called into Doubt

M.C.L.A. §§ 28.721, 28.725(1)(f, g), 28.727(1)(i), 28.734Michael J. Steinberg, American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, William W. Swor, Detroit, MI, Miriam J. Aukerman, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Grand Rapids, MI, Paul D. Reingold, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, for Plaintiffs.

Erik A. Grill, Margaret A. Nelson, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS

ROBERT H. CLELAND, District Judge.

On March 16, 2012, Plaintiffs John Does I–IV and Mary Doe initiated the above-captioned lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Michigan Sex Offender Registry Act (“SORA” or “Act”), as amended in 2011. Governor Richard Snyder and Colonel Kriste Etue of the Michigan Department of State Police are named in their official capacity as Defendants. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction. On April 24, 2012, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. Plaintiffs responded on May 25, 2012, and Defendants replied on June 15, 2012. The court heard oral argument on August 8, 2012. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory History

Michigan first enacted SORA in 1994 in response to Congress's Jacob Wetterling Act. As initially enacted, the Act established a confidential database available only to law enforcement containing information about sex offenders. The statute applied retroactively to individuals who were convicted before October 1, 1995. Since its adoption SORA has undergone numerous amendments.

In 1997, SORA was amended to require law enforcement agencies to make registry information available to the public during business hours. A 1999 amendment increased the number of offenses for which registration was required and mandated that a less-detailed version of the registry be made available to the public online.

SORA was again amended in 2002, 2004, and 2006. These amendments, among other things, increased reporting requirements for registrants; removed the registration requirement for individuals convicted under the HYTA after October 1, 2004; barred registrants from working, residing, or loitering within 1,000 feet of a school; and created a program whereby members of the public could be notified electronically when a sex offender moved into a particular zip code.

The most recent amendment to SORA came in 2011, which significantly altered the statute to comply with the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. As amended in 2011, SORA now categorizes registrants into three tiers which determine the length of time individuals must register and the frequency with which they must report. Tier classifications are based solely on a registrant's offense and do not factor in an individualized determination of risk. There is no way to reduce one's tier classification or to remove oneself from the list. SORA 2011 extended the length of registration for most registrants, and individuals who were assigned to Tier III, Plaintiffs included, are now required to register for life. The 2011 amendment also (1) expanded the in-person reporting requirement to require registrants to report to the police station within three days of establishing any new electronic mail address, instant message address, or other designation used in Internet communications or postings; (2) expanded registrants' reporting obligations before traveling; and (3) increases the number of times registrants must regularly report in-person each year.

B. Plaintiffs

All five Plaintiffs are Michigan residents who are required by law to register as sex offenders and comply with the myriad provisions of SORA. They explain their backgrounds in the complaint.

In 1990, when John Doe I was twenty, he armed himself and attempted to rob his former employer, a fast-food restaurant. (Compl. ¶ 16.) In the midst of the robbery, he threatened to kidnap the manager's 12–year–old son, ( Id. ¶ 17), but the manager and the son escaped. Later, John Doe I was apprehended and eventually entered a plea of guilty to armed robbery, weapons charges, and kidnapping, and was sentenced to twenty-to-forty years in prison. ( Id. ¶¶ 18–20.) He was released in 2009. ( Id. ¶ 22.) Although John Doe I's criminal offense lacked an overtly sexual component, because he was guilty of kidnapping, he is classified as a Tier III offender under SORA and is required to register as a sex offender for life. ( Id. ¶¶ 25–26.)

John Does II–IV all had sexual relationships with young girls. ( Id. ¶¶ 30, 47, 57.) John Doe II was eighteen years old in 1996 and had a sexual relationship with a fourteen year old. ( Id. ¶ 30.) He pled guilty to third degree criminal sexual conduct (which requires sexual penetration) under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (“HYTA”). This allowed him to have his case dismissed and his record sealed after completing a two-year trainee period of probation. ( Id. ¶¶ 31–32, 35.) An assignment to trainee status under HYTA is not a “conviction” of a crime unless the court revokes the status. ( Id. ¶ 33.) Under SORA, John Doe II is classified as a Tier III offender and is required to register as a sex offender for life. ( Id. ¶ 42.)

In 1998, when Doe III was nineteen years old, he had a sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-old. ( Id. ¶ 47.) He pled guilty to attempted third degree criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced to four years probation under HYTA. ( Id. ¶ 50.) During his last year on probation, Doe III failed to register for Michigan's sex offender registry within the time required and had his status under HYTA revoked. ( Id. ¶ 52.) His conviction was then entered. Under SORA, he is classified as a Tier III offender and is required to register as a sex offender for life.

In 2005, when John Doe IV was twenty-three years old, he had a sexual relationship with a fifteen-year-old. ( Id. ¶ 57.) He later pled guilty to attempted third degree criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced to five years probation and counseling. ( Id. ¶¶ 59, 61.) Under SORA, he is classified as a Tier III offender and required to register as a sex offender for life. ( Id. ¶ 63.)

In 2003, Mary Doe was convicted of having a sexual relationship with a fifteen-year-old boy and was sentenced to three years in prison ( Id. ¶ 65–66.) She was released after serving seven months, and her sentence was modified to four years of probation and 200 hours of community service. ( Id. ¶ 73.) Under the terms of her judicial release, Mary Doe was required to move from Ohio, where she had been convicted, to Michigan. Under SORA, she is classified as a Tier III offender and required to register as a sex offender for life. ( Id. ¶ 76.)

C. Complaint

Plaintiffs claim that the retroactive nature of SORA and its extensive reporting requirements and prohibitions violate their constitutional rights. The complaint alleges eight counts: (1) violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) violation of Plaintiffs' fundamental rights to travel; (3) violation of Plaintiffs' fundamental rights to engage in common occupations of life; (4) violation of Plaintiffs rights to direct the education and upbringing of their children; (5) violation of the First Amendment; (6) violation of the Due Process Clause because the Act is retroactive and “harsh and oppressive”; (7) violation of the Due Process Clause because certain provisions are vague and impossible to comply with; and (8) violation of the Headlee Amendment to the Michigan Constitution.

II. STANDARD

When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must construe the complaint in a light most favorableto the plaintiff and accept all the factual allegations as true. Evans–Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d 223, 228 (6th Cir.2005); Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.2002). “[T]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir.2007). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

The plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Though decidedly generous, this standard of review does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions.

[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the complaint's allegations are true.

Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Further, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In application, a “complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Therefore, “to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and to state a claim to relief...