Sierra Club v. Robertson, 91-2565
Decision Date | 27 March 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 91-2565,91-2565 |
Citation | 960 F.2d 83 |
Parties | SIERRA CLUB; Jerry Williams; Defenders of the Ouachita Forest; Sherry Balkenhol; Bill Greer; Stan Heard, Plaintiffs, Ouachita Watch League; Concerned Citizens of Hot Springs; Beth Johnson, Intervenors, v. F. Dale ROBERTSON, Chief, USDA Forest Service; John E. Alcock; John M. Curran, Supervisor, Ouachita National Forest; Larry Theivagt; George Landrum; Paul Fuller; Don Monk; John Archer; James Watson; Robert Raines; Douglas Webb; Eugene Hayes, in his official capacity as Fourche District Ranger, USDA Forest Service, Defendants-Appellees, Arkansas Forestry Association; Ouachita National Forest Timber Purchasers Group; Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers Council, Intervenor-Appellees. State of Arkansas, Movant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Jeffery A. Bell, Little Rock, Ark., argued (Winston Bryant, Jeffrey A. Bell and Mary B. Stallcup, on brief), for appellant.
Peter A. Appel, Washington, D.C., argued (Barry M. Hartman, J. Michael Fitzhugh, Charles E. Smith, Martin W. Matzen, David F. Shuey and Peter A. Appel, on brief), and Vicki Breman, Atlanta, Ga., of counsel, for appellees.
Before FAGG and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges, and WOODS, * District Judge.
The State of Arkansas appeals from the district court's denial of the State's motion to intervene as a plaintiff in an action against the Forest Service. We reverse and remand.
The Forest Service proposed to implement certain forest management practices (the "Plan") in the Ouachita National Forest in Arkansas. The Plan addressed, among other things, the production of trees in even-aged stands and the use of burning, clearcutting, and herbicides.
The Sierra Club, certain private citizens, and another private organization ("Plaintiffs") filed suit against the Forest Service for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs asked the court to declare the Plan void and to enjoin its implementation, alleging that the proposed forest management practices would detract from the aesthetic value of the Forest and lessen their enjoyment of hunting, hiking, biking, fishing and other recreational activities. Plaintiffs also claimed that the practices would diminish tourism.
After the district court stayed the proceedings to accommodate an administrative appeal, and before the Forest Service had filed an answer to the complaint, the State moved to intervene as a plaintiff. The State sought intervention as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) or, in the alternative, permissive intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(2).
The State sought to intervene in order to protect a number of interests. The State asserts an interest in the fish and wildlife within the state, which it holds in trust for its citizens. The State also claims an interest in protecting the recreational opportunities of its citizens and in promoting the tourism industry, both for the sake of the state economy and as a source of tax revenue. It also asserts an interest as a property owner: the State owns parks within and adjacent to the Ouachita National Forest, and it leases land downstream from the Forest for use as recreational areas. All these interests are threatened, the State alleges, because the proposed practices could degrade the quality of the water flowing from the Forest, destroy wildlife habitat, and diminish the scenic and aesthetic quality of the state.
A timely motion to intervene as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) should be granted where three conditions are met: 1) the proposed intervenor has an interest in the subject matter of the action; 2) the interest may be impaired; and 3) the interest is not adequately represented by an existing party to the action. Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski Special School Dist. No. 1, 738 F.2d 82 (8th Cir.1984). The district court denied the State's motion on the ground that Plaintiffs adequately represent the State's interests. 1
We must first determine the appropriate standard to apply when reviewing the district court's decision as to the adequacy of representation. Several Circuits have expressly adopted a de novo standard for reviewing the denial of a motion to intervene as of right, except as to the timeliness requirement. United States v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir.1991); Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 921 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir.1990); Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir.1989); see also Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135, 1151 n. 16 (11th Cir.1986) ( ); Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1468 (D.C.Cir.1985) ( ). Other Circuits have adopted an abuse of discretion standard of review. In re Sierra Club, 945 F.2d 776, 779 (4th Cir.1991); International Paper Co. v. Town of Jay, Me., 887 F.2d 338, 344 (1st Cir.1989); Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 947, 108 S.Ct. 336, 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 990-91 (2d Cir.1984).
While the parties have not referred us to any case in which we explicitly announced the appropriate standard, the language employed in our previous decisions indicates that de novo review is appropriate. See Little Rock School Dist., 738 F.2d at 84 (); S.E.C. v. Flight Transp. Corp., 699 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir.1983) ( ); Corby Recreation, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 581 F.2d 175, 176 (8th Cir.1978) ( ); Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 870 (8th Cir.1977) ( ); Liddell v. Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir.1976) (, )cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2987, 53 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1977); Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104, 110 (8th Cir.1960) ( ).
This standard of review comports with our usual practice of reviewing de novo a district court's application of law to undisputed facts. See, e.g., Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. United States, 953 F.2d 1086, 1089 n. 4 (8th Cir.1992); see also Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1902 at 231 (1986) (). Accordingly, in the light of the language in our prior decisions and in accordance with the holdings of the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, we will review de novo the district court's decision regarding the adequacy of representation.
The "inadequate representation" condition is satisfied if the proposed intervenor shows that the representation of its interests by the current party or parties to the action "may be" inadequate. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n. 10, 92 S.Ct. 630, 636 n....
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