Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment

• Decision Date: 18 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 26 EAP 2008.,No. 25 EAP 2008.,No. 27 EAP 2008.,No. 28 EAP 2008,25 EAP 2008.,26 EAP 2008.,27 EAP 2008.,28 EAP 2008
• Citation: 977 A.2d 1132
• Parties: Gary SPAHN, Appellant v. ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, the City of Philadelphia and R.G. Woodstock Associates, LLC, Appellees Society Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB), Mary Cawley Tracy, Wynnefield Heights Civic Association, Belmont Village Community Association, and George David, Jr. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Philadelphia, the City of Philadelphia and Patrick B. Gillespie, Jr./Shannon Outdoor, LLC Appeal of Society Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB), Mary Cawley Tracy, Wynnefield Heights Civic Association and Belmont Village Community Association. Society Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB), Mary Tracy, Wecaccoe CDC, Whitman Council, Fred Druding and Jovida Hill, Appellants v. Zoning Hearing Board of Adjustment of the City of Philadelphia, City of Philadelphia, BDB Company and Keystone Outdoor Advertising, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

977 A.2d 1132

Gary SPAHN, Appellant v. ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, the City of Philadelphia and R.G. Woodstock Associates, LLC, Appellees Society Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB), Mary Cawley Tracy, Wynnefield Heights Civic Association, Belmont Village Community Association, and George David, Jr. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Philadelphia, the City of Philadelphia and Patrick B. Gillespie, Jr./Shannon Outdoor, LLC

Appeal of Society Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB), Mary Cawley Tracy, Wynnefield Heights Civic Association and Belmont Village Community Association.

Society Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB), Mary Tracy, Wecaccoe CDC, Whitman Council, Fred Druding and Jovida Hill, Appellants v. Zoning Hearing Board of Adjustment of the City of Philadelphia, City of Philadelphia, BDB Company and Keystone Outdoor Advertising, Appellees.

No. 25 & 26 EAP 2008.

No. 27 EAP 2008.

No. 28 EAP 2008

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 2, 2008.

Decided August 18, 2009.

Samuel C. Stretton, Esq., Law Offices of Samuel C. Stretton, West Chester, for Gary Spahn, Society Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB)/M.C. Tracy/Wynnefield Hghts. Civic Ass'n/Belmont Village Comm. Ass'n, appellants.

Richard Gerson Feder, Esq., Cheryl Lorraine Gaston, Esq., City of Philadelphia Law Dept., for Zoning Bd. of Adjustment/City of Philadelphia, appellee.

Joseph Beller, Esq., Beller, Stouffer & Orphanides, L.L.P., for R.G. Woodstock Associates, LLC, appellee.

Lathrop Barrere Nelson, III, Esq., Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, L.L.P., Philadelphia, for Patrick B. Gillespie, Jr. and Shannon Outdoor, LLC, appellee.

Stephen G. Pollock, Esq., Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, L.L.P., Philadelphia, Vincent B. Mancini, Esq., Law Offices of Vincent B. Mancini & Associates, Media, John M. Elliott, Esq., Elliott Greenleaf, Blue Bell, for BDB Co. and Keystone Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc., appellees.

BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD and McCAFFERY, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice CASTILLE.

The questions presented in this appeal arose from the General Assembly's enactment of Section 17.1 of the First Class City Home Rule Act ("Home Rule Act"), 53 P.S. § 13131.1.¹ The enactment occurred following the introduction of House Bill No. 1954 on September 9, 2003, which originally involved increasing the fines and penalties for Philadelphia Code ("Code") violations (Section 1 of the bill). The bill was then amended on November 19, 2004 and added Section 2 to the bill providing for standing in appeals from zoning matters as follows:²

In addition to any aggrieved person, the governing body vested with legislative powers under any charter adopted pursuant to this act shall have standing to appeal any decision of a zoning hearing board or other board or commission created to regulate development within the city. As used in this section, the term "aggrieved person" does not include taxpayers of the city that are not detrimentally harmed by the decision of the zoning hearing board or other board or commission created to regulate development.

53 P.S. § 13131.1 (emphasis added). The Act was signed into law on November 20, 2004. Section 2 of the bill became Section 17.1 of the Home Rule Act.

The specific issues raised in this appeal are whether the Pennsylvania General Assembly removed general taxpayer standing from the Code by enacting Section 17.1 of the Home Rule Act; whether such action violated the single subject rule of the Pennsylvania Constitution; and whether appellants have standing to pursue the zoning challenges under traditional notions of standing.

The Commonwealth Court concluded that following the enactment of Section 17.1, taxpayer standing was no longer viable under the Philadelphia Zoning Ordinance. The court also concluded that the enactment did not violate the single subject rule and that appellants did not have standing. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the orders of the Commonwealth Court.

Although the cases were consolidated before this Court because they all involve a challenge to the interpretation and constitutionality of Section 17.1, the matters arose as separate appeals and, therefore, the facts and procedural history of each case are distinct and are discussed separately.

Spahn v. Zoning Board of Adjustment (25 and 26 EAP 2008)

R.G. Woodstock Associates ("Woodstock") is the owner of two vacant lots on Bainbridge Street in Philadelphia. The lots are in an area zoned R-10 residential district. In June of 2005, Woodstock filed two separate applications with the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections ("L & I") seeking to construct a three-story, single family home on each of the lots. L & I denied the permits because each residence did not have a roofed-over front porch with usable space underneath and failed to meet certain open area requirements of the Code. Woodstock appealed to the Zoning Hearing Board of Philadelphia ("Board") seeking a dimensional variance with respect to each lot. The Board conducted a hearing on August 17, 2005.

Prior to the hearing, Gary Spahn (one of the appellants herein) submitted a letter in opposition to the request. At the hearing, the parties agreed that the front porch was not at issue but was the result of a clerical/labeling error on the design plans and the matter proceeded solely on the question of the open area requirements. The Code requires a minimum open area of 30% for lots in an area zoned R-10. The plans submitted by Woodstock only provided for an open area of 19% with respect to each lot. Spahn testified in opposition to the granting of the dimensional variance at the hearing. Following the hearing, the Board granted a variance with respect to each lot, concluding that Woodstock had presented sufficient evidence to meet the criteria necessary for a variance. Spahn appealed the grant of both variances and the trial court consolidated the appeals.

Before the trial court Woodstock filed a motion to quash the appeals on the basis that Spahn was not an aggrieved person having standing to appeal the Board's decision. Woodstock argued that the General Assembly's addition of Section 17.1 to the Home Rule Act eliminated the general standing granted to any taxpayer under Section 14-1807 of the Code to appeal a decision of the Board. The trial court agreed with Woodstock's interpretation of Section 17.1 and pointed out that Spahn did not present evidence to establish himself as an aggrieved party. Therefore, the trial court granted Woodstock's motion to quash the appeals on the basis that Spahn did not have standing to pursue them. Spahn appealed.

On appeal, a panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court's order. Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment et al., 922 A.2d 24 (Pa.Commw.2007). As to Spahn's first argument, that Section 17.1 did not eliminate taxpayer standing, the court majority explained that it saw "no purpose" of the language of Section 17.1 "other than to limit the broad grant of general taxpayer standing provided" in the Code. Id. at 28. The court further noted that Section 17.1 limited the definition of "aggrieved person" by specifically excluding "taxpayer" from its definition. Therefore, "under Section 17.1, only a taxpayer with an interest that could be `detrimentally' affected by a decision of an entity such as the Board has standing to appeal." Id.

Turning to the issue of whether the standing provision of the Code supersedes Section 17.1, the court acknowledged that the concept of home rule gives municipalities the right to enact such ordinances, but that the home rule municipality cannot exercise powers "contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by acts of the General Assembly." Spahn, 922 A.2d at 29 (quoting 53 P.S. § 13133(b)). Thus, the General Assembly has the authority to negate ordinances enacted by a home rule municipality if the conflicting statute involves a substantive matter of statewide concern. Section 17.1 met this standard since "this issue involves access to the courts, a concern for every citizen [o]f this Commonwealth." Id. at 29.

The court then looked at the constitutionality of Section 17.1 under Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution pertaining to the single subject requirement. Relying on this Court's pronouncement in Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund v. Commonwealth, 583 Pa. 275, 877 A.2d 383 (2005) (hereafter "PAGE"), the court explained that the rule was not violated so long as the amendments to the bill are "germane" to the bill's subject. Applying such a test, the court concluded that Spahn confused subject for content since, in this case, the standing language was germane to the subject of the bill—an amendment to the Home Rule Act, 53 P.S. § 13101 et seq. See Spahn, 922 A.2d at 30-31.

Finally, considering whether Spahn was an aggrieved party, the court agreed with the trial court's review of the record evidence that revealed that Spahn lived approximately one and a half blocks from the subject properties, but that he only walked by the properties every day. Thus, the court concluded that Spahn's interest was no different from "the interest common to all citizens regarding obedience to the law." Id. at 31.

Judge Simpson concurred in the result of the majority, writing separately to note his view that Section 17.1 may have violated the "clear expression of title requirement" contained in Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, but concluding that such an argument was not preserved. Spahn, 922 A.2d at 31-32 (Simpson, J., concurring).

This Court granted allowance of appeal to consider the statutory construction of Section 17.1, the single subject requirement, and aggrieved party standing. Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 598 Pa. 108, 954 A.2d 567 (2008).

Society Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB) et al. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Adjustment of Philadelphia County et al. (...