568 U.S. 342 (2013), 11-820, Chaidez v. United States
|Citation:||568 U.S. 342, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 185 L.Ed.2d 149, 81 U.S.L.W. 4112, 24 Fla.L.Weekly Fed. S 42|
|Opinion Judge:||Kagan, Justice.|
|Party Name:||ROSELVA CHAIDEZ, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES|
|Attorney:||Jeffrey L. Fisher argued the cause for petitioner. Donald B. Verrilli Jr. argued the cause for respondent.|
|Judge Panel:||Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 358 Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p.359. Thomas, Justice...|
|Case Date:||February 20, 2013|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued November 1, 2012.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. Ill., 2011)
655 F.3d 684, affirmed.
[133 S.Ct. 1104] Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against petitioner Chaidez in 2009 upon learning that she had pleaded guilty to mail fraud in 2004. To avoid removal, she sought to overturn that conviction by filing a petition for a writ of coram nobis, contending that her former attorney's failure to advise her of the guilty plea's immigration consequences constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. While her petition was pending, this Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284, 295, that the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients of the deportation risks of guilty pleas. The District Court vacated Chaidez's conviction, determining that Padilla did not announce a " new rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, and thus applied to Chaidez's case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla had [185 L.Ed.2d 153] declared a new rule and should not apply in a challenge to a final conviction.
Held: Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. Pp. ___ - ___, 185 L.Ed.2d, at 155-162.
(a) Under Teague, a person whose conviction is already final may not benefit from a new rule of criminal procedure on collateral review. A " case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." 489 U.S., at 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334. And a holding is not so dictated unless it would have been " apparent to all reasonable jurists." Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-528, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771. At the same time, a case does not " announce a new rule [when] it [is] merely an application of the principle that governed" a prior decision to a different set of facts. Teague, 489 U.S., at 307, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334. Thus, garden-variety applications of the test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, for assessing ineffective assistance claims do not produce new rules, id., at 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.
But Padilla did more than just apply Strickland 's general standard to yet another factual situation. Before deciding if failing to inform a client about the risk of deportation " fell below [ Strickland 's] objective standard of reasonableness," 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, Padilla first considered the threshold question whether advice about deportation was " categorically removed" from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it involved only a " collateral consequence" of a conviction, rather than a component of a criminal sentence, 559 U.S., at 366, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1482, 176 L.Ed.2d 284. That is, prior to asking how the Strickland test applied, Padilla asked whether that test applied at all.
That preliminary question came to the Court unsettled. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, had explicitly left open whether the Sixth Amendment right extends to collateral consequences. That left the issue to the state and lower federal courts, and they [133 S.Ct. 1105] almost unanimously concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not require attorneys to inform their clients of a conviction's collateral consequences, including deportation. Padilla 's contrary ruling thus answered an open question about the Sixth Amendments reach, in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions. In so doing, Padilla broke new ground and imposed a new obligation. Pp. ___ - ___, 185 L.Ed.2d, at 155-160.
(b) Chaidez argues that Padilla did no more than apply Strickland to a new set of facts. But she ignores that Padilla had to develop new law to determine that Strickland applied at all. The few lower court decisions she cites held only that a lawyer may not affirmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise actively mislead his client as to any important matter. Those rulings do not apply to her case, and they do not show that all reasonable judges thought that lawyers had to advise their clients about deportation risks. Neither does INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347, have any relevance here. In saying that a reasonably competent lawyer would tell a non-citizen client about a guilty plea's deportation [185 L.Ed.2d 154] consequences, St. Cyr did not determine that the Sixth Amendment requires a lawyer to provide such information. It took Padilla to decide that question. Pp. ___ - ___, 185 L.Ed.2d, at 160-162.
655 F.3d 684, affirmed.
Jeffrey L. Fisher argued the cause for petitioner.
Donald B. Verrilli Jr. argued the cause for respondent.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 358 Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p.359.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal defendant to provide advice about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea. We consider here whether that ruling applies retroactively, so that a person whose conviction became final before we decided Padilla can benefit from it. We conclude that, under the principles set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), Padilla does not have retroactive effect.
Petitioner Roselva Chaidez hails from Mexico, but became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1977. About 20 years later, she helped to defraud an automobile insurance company out of $26,000. After federal agents uncovered [133 S.Ct. 1106] the scheme, Chaidez pleaded guilty to two counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The District Court sentenced her to four years of probation and ordered her to pay restitution. Chaidez's conviction became final in 2004.
Under federal immigration law, the offenses to which Chaidez pleaded guilty are " aggravated felonies," subjecting her to mandatory removal from this country. See 8 U.S.C. § § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). But according to Chaidez, her attorney never advised her of that fact, and at the time of her plea she remained ignorant of it.
Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against Chaidez in 2009, after an application she made for citizenship alerted them to her prior conviction. To avoid removal, Chaidez sought to overturn that conviction by filing a petition for a writ of coram nobis in Federal District Court.1 She argued that her former attorney's failure to advise her of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
While Chaidez's petition was pending, this Court decided Padilla. Our ruling vindicated Chaidez's view of the Sixth Amendment: We held that [185 L.Ed.2d 155] criminal defense attorneys must
inform non-citizen clients of the risks of deportation arising from guilty pleas. See 559 U.S., at 374, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1482, 176 L.Ed.2d 284, 295. But the Government argued that Chaidez could not benefit from Padilla because it announced a " new rule" and, under Teague, such rules do not apply in collateral challenges to already-final convictions.
The District Court determined that Padilla " did not announce a new rule for Teague purposes," and therefore should apply to Chaidez's case. 730 F.Supp.2d 896, 904 (ND Ill. 2010). It then found that Chaidez's counsel had performed deficiently under Padilla and that Chaidez suffered prejudice as a result. Accordingly, the court vacated Chaidez's conviction. See No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664 (ND Ill., Oct. 6, 2010).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla had declared a new rule and so should not apply in a challenge to a final conviction. " Before Padilla," the Seventh Circuit reasoned, " the [Supreme] Court had never held that the Sixth Amendment requires a criminal defense attorney to provide advice about matters not directly related to [a] client's criminal prosecution,"...
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