A.A. v. Rolle, s. 78142
| Decision Date | 23 July 1992 |
| Docket Number | 78572,Nos. 78142,78665 and 79071,78577,78571,s. 78142 |
| Citation | 604 So.2d 813 |
| Parties | A.A., a juvenile, Petitioner, v. Cornell ROLLE, etc., Respondent. L.L., a child, Petitioner, v. James WOOLSEY, etc., Respondent. A.M.R., a child, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. T.T., a child, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. T.S., a child, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. L.S., a child, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. 604 So.2d 813, 17 Fla. L. Week. S561 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robert Burke and Elliot H. Scherker, Asst. Public Defenders, Miami, and Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and Ward L. Metzger, Asst. Public Defender, Jacksonville, for petitioners.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Gypsy Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
Claudia Wright, Clinical Professor, Florida State University, College of Law, Tallahassee, amicus curiae, for the Children's Advocacy Center, joined by Children First: A Joint Project in Law, Medicine and Educ.
We have for review six consolidated cases involving juveniles who were adjudicated guilty of contempt of court and sentenced to varying periods of incarceration in secure detention facilities. A.A. v. Rolle, 580 So.2d 282, 285 (Fla.3d DCA 1991); L.L. v. Woolsey, 583 So.2d 823, 823 (Fla.1st DCA 1991); A.M.R. v. State, 583 So.2d 823, 824 (Fla.1st DCA 1991); T.T. v. State, 583 So.2d 736, 736 (Fla.1st DCA 1991); In re T.S., 585 So.2d 498, 498 (Fla.1st DCA 1991); In re L.S., 589 So.2d 467, 467 (Fla.1st DCA 1991). In A.A. and L.L., the district courts denied the children's petitions for writs of habeas corpus and affirmed the sentences. A.M.R., T.T., T.S., and L.S. are per curiam affirmances. All the decisions certified conflict with T.D.L. v. Chinault, 570 So.2d 1335 (Fla.2d DCA 1990). 1
Four cases, A.M.R., T.T., T.S., and L.S., involve children who were in the jurisdiction of the courts because they were physically or sexually abused or neglected and thereby adjudicated "dependent." 2 These four children were found guilty of indirect contempt of court 3 for violating court orders not to run away from their current placements and/or to attend school. Two cases, A.A. and L.L., involve juveniles who were previously adjudicated "delinquent." 4 These children were sentenced to secure detention for direct contempt of the court. 5
The issue to be resolved here is not whether juveniles can be found in contempt of court, but whether they can be punished by incarceration in "secure detention facilities" 6 for contempt of court. All parties concede that the juvenile court has the inherent power to adjudicate juveniles in contempt of court. The only question is whether the legislature has precluded the use of facilities it has designated for a specific purpose, secure detention facilities, for punishing such juveniles.
It is beyond question that the legislature has the power to determine how and to what extent the courts may punish criminal conduct, including contempt. Thus, although it has been recognized that courts have both an inherent and a statutory power to make a finding of contempt, see, e.g., State ex rel. Giblin v. Sullivan, 157 Fla. 496, 507, 26 So.2d 509, 515-16 (1946); Sec. 38.22, Fla.Stat. (1991), the sanctions to be used by the courts in punishing contempt may properly be limited by statute. See, e.g., Aaron v. State, 284 So.2d 673, 676 (Fla.1973) (). As stated by this Court in Ex parte A.K. Edwards:
[I]n the absence of any statutory limitations or restrictions, the power of the several courts over "contempts" is omnipotent, and its exercise is not to be enquired into by any other tribunal....
The genius of our people, however, ever sensitively jealous of restraints upon the personal liberty of the citizen, has caused them, through the action of the legislative department, to limit and restrict this common law power of the courts.
11 Fla. 174, 186 (1867) (emphasis added); see also State ex rel. Grebstein v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 483-84, 129 So. 818, 820 (1939). 7 Thus, we must now determine how the legislature has addressed the question presented.
The pertinent statutory provisions in this case concern the 1988 and 1990 amendments to chapter 39, the "Florida Juvenile Justice Act." The State argues that neither the 1988 nor the 1990 amendments prohibit the incarceration of juvenile contemnors in secure detention facilities. Alternatively, the State argues that even if the 1988 amendments could be read as containing such a prohibition, the enactment of section 39.044(10), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), now indicates legislative intent to permit secure detention for juvenile contemnors.
In 1988 the Florida legislature undertook substantial amendments and revisions to chapter 39 with the stated specific intent of restricting the placement of juveniles in secure detention. See ch. 88-381, Secs. 12-14, Laws of Fla. The codified provision on legislative intent reads:
[I]t is the intent of the Legislature that detention under the provisions of part I of this chapter be used only when less restrictive interim placement alternatives prior to adjudication and disposition are not appropriate. It is further the intent of the Legislature that decisions to detain be based in part on a prudent assessment of risk, and that decisions to detain be limited to situations where there is clear and compelling evidence that a child presents a danger to himself or the community, presents a risk of failing to appear, or is likely to commit a subsequent law violation prior to adjudication and disposition.
Sec. 39.1105, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1988) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the legislature enacted section 39.0321, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), which provided 39.0321 Prohibited use of secure detention.--
A child alleged to have committed a delinquent act shall not be placed in secure detention for the following reasons:
(1) To punish, treat or rehabilitate the child.
(2) To allow a parent to avoid his or her legal responsibility.
(3) To permit more convenient administrative access to the juvenile.
(4) To facilitate further interrogation or investigation.
(5) Due to lack of more appropriate facilities.
(Emphasis added). "Secure detention facility" was defined by the legislature as "a physically restricting facility for the temporary care of children, pending delinquency adjudication or court disposition." Sec. 39.01(45), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1988). Thus, under section 39.0321, a juvenile could never be placed in secure detention for any of the reasons enumerated. More specifically, a delinquent child could only be placed in secure detention based on the risk assessment guidelines set forth in section 39.032, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988). That assessment looked to whether the child was at risk of failing to appear at the detention hearing, was a danger to himself or the community, or was likely to commit a subsequent violation of law prior to disposition. See Sec. 39.032(2)(a)-(f), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1988).
In T.D.L. v. Chinault, 570 So.2d 1335, 1336 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), the Second District held correctly:
Turning to T.D.L.'s first issue, he challenges the use of secure detention to punish his contemptuous conduct. In response, the state relies upon existing authority approving the use of secure detention for this purpose. See, e.g., R.M.P. v. Jones, 419 So.2d 618 (Fla.1982). The foregoing authority, however, predates section 39.0321, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1988. In this recent enactment, the legislature has specifically proscribed the use of secure detention for punishment. Thus, it is clear that the trial court is no longer permitted to punish a contemptuous juvenile with secure detention.
(Citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In 1990 the legislature revisited chapter 39 to make it clear that dependent children, as well as delinquent children, could not be placed into secure detention as a means of punishment. See Ch. 90-208, Sec. 5, Laws of Fla. Former section 39.0321 was renumbered as section 39.043, Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), and provides:
39.043 Prohibited uses of detention.
(1) A child alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law shall not be placed into secure, nonsecure, or home detention care for any of the following reasons:
(a) To punish, treat or rehabilitate the child; ....
(2) A child alleged to be dependent or in need of services shall not, under any circumstances, be placed into secure detention care solely for these reasons.
Sec. 39.043, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1990) (emphasis added). "Secure detention" was specifically defined in section 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990):
"Secure detention center or facility" means a physically restricting facility for the temporary care of children, pending adjudication, disposition, or placement.
(Emphasis added).
As in the 1988 amendments, one of the legislature's primary concerns in 1990 was the improper uses of secure detention. The Preamble to the Florida Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1990 provides:
[P]ublic safety is compromised by the inappropriate placement of children into secure detention, because those children are then exposed to negative role models, are given the opportunity to learn new crime techniques, and may become victims of intimidation and violence.
Ch. 90-208, Preamble at 1085, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the changes further clarified, consistent with T.D.L., that secure detention facilities were not the facilities to be used to punish juveniles for contempt of court. Instead, the facilities were only to be used as a temporary measure to ensure the child's appearance in court or to protect the child or the public against increased safety risks. 8
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