Walker v. Bentley
| Decision Date | 30 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-01084,95-01084 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2019 Robert James WALKER, Petitioner, v. Honorable E. Randolph BENTLEY, as Circuit Judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Howard L. Dimmig, II, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for petitioner.
Thomas C. MacDonald, Jr. of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, P.A., Tampa, for respondent.
The petitioner, Robert James Walker, seeks a writ of prohibition restraining the respondent circuit judge from exercising jurisdiction in an indirect criminal contempt proceeding initiated to punish him for an alleged violation of a domestic violence injunction issued pursuant to section 741.30, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). He contends that the provisions of section 741.30(8)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), specifically limit the respondent's jurisdiction to the use of civil contempt to enforce compliance with such an injunction. Because this statute purports to divest the respondent of the jurisdiction to use the power of indirect criminal contempt, prohibition is the appropriate remedy. See Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Bonanno, 568 So.2d 24 (Fla.1990). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction.
We deny the writ because, as will be discussed, the legislature has no authority under the doctrine of the separation of powers embodied in article II, section 3 of the Florida
Constitution, to limit the jurisdiction of a circuit court in the exercise of its constitutionally inherent power of contempt. Furthermore, although we construe section 741.30(8)(a) in a manner consistent with the constitution, we certify two questions of great public importance regarding its interpretation and constitutionality.
In 1984, the legislature substantially revised section 741.30, Florida Statutes (1983), by creating a simplified, expedited procedure for obtaining from a circuit court an injunction for protection against domestic violence. See Ch. 84-343, Sec. 10, at 1987-1990, Laws of Fla. (codified at section 741.30, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1984)). Such an injunction could now "be obtained directly, quickly, without an attorney's help, and at little monetary cost." Office of State Attorney v. Parrotino, 628 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla.1993). The legislature also provided that the court issuing the injunction was required to enforce compliance through "contempt proceedings." Sec. 741.30(9)(a), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1984).
In 1986, the legislature again amended the statute by providing that the court issuing the injunction "shall enforce" compliance through "civil or indirect criminal contempt proceedings." See Ch. 86-264, Sec. 1, at 1973, Laws of Fla. (codified at Sec. 741.30(9)(a), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1986)). It also created a statute which criminalized specifically defined willful violations of a domestic injunction and provided that the penalty for such a violation was to be in addition to any penalty imposed for contempt. See Ch. 86-264, Sec. 2, at 1974, Laws of Fla. (codified at Sec. 741.31, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1986)).
During the 1994 legislative session, the legislature again revised the statutes relating to domestic violence. See Ch. 94-134, Secs. 1-6, at 384-391, Laws of Fla. The revised statutes took effect July 1, 1994, and apply to offenses committed on or after that date. See Ch. 94-134, Sec. 36, at 405, Laws of Fla. 1
In making these revisions, the legislature specifically determined that domestic violence was to "be treated as an illegal act rather than a private matter, and for that reason, indirect criminal contempt may no longer be used to enforce compliance with injunctions for protection against domestic violence." Sec. 741.2901(2), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994) (revision underscored). To effectuate this policy change, it provided that "[t]he state attorney in each circuit shall adopt a pro-prosecution policy for acts of domestic violence[ ]" and that "[t]he filing, nonfiling, or diversion of criminal charges shall be determined ... over the objection of the victim, if necessary." Id. (revision underscored). The legislature also expanded the incidents giving rise to a criminal prosecution for violating a domestic violence injunction and increased the penalty for such a violation from a misdemeanor of the second degree to a misdemeanor of the first degree. Compare Sec. 741.31, Fla.Stat. (1993) with Sec. 741.31, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994). It eliminated, however, the provision that the penalty for such a criminal violation was to be in addition to any penalty imposed through contempt proceedings. Id.
With respect to the judiciary's role in the enforcement process, the legislature manifested a clear intent that a circuit court could now only "[e]nforce, through a civil contempt proceeding, a violation of an injunction for protection against domestic violence which is not a criminal violation under s. 741.31." Sec. 741.2902(2)(g), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994). It substantively codified this intent in section 741.30(8)(a), which provides in part that "[t]he court shall enforce, through a civil contempt proceeding, a violation of an injunction for protection which is not a criminal violation under s. 741.31." (Emphasis added.) This revision purported to divest the circuit courts of their previous statutory authority to use an indirect criminal contempt proceeding as one of the methods to enforce compliance with any violation of a domestic violence injunction. See Sec. 741.30(9)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993). 2
We glean from these revisions the legislature's clear intent to prosecute and punish substantive violations of domestic violence injunctions through traditional means of criminal prosecution in the county courts rather than through the use of indirect criminal contempt proceedings by the circuit courts that issue the injunctions. We also perceive the legislature's intent to limit circuit courts to the use of civil contempt as the means of punishing violations that do not fall within the criminal ambit of section 741.31. See In re Report of the Comm'n on Family Courts, 646 So.2d 178, 180 (Fla.1994). While such a legislative approach to combat an ongoing societal problem may be laudable, we conclude that to the extent it infringes on the time-honored and well-recognized constitutional authority of a circuit court to punish by indirect criminal contempt an intentional violation of a court order, it violates the doctrine of the separation of powers embodied in article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. Our conclusion is based on the following analysis.
We initially note that in In re Report, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the "administrative Frankenstein" created by chapter 94-134, pointing out that "it has placed the violation of some provisions of domestic injunctions in the jurisdiction of the criminal division of county courts while the violations of other provisions in the injunction remain in the family law divisions of the circuit courts." 646 So.2d at 180. One interesting aspect noted by the court was the possibility that the circuit court judge who issued the injunction may have to appear as a prosecution witness in the county court criminal proceeding. Significantly, although not addressing the issue, the court foresaw that "[a] separation of powers issue exists as to whether the legislature has the authority to completely eliminate the judicial power of indirect criminal contempt to punish those who violate judicial orders." Id. at n. 1.
The legislature may have foreseen this separation of powers problem because, in the recently concluded 1995 session, it once again purported to restore the criminal contempt power to a circuit court to enforce a violation of a domestic injunction occurring on or after July 1, 1995. See Ch. 95-195, Sec. 5, at 1400, Laws of Fla. Notwithstanding this legislative change of mind, however, the separation of powers issue inherent in section 741.30(8)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), remains viable for offenses, such as petitioner's, occurring between July 1, 1994, and July 1, 1995. Accordingly, the doctrine of mootness does not preclude us from addressing that issue in this case because our decision will not only affect the rights of the petitioner, it will also affect a significant number of other individuals who occupy the same status as petitioner, thereby determining a question of great public importance in the realm of a pressing social problem. See State v. Kinner, 398 So.2d 1360 (Fla.1981).
We begin our substantive analysis by noting that many years ago the Florida Supreme Court made it clear that under the power vested in the judicial branch of government by article V, section 1 of the Florida Constitution, courts of this state "are by the law protected from insult and interference, for the purpose of giving them their due weight and authority in performing their judicial functions in the interest of orderly government." Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 313, 95 So. 755, 760 (1923). Thus, it concluded that under our constitutional form of government, the judiciary has the "inherent power by due course of law to appropriately punish by fine or imprisonment or otherwise, any contempt that in law constitutes an offense against the authority and dignity of a court or judicial officer in the performance of judicial functions." Id. (emphasis added). The court then defined the various species of contempt punishable by this "inherent power" to be "direct or indirect or constructive, or criminal or civil, according Under Earman, therefore, circuit courts established under the provisions of article V of the Florida Constitution have inherent constitutional authority to invoke the power of indirect criminal contempt under appropriate circumstances. Of course, in invoking this power in the modern era, courts must now strictly comply...
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