ABCD, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Welfare

• Citation: 378 Mass. 327,391 N.E.2d 1217
• Parties: ABCD, INC., et al. 1 v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC WELFARE et al. 2 (and a companion case 3 ).
• Decision Date: 29 June 1979
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 1217

391 N.E.2d 1217

378 Mass. 327

ABCD, INC., et al. ¹

v.

COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC WELFARE et al. ² (and a companion case ³).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued May 8, 1979.

Decided June 29, 1979.

Edward T. Dangel, III, Boston (Michael K. Mattchen and Richard McVity, Boston, with him) for the ABCD, Inc. & others.

Mary C. Gallagher, Boston (Mark S. Coven, Boston, with her) for Massachusetts Ass'n of Older Americans & others.

S. Stephen Rosenfeld, Asst. Atty. Gen. (John F. Hurley, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., with him) for defendants.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and BRAUCHER, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

These actions challenge the refusal of the Commonwealth to make certain payments to present recipients of the program of aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) and the refusal of the Commonwealth to provide AFDC and general relief benefits to certain persons who, it is claimed, are newly entitled to such benefits. A single justice reported these cases to the full court on the complaints, a joint motion to consolidate the actions, a class stipulation, and a statement of agreed facts. ⁴

The plaintiffs seek a determination that the Commonwealth's response to the enactment of § 44 and § 44A of St.1978, c. 367 (the general appropriation act for the 1979 fiscal year), is unlawful. Section 44A, which is set forth in full in the margin, ⁵ provides a 6% Supplementary payment in the 1979 fiscal year for each recipient of AFDC, computed on the net monthly consolidated grant payable to that recipient. Section 44, which is also set forth in the margin, ⁶ provides each recipient of the program of general relief a 6% Supplementary payment based on the standard needs portion of each monthly grant payable to each recipient. Each section contains, in identical language, a sentence stating that "(s)aid supplementary payment shall not be considered in determining the eligibility for said program." ⁷

The Commonwealth has concluded that § 44A's 6% Supplemental payments for current AFDC recipients should not be paid because, not only will those payments not qualify for the approximately 50% Reimbursement normally available from the Federal government, but any such payments will have to be reflected in corresponding reductions in AFDC payments to AFDC recipients. Thus the Commonwealth argues that it need not implement § 44A because, if it did, the legislative purpose of increasing payments to AFDC recipients would not be achieved. ABCD challenges these conclusions, claiming an improper executive impoundment of funds. We conclude that the Commonwealth properly declined to pay the additional 6% Allowance to current AFDC recipients because to make such payments would be futile.

The Massachusetts Association of Older Americans (Association) presents a different contention. Its concern is with the interests of certain persons not currently eligible for AFDC or general relief benefits. The Association's challenge is to the Legislature's attempt to provide additional benefits only to current AFDC and general relief recipients, and to those who would be eligible for benefits under the law as it stood before the 1978 statutory changes. The Association, unlike ABCD, accepts the Commonwealth's conclusion that the AFDC program as restricted by § 44A conflicts impermissibly with Federal law. It asserts, however, that the legislative classifications in both § 44 and § 44A deny equal protection of the laws to certain persons who are ineligible for public welfare benefits despite the fact that they have fewer resources than some welfare recipients have after receiving welfare benefits. The Association then argues that to avoid § 44A's conflict with Federal law and to avoid the equal protection problem, the invalid portions of § 44 and § 44A, including the eligibility restriction of each section, should be treated as severable. Once these portions are severed, the argument goes, the remaining provisions of § 44 and § 44A can be implemented, thus permitting additional persons to qualify for AFDC and general relief benefits and all recipients to obtain benefits at the higher level expressed in the 1978 act. ⁸

We conclude that the eligibility restriction of § 44A is not properly severable. The result is that no portion of § 44A, concerning AFDC, need be implemented. In addition, we find no denial of equal protection of the laws in the classifications made by § 44 concerning general relief.

The ABCD Case

Each State that participates in the AFDC program authorized by the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1976)) administers its program under a plan that must be approved by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) as a pre-condition to reimbursement by the Federal government of a percentage (approximately 50% In Massachusetts) of the payments made to AFDC recipients. Id. at §§ 601, 603. See Carroll v. Acting Director of Pub. Welfare, 355 Mass. 182, 187, 243 N.E.2d 817 (1969). The Commonwealth has had such a program for many years. See St.1936, c. 413. The AFDC program of each State must have standards of assistance used to determine need and to establish a level of AFDC benefits, not in excess of the standard of need, for each individual or family. ⁹ See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970); Bourgeois v. Stevens, 532 F.2d 799, 802-803 (1st Cir. 1976); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2) and (b)(2) (1978). In this Commonwealth, the level of benefits is 100% Of the standard of need for AFDC. The net payment to a recipient is determined by deducting from the full standard of need for that recipient any "countable income," that is, income from other sources that, under existing State and Federal regulations, is not to be disregarded and must be counted against the amount otherwise payable. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1976). See generally Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 254, 94 S.Ct. 1746, 40 L.Ed.2d 120 (1974).

In July, 1978, following the enactment of the appropriation bill for the 1979 fiscal year (containing §§ 44 and 44A), questions were raised whether the provisions of § 44A complied with Federal requirements for an AFDC program. In July, 1978, HEW's Acting Assistant Regional Commissioner for Family Assistance sent a letter to the Commissioner of Public Welfare. That letter indicated that payments in excess of the standard of need were not contemplated by the Federal AFDC program and that the Commonwealth's failure to increase the standard of need raised questions of conformity to Federal requirements. The Acting Assistant Regional Commissioner stated that it was doubtful whether "HEW would be able to provide Federal financial participation in the 6% Supplementary payments made under (§ 44A)." He also noted that amounts paid above the standard of need would be considered income to the recipient which would require a dollar-for-dollar reduction in that recipient's AFDC payment. The letter expressed doubt whether "the Massachusetts Legislature intended to have the 6% Supplementary payment cause a reduction in the AFDC grant with no net benefit to the recipients." The Acting Assistant Regional Commissioner also questioned the implementation of that provision in § 44A which directed that the 6% Supplementary payment should be computed "on the Net monthly consolidated grant payable to each recipient" (emphasis supplied). The standard of need includes the monthly portion of a quarterly payment, but § 44A does not increase this element by 6%. Nor does § 44A provide any increase in the portion of a recipient's standard of need which is met by "countable income." The 6% Additional payment disregarded these items and thus, the letter indicated, did not treat all types of income in the same way, as required by 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(1) (1978). Subsequently, HEW formally disapproved a proposed amendment to the Commonwealth's AFDC State plan which undertook to implement § 44A.

The result of the position taken by HEW, with which the Commonwealth agrees, is that the Federal government would decline to participate financially in any 6% Supplemental payment, and, if any such payment were proposed to be made, the amount of the payment would be considered "countable income," thus reducing correspondingly the AFDC payments to be made. ¹⁰ The parties stipulated that, if the Commonwealth were to implement § 44A, as written, and were to treat § 44A payments as "countable income," recipients would realize no net increase as a result of those payments. Further, the parties agreed that if the § 44A payments were not treated as "countable income" to recipients, HEW might seek to penalize the Commonwealth. See 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1976).

ABCD argues that the Commonwealth should have pressed its case further with HEW. We need not consider whether the Commonwealth may rely conclusively in this case on HEW's interpretations of its regulations. HEW's assessment of the situation was unequivocal, and its interpretations are entitled to considerable weight in any judicial proceeding. See Miller v. Youakim, --- U.S. ----, ----, 99 S.Ct. 957, 969, 59 L.Ed.2d 194 (1979); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 738, 98 S.Ct. 2068, 56 L.Ed.2d 658 (1978); New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 37 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 559, 90 S.Ct. 1282, 25 L.Ed.2d 561 (1970). Here, in any event, we agree that, if the 6% Supplementary payments were made, no Federal contribution would be available toward those payments and the recipients would gain no financial advantage. ¹¹

In light of the utter futility of making 6% Supplementary payments to current AFDC recipients, we think that the Commonwealth was justified in not implementing § 44A by impounding that portion of the appropriation for AFDC that was intended to fund it. ¹² Certainly, the refusal was warranted until a judicial determination could be made whether...