Abendroth v. Moffo

• Decision Date: 21 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 36547.,36547.
• Citation: 114 A.3d 1224,156 Conn.App. 727
• Parties: Isabella ABENDROTH, Administratrix (Estate of Craig Abendroth) v. Nicholas MOFFO et al.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

156 Conn.App. 727

114 A.3d 1224

Isabella ABENDROTH, Administratrix (Estate of Craig Abendroth)

v.Nicholas MOFFO et al.

No. 36547.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 11, 2015.

Decided April 21, 2015.

Bruce E. Newman, Bristol, for the appellant (plaintiff).

David A. Corbett, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph H. Carlisle, Simsbury, for the appellees (defendants).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and BEACH and BERGER, Js.

Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C.J.

The plaintiff, Isabella Abendroth, the administratrix of the estate of Craig Abendroth (decedent), appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants, Nicholas Moffo and Zysk Brothers Landscaping, Inc. (Zysk). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that her action was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31–284(a), and did not fall within the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a fellow employee exception set forth in General Statutes § 31–293a. See, e.g., Chamberland v. LaBonte, 99 Conn.App. 464, 465–66, 913 A.2d 1129, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 912, 924 A.2d 137 (2007). Because the vehicle that struck and killed the decedent was special mobile equipment, and not a motor vehicle, we conclude that the court properly determined that the motor vehicle exception did not apply under these unfortunate facts and circumstances. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The court set forth the following facts and procedural history in its memorandum of decision. On the morning of June 30, 2011, Moffo, an employee of Zysk, used a front end loader (payloader) to mix topsoil. As he was operating the payloader to move soil from one pile to another, it struck the decedent. As a result of this accident, the decedent suffered injuries that caused his death. In a complaint filed March 30, 2012, the plaintiff alleged that Moffo had acted negligently in operating the payloader and causing the decedent's death, and that Zysk was vicariously liable. The defendants filed an answer denying that Moffo had acted negligently and raised the exclusivity provision of the act as a special defense.

On May 31, 2013, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the act provided the exclusive remedy to the plaintiff and that the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a fellow employee exception did not apply under these facts. They argued that the payloader met the definition of “special mobile equipment” and therefore had been excluded by our legislature from the definition of a motor vehicle. As a result, this exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the act did not apply and they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In support of their motion, the defendants attached, inter alia, affidavits from John Zyskowski, the owner of Zysk, a copy of a Connecticut registration certificate identifying the payloader as special mobile equipment,¹ the operators manual for the payloader and an affidavit from Moffo.² On July 29, 2013, the plaintiff objected to the defendants' motion for summary judgment.³

On January 2, 2014, the court issued a memorandum of decision, granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that the terms “bucket loader” and “payloader” referred to the same type of equipment and that a bucket loader specifically is excluded from the statutory definition of a motor vehicle. “Thus, as there is no genuine issue of material fact that Moffo was operating a payloader, and payloaders, as special mobile equipment, are not motor vehicles for the purposes of § 31–293a, the defendants have met their burden ... and ... they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law....” Accordingly, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. On January 29, 2014, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to reargue and/or for reconsideration. This appeal followed.

“The standard of review of motions for summary judgment is well settled. Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court.... Our review of the trial court's decision to grant [a moving party's] motion for summary judgment is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smigelski v. Dubois, 153 Conn.App. 186, 197, 100 A.3d 954, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 948, 103 A.3d 975 (2014) ; see also Surprenant v. Burlingham, 64 Conn.App. 409, 413, 780 A.2d 219 (2001). “Furthermore, because our resolution of the plaintiff's claim requires us to construe § 31–293a as it applies to a particular factual scenario, our review of that issue of law is plenary.” Colangelo v. Heckelman, 279 Conn. 177, 182, 900 A.2d 1266 (2006).

A brief discussion of the act will facilitate our analysis. “Professor Arthur Larson's treatise on workers' compensation states: Once a workers' compensation act has become applicable ... it affords the exclusive remedy for the injury by the employee.... This is part of the quid pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are to some extent put into balance, for, while the employer assumes a new liability without fault, it is relieved of the prospect of large damage verdicts. 6 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law (2010) § 100.01, pp. 100–2 and 100–3.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hodgate v. Ferraro, 123 Conn.App. 443, 460, 3 A.3d 92 (2010) ; see also Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 97, 491 A.2d 368 (1985).

Our Supreme Court has stated that the act “is the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment.... General Statutes § 31–284(a). Under the act's strict liability provisions, workers are compensated without regard to fault. In return for a relatively low burden of proof and expeditious recovery, employees relinquish their right to any common-law tort claim for their injuries.... Generally, then, all rights and claims between employers and employees, or their representatives or dependents, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished as a result of the act's exclusivity bar.

“Another provision of [this state's] act, [namely] ... § 31–293a, creates an exception, however, to the otherwise applicable exclusivity bar. In relevant part, § 31–293a provides that [i]f an employee ... has a right to benefits or compensation ... on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee or dependent and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was wilful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle .... As we explained in Colangelo v. Heckelman, [supra, 279 Conn. at 183–84, 900 A.2d 1266 ], if an employee suffers injuries, which otherwise would be compensable under the act, due to the negligence of a fellow employee, the injured employee is barred from recovery against that fellow employee unless the injuries were caused by the fellow employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323, 328–29, 948 A.2d 955 (2008).

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, she argues that the court failed to consider that the circumstances of the accident were a result of the special hazards of the workplace. The plaintiff also contends that the exclusion of special mobile equipment from the definition of a motor vehicle applies only if the accident occurs at a worksite, and that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the factors used in Arias v. Geisinger, 126 Conn.App. 860, 15 A.3d 641, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 941, 17 A.3d 476 (2011), to determine whether the payloader could be considered a motor vehicle.⁴ Guided by the clear statutory language and our Supreme Court's decision in Ferreira v. Pisaturo, 215 Conn. 55, 573 A.2d 1216 (1990), we conclude that the court correctly determined that the payloader was not a motor vehicle and, therefore, that the motor vehicle exception did not apply to these facts and circumstances. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant statutory language. “If an employee or, in case of his death, his dependent has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee or dependent and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was wilful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in section 14–1.” General Statutes § 31–293a.

This court has determined that “[t]he definition of motor vehicle for purposes of the motor vehicle exception to § 31–293a is controlled by the definition of motor vehicle in General Statutes § 14–1.” Pinheiro v. Board of Education, 30 Conn.App. 263, 269, 620 A.2d 159 (1993). Section 14–1(53) defines a motor vehicle as ...