Abercrombie v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 02 May 1950
• Docket Number: No. 32983,No. 2,32983,2
• Citation: 59 S.E.2d 664,81 Ga.App. 690
• Parties: ABERCROMBIE et al. v. FORD MOTOR CO. et al
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 664

59 S.E.2d 664

81 Ga.App. 690

ABERCROMBIE et al. v. FORD MOTOR CO. et al.

No. 32983.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

May 2, 1950.

Rehearing Denied June 7, 1950.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In a proceeding for the recovery of unemployment benefits under Chapter 54-6 of the Supplement to the Code of Georgia, and appeal from the decision of the Board of Review to the Superior Court is provided for as a matter of right, and where the application filed with the Superior Court for the review of the decision of the Board of Review meets all the requirements of this Chapter, it is not subject to attack by demurrer or motion to dismiss.

2. (a) The law of this State providing for unemployment compensation benefits must be construed liberally in the light of the public policy of the State as declared in section 2 of the Act, so as to carry into effect its beneficient provisions.

(b) Thus construed, Section 54-610(d) of the Code Supplement providing in substance that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits for any week with respect to which his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute in the factory, establishment, or other premises in which he is or was last employed, required that in order to effect the disqualification of an employee under such circumstances the labor dispute which brought about the stoppage of the work must be in the place where the employee was last employed, and cannot effect a disqualification for such benefits where the labor dispute is in a separate factory, establishment, or other premises of the employer.

3. The evidence demands a finding that the claimants herein are not disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits on account of the acts of the International Union U.A.W.-C.I.O. for the reasons set out in the corresponding division of the opinion.

4. The evidence authorized the decision of the Board of Review, and the judgment of reversal of the trial court was therefore error.

An application was made on behalf of J. P. Abercrombie and 414 other employees of the Ford Motor Co. to the Commissioner of Labor under Chapter 54-6 of the Supplement to the Code of Georgia for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation provisions of the law in question. There was an administrative determination within the Department of Labor allowing benefits to these employees which, in accordance with the terms of the law, was appealed to an Appeals Tribunal. This Tribunal took evidence and, based thereon, a majority of the Tribunal of three members, one member dissenting, found certain facts and rendered a decision in favor of the employer. Within the time provided by the law the claimants filed an appeal to the Board of Review which likewise consisted of three members and which, without taking any additional evidence, by a vote of two to one reversed the decision of the Appeals Tribunal, the effect of which is to hold that the claimants are entitled to benefits of unemployment compensation. Apparently the Board of Review adopted the findings of fact of the Appeals Tribunal, but reached the opposite conclusion as to the principles of law applicable thereto. The salient facts found by the Appeals Tribunal and which were adopted by the Board of Review and were authorized by the evidence, are substantially as follows: That the employer is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of automobiles; that in connection therewith it operates the River Rouge plant near Detroit, Michigan, where it manufactures automobile parts; that also near the River Rouge manufacturing plant it operates an assembly plant in what is known as its B Building; that also in connection with its business it operates another assembly plant in Hapeville, Fulton County, Georgia that in order to operate these assembly plants it is necessary for the parts of the automobiles to continue to follow from the plant where the same are manufactured; that at the assembly plant in Michigan a dispute arose between the employees and the employer as to certain working conditions; that the International Union U.A.W.-C.I.O. were the bargaining agents for the employes of the manufacturing plant in Michigan, the assembly plant in Michigan, and the assembly plant in Hapeville, Georgia; that all these employees at these different plants worked for the employer under one contract between this international labor union and the employer; that the employees of both the manufacturing plant and the assembly plant in Michigan were members of a local union affiliated with this international labor organization; that the employees of the Hapeville plant were members of a local union which was also affiliated with the same international labor organization; that because of certain working conditions which involved the construction of the contract under which all the employees of the employer were working, which met with dissatisfaction from the employees of the assembly plant in Michigan, the local labor union there went on strike; that this strike brought about a closing of both the assembly plant and the manufacturing plant in Michigan; that because the manufacturing plant thus became closed in Michigan, the plant in Hapeville ran out of parts and for the want of parts to assemble there was nothing for many of the employees in Hapeville, including these claimants, to do; that in view of these conditions the employer notified the claimants, who constituted a part of its employees in Hapeville, that there would be no employment for them until the strike was settled in Michigan and the supply of parts had resumed; that this led to the unemployment of the claimants herein and resulted in their claims for unemployment benefits which is the subject matter of this litigation. A copy of the Constitution of the International Union U.A.W.-C.I.O. is attached to the brief of evidence and it shows that the local labor union in Michigan was authorized to vote a strike, and, having done so, and this action having been approved by the Executive Board of the international union, the local union in Hapeville would be without power or authority to interfere. It also apears from this document that the approval of the Executive Board is a condition precedent to any strike voted by any local union.

The Board of Review was also authorized to find from the evidence that while there was no local dispute between the employees and the management in Hapeville, and that both would have been glad to have continued to work, yet the strike resulted in more favorable working conditions to the claimants, and that they thus indirectly benefitted from it.

The contentions of the employer are substantially as follows:

1. (a) That the Ford Motor Company, whose main purpose is the manufacture and sale of automobiles, is so integrated that a strike resulting in the stoppage of work at a plant in Michigan where auto parts are made is the equivalent of a strike in an assembly plant at Hapeville, Georgia where there was a stoppage of work for the want of the parts which would have been made at the River Rouge plant but for the strike there.

(b) That the employees who were notified by the company not to come to work at the Hapeville plant because, due to the strike in the Michigan plant, there were no parts at Hapeville to be assembled, became disqualified for benefits under § 54-610(d) of the Supplement of the Code of Georgia.

(c) That such employees do not come within the exclusionary provision of said statute because the Hapeville employees were directly interested in the labor dispute in the Michigan plant which caused the stoppage of work at Hapeville in that they directly benefitted by receiving improved working conditions which resulted from the strike in the Michigan plant.

2. That the employees at the Hapeville plant are disqualified from benefits under § 54-610(a) of the Code Supplement because they voluntarily left their employment without good cause. In this connection the employer contends that the employees at its Hapeville plant delegated to the International U.A.W.-C.I.O. the authority to act for them; that their unemployment was brought about by the affirmative action of their agent, thus designated, acting within the scope of its authority.

The contentions of the employees are substantially as follows:

(1-A). That the factory, establishment, or other premises of the employer near Detroit, Michigan, is an entirely different one, within the meaning of this law, from the factor, establishment, or other premises of the employer at which they were employed at Hapeville.

(b) That they were not disqualified because of a strike resulting in a stoppage of work which existed because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises of the employer near Detroit, Michigan, since that factory, establishment, or other premises of the employer is different from the factory, establishment or other premises of the employer in which they were employed in Hapeville.

(c) That the point of the application of the exclusionary provisions of the act is never reached in this case, for the reason that there was no stoppage of work in Hapeville because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises of the employer there where they were last employed.

2. That their unemployment was involuntary as to them and that under the Constitution of the International U.A.W.-C.I.O. and the contract between the International Union and the employer it was not such an agent of theirs, within the meaning of the law, as to bring about their unemployment on their behalf.

The decision of the Board of Review being adverse to the employer, it filed a petition for review of the decision in the Superior Court of Fulton County as provided for in § 54-619 of the Code Supplement, which, in effect, is an appeal from the Board of Review to the Superior Court. To this action the claimants...