Abodeely v. Worcester County

• Citation: 227 N.E.2d 486,352 Mass. 719
• Parties: Michael N. ABODEELY v. COUNTY OF WORCESTER et al. (and a companion case).
• Decision Date: 12 June 1967
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 486

227 N.E.2d 486

352 Mass. 719

Michael N. ABODEELY v. COUNTY OF WORCESTER et al. (and a companion case).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued May 4, 1967.

Decided June 12, 1967.

Willie J. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

James C. Donnelly, Worcester, for County of Worcester and another.

Steven J. Comen and William P. Homans, Jr., Boston, for Voluntary Defenders Committer, Inc., amicus curiae.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, KIRK, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.

REARDON, Justice.

The petitioner, an attorney, brought petitions against the county of Worcester and its treasurer, and against the Commonwealth, seeking payment for services rendered to a criminal defendant, Walter S. Albert, to which representation he was appointed by a judge of the Superior Court. Albert had previously received sentences of life imprisonment on indictments involving rape and other charges. In March of 1964 a new trial was ordered and on August 18, 1964, Albert was adjudged an indigent defendant and the petitioner was appointed to represent him at a new trial and to act as his counsel in all matters. The petitioner has been a practicing attorney in Massachusetts since 1927 and 'has handled, since that time, criminal cases of all kinds ranging from first degree murder down to the smallest misdemeanor.' The petitioner's services to Albert consisted of various conferences with him and the preparatory work on pleadings and motions customary for the defence of the indictments. He appeared for Albert in court for one full day on November 9, 1964, and for a half day on the day following, when Albert decided to plead guilty to charges of assault and battery, three counts of rape, two charges of unarmed robbery, one charge of using a motor vehicle without authority, one charge of kidnapping, one of conspiracy, and six of accessory before the fact of rape. The disposition resulted in greatly reduced sentences imposed upon Albert. Sometime after November 10, 1964, the petitioner submitted a bill for services to the presiding judge in the Superior Court in Worcester. The bill was approved and submitted to the respondent treasurer of the county of Worcester who refused payment. These proceedings were then commenced. After a hearing on July 27, 1966, on agreed facts, the trial judge 'entered findings for the petitioner against each respondent in the sum of $500' and reported the cases.

The question presented is the liability of the Commonwealth and the county, or both, to compensate counsel appointed by the court to defend an indigent accused of a noncapital felony.

We are well aware of the series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States which has greatly expanded the requirements for counsel in noncapital felonies. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799; Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977; Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Since argument of this case there has been a further expansion of these requirements. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. The petitioner has called our attention also to certain other decisions bearing upon the rights of criminal defendants in matters relating to their defence. Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811; Draper v. State of Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899. The net effect of these decisions, as is too well known to be discussed, has created a requirement of representation of criminal defendants on a scale unprecedented in this Commonwealth with an accompanying increased burden on the bench and bar.

The rule of this court, S.J.C. Rule 3:10 (1967), was originally promulgated as Rule 10 in 1958 and anticipated by some years Gideon v. Wainwright. The present rule, as last amended in 1964, now requires counsel for any defendant charged with a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed. The breadth of the rule, as the petitioner has pointed out, is to be seen in Williams v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 732, 216 N.E.2d 779. Our statutes, however, passed long before the Gideon decision, provide compensation for counsel only in first degree murder or 'capital cases.' G.L. c. 277, §§ 47, 55, and 56. Rule 95 of the Superior Court (1954). Grady v. Treasurer of County of Worcester, Mass., 227 N.E.2d 490. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964), which provides compensation by the Federal government for attorneys assigned to represent indigents charged with felonies and misdmeanors, other than petty offences, in the Federal courts.

The consolidated brief of the respondents provides sufficient indication that the great weight of authority to date throughout the United States has been that in the absence of a statute providing for compensation an attorney appointed to defend an indigent defendant has no right to compensation from public funds. Annotations, 130 A.L.R 1439; 144 A.L.R. 847. There have been few exceptions, one being Indiana which bases its right to compensation of counsel in such circumstances on art. 1, § 21, of its Constitution: 'No man's particular services shall be demanded, without just compensation.' See Knox County Council v. State ex rel. Kirk, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405, 130 A.L.R. 1427. Last year, however, in an opinion by Chief Justice Weintraub in State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441, the court held that there was inherent power in the judiciary to administer justice, that members of the bar should not 'continue to bear alone the constitutional duty of the State to provide counsel for the indigent,' and that since counties in New Jersey were charged with the costs of criminal prosecution they should also bear the costs of providing counsel for indigents 'without which a prosecution would halt and inevitably fail under Gideon v. Wainwright, * * * 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799.' State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 414--415 217 A.2d 441, 449.

We need not consider a contention argued by the petitioner that the failure to reimburse him for his services constitutes a deprivation of property interests in derogation of constitutional rights. This argument has been uniformly rejected. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 9 Cir., 346 F.2d 633, cert. den. 382 U.S. 978, 86 S.Ct. 550, 15 L.Ed.2d 469; State v. Clifton, 247 La. 495, 172 So.2d 657; Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966), cert. den. Warner v. Kentucky, 385 U.S. 858, 87 S.Ct. 108, 17 L.Ed.2d 85. Nor need we discuss the inherent power of this court in dealing with its officers. The answer to the problem raised by the petition is to be found in G.L. c. 213, § 8, which reads, 'The courts shall, respectively, receive, examine and allow accounts for services and expenses incident to their sittings in the several counties and order payment thereof out of the respective county treasuries.' Other statutes indicate that it has been the legislative intent that he counties of the Commonwealth shall bear the costs of criminal prosecution. See G.L. c. 277, § 69; G.L. c. 280, §§ 4 and...