Abraham v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 October 1932
• Docket Number: No. 41552.,41552.
• Citation: 215 Iowa 1,244 N.W. 675
• Parties: ABRAHAM v. HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

215 Iowa 1

244 N.W. 675

ABRAHAM

v.HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO.

No. 41552.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 19, 1932.

Appeal from District Court, Woodbury County; Robert H. Munger, Judge.

Action to recover for the loss of an automobile by theft, under the provisions of an insurance policy. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff was not the owner of the automobile in question, and therefore the policy was void under its terms and provisions. The cause was submitted to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant prosecutes this appeal.

Affirmed.Henderson, Hatfield & Wadden, of Sioux City, and Myers & Snerly, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Griffin, Griffin & Griffin, of Sioux City, for appellee.

FAVILLE, J.

The appellee is a widow living with her son and a daughter who had attained her majority. The appellee was the owner of the automobile involved in this action, and on or about January 15, 1929, she executed an assignment of the certificate of registration and the same was filed in the proper office, showing by its terms a transfer of said automobile from the appellee to her daughter. A year thereafter, to wit, on January 14, 1930, the appellee procured a policy of insurance from the appellant providing for the payment of damages in the event of the theft of said automobile. In November following the automobile was stolen.

The policy sued upon provides, in part, as follows: “This entire policy shall be void * * * if the interest of the assured in the subject of this insurance be or become other than unconditional and sole ownership, or in case of transfer or termination of the interest of the assured other than by death of the assured, or in the case of any change in the nature of the insurable interest of the assured in the property described herein either by law or otherwise.”

The main issue tendered by the appellant in the case was that the policy was void by virtue of this provision, and it is appellant's contention that under the evidence the appellee was not the unconditional and sole owner of the automobile at the time the policy of insurance was taken out. In support of its contention in this regard the appellant relies on the transfer of the certificate of registration from the appellee to her daughter Mary, and upon written statements made by the appellee to the agent of the appellant to the effect that the appellee had transferred the ownership of said car to her daughter prior to the time of the writing of said policy of insurance.

The appellee combatted this evidence of the appellant with her own testimony, and that of other witnesses, tending to corroborate her, to the effect that she was unable to read or write, that the contents of said written instruments were not fully made known to her, and that they were obtained by false representations made to her at the time of their execution; and it was further contended by the appellee that the claimed transfer of the ownership of said automobile from her to her daughter was merely colorable. It is her contention that after the death of her husband a claim was filed in his estate, and that, fearing that said automobile might be made subject to the payment of said claim, she made the colorable transfer of ownership of the same to her daughter, as evidenced by the transfer of said registration card, and that she had no intention to and did not in fact part with the ownership of said automobile.

The evidence was in conflict with regard to this matter, and the court submitted the question to the jury for it to determine the fact under the record as to whether or not the appellee was the unconditional and sole owner of said automobile at the time the said policy was written.

[1] I. The appellant contends that the court erred in permitting appellee and her witnesses to testify in contradiction of the written statements made by the appellee and in contradiction of the written transfer of the certificate of registration.

We do not think there is merit in the appellant's contention at this point. The question was essentially one of fact as to whether or not the appellee was the unconditional and sole owner of the automobile at the time the policy of insurance was written. The transfer of the registration card, under the statute (Code 1931, § 4961 et seq.), is not conclusive evidence of the transfer of the title, at least as to third parties. In Davenport v. Pierce, 194 Iowa, 1152, 190 N. W. 942, we held that such statute had no direct relation to the rights and equities which may exist as between successive owners or purchasers of such property. We there held that the...