Bolton-Swanby Co. v. Owens

• Decision Date: 05 November 1937
• Docket Number: No. 31258.,31258.
• Citation: 201 Minn. 162,275 N.W. 855
• Parties: BOLTON-SWANBY CO. v. OWENS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

275 N.W. 855

201 Minn. 162

BOLTON-SWANBY CO. v. OWENS.

No. 31258.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

November 5, 1937.

Appeal from District Court, St. Louis County; C. R. Magney, Judge.

Action by the Bolton-Swanby Company against Sam M. Owens. From an order, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Arthur R. Smythe, of Duluth (Fred A. Noreen, of Duluth, of counsel), for appellant.

H. B. Haroldson, of Duluth, for respondent.

PETERSON, Justice.

Plaintiff sued defendant for conversion of an automobile taken from the possession of one Mrs. Ella G. Schiller by defendant sheriff and sold to satisfy a judgment against Mrs. Schiller. Plaintiff, an automobile agency, claims that it owned the automobile when it was seized, and that Mrs. Schiller enjoyed possession under an oral contract of bailment. Defendant claims that title to the automobile was in Mrs. Schiller, or that at least plaintiff, by investing her with possession and indicia of ownership, is not in a position to assert the contrary. Plaintiff recovered a verdict of $450.

Mrs. Schiller obtained possession of the automobile on May 10, 1934, and held and used it constantly until it was taken by defendant on June 2, 1936, under execution on a judgment docketed May 25, 1936, for indebtedness incurred by Mrs. Schiller some two or three years before she had the automobile. On May 10, 1934, the president of plaintiff company executed a dealer's report of sale, stating that the automobile had on that day been sold to Mrs. Schiller. In connection with this report of sale, Mrs. Schiller applied for registration of car, stating in the application that she had purchased it from plaintiff, and held it under conditional ownership. The report of sale was filed with the Secretary of State pursuant to Mason's Minn.St.1927, § 2681, and the automobile was registered in Mrs. Schiller's name. Mrs. Schiller signed a blank bill of sale which was kept by plaintiff but never filled in and completed. In 1935, Mrs. Schiller registered the car in her name as absolute owner, and in 1936 registered it in the same manner. Each year, Mrs. Schiller signed and left with plaintiff company, blank and incompleted bills of sale. Also, each year, upon receipt of the registration card from the Secretary of State, she signed the bill of sale on the back in blank, and then turned the card over to plaintiff. Various policies of insurance covering the car stated the assured to be "Mrs. Ella G. Schiller and/or Bolton-Swanby Co." In return for the use of the car, Mrs. Schiller, as a Duluth hostess, was to render advertising and patronage service to plaintiff company. By oral agreement it was understood when Mrs. Schiller took the car that it would belong to plaintiff, who could take it back at will.

1. It was not error to admit parol evidence to vary and contradict the dealer's report of sale filed by plaintiff with the Secretary of State pursuant to Mason's Minn.St.1927, § 2681, which requires a notice of transfer, whether by sale, lease, or otherwise. The parol evidence rule is generally applied only to contractual instruments. Dunnell, Minn.Dig.(2 Ed.) § 3390. Whatever its effect may be where the state is interested, as between other parties, the report was not intended by the statute to furnish conclusive evidence of a transfer of ownership. See 5 Wigmore on Evidence 358, § 2453; Abraham v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 215 Iowa 1, 244 N.W. 675.

2. Registration of the automobile in the name of Mrs. Schiller did not preclude plaintiff from showing that it was the owner and Mrs. Schiller a bailee. Registration does not determine or affect title. The purposes of the act are taxation and identification of automobiles, having no regard to vendees of the person holding the registered title. Holmes v. Lilygren Motor Co. (Minn.) 275 N.W. 416, filed October 15, 1937; Amick v. Exchange State Bank, 164 Minn. 136, 204 N.W. 639; 5 Am.Jur. 567, §§ 90, 91. The purpose is not to determine and establish title by registration. It is the vehicle, and not the title, which is registered. Holmes v. Lilygren Motor Co., supra; Amick v. Exchange State Bank, supra; Abraham v. Hartford Fire Ins. Company, 215 Iowa 1, 244 N.W. 675; Celina Mutual Casualty Company v. Baldridge (Ind.App.) 5 N.E.(2d) 991; Braham & Company v. Steinard-Hannon M. Co., 97 Pa.Super. 19; Hyland v. Hyland, 278 Mass. 112, 179 N.E. 612; Moore v. Wilson, 230 Ky. 49, 18 S.W.(2d) 873; Higginbotham v. Higginbotham's Trustee, 253 Ky. 218 69 S.W.(2d) 329. The provisions of the act are appropriate for the purposes of taxation and identification, but not for registration of title. Mason's Minn.St.1927, § 2672, as amended by Laws 1933, c. 344, § 1, provides that an "application for registration" has the same meaning as "listing for taxation," and that an owner is one having the exclusive use of an automobile under lease or otherwise for over 30 days. Section 2677, pursuant to which the registration card is issued, requires the name and address of the holder and a description of the motor vehicle to be stated, but not the nature of his title. The very essence of registration of title is to identify not only the owner and the property, but also the title and interest registered. In this respect, the registration of motor vehicles is entirely unlike proceedings which are had for the registration of title to land under the Torrens Act (Mason's Minn.St. 1927, § 8247 et seq., as amended) by judicial proceeding and determination of title binding on all the world. A certificate of title under the Torrens Act discloses an identification of the owner, a description of the property, and the particular title and interests...