Abreu v. Lloyd's, London

Decision Date07 July 2004
Docket NumberNo. 3D03-1379.,3D03-1379.
Citation877 So.2d 834
PartiesMario ABREU, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. LLOYD'S, LONDON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Lopez & Best and Virginia M. Best, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Adorno & Yoss, P.A., and Jack R. Reiter and William S. Berk and Effie D. Silva, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and GODERICH, J., and DELL, JOHN W., Senior Judge.

DELL, JOHN W., Senior Judge.

Mario Abreu ("Abreu") appeals from a Final Judgment in favor of appellee, Lloyd's of London ("Lloyd's"). Lloyd's cross-appeals from an order denying its motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. We reverse the trial court's Final Judgment in favor of Lloyd's and affirm the trial court's denial of Lloyd's motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution.

Lloyd's insured a truck owned by Abreu. During the night of April 26, 1998, Abreu's truck was stolen. He had parked the truck for the night on the side of a street. Abreu filed a claim with Lloyd's. Lloyd's denied coverage pursuant to the special conditions set forth in section 5 of its policy. Section 5 provides in part: "Warranted vehicle not left on open highway overnight." Abreu filed suit and the parties agreed to refer the case to a General Master. The General Master concluded that Lloyd's' failure to define the term "open highway" did not render the term ambiguous and that "under the plain meaning of the policy, the theft of the truck was not covered, ... as [Abreu] parked the truck on an open highway overnight." The trial court approved the General Master's Report and entered Final Judgment in favor of Lloyd's. Abreu argues that Lloyd's failure to define the term "open highway" made the provision ambiguous as applied to his claim and that because of this ambiguity the policy must be construed in his favor. We agree.

The supreme court explained in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., that:

The lack of a definition of an operative term in a policy does not necessarily render the term ambiguous and in need of interpretation by the courts ... [h]owever, where policy language is subject to differing interpretations, the term should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer.

720 So.2d 1072, 1076 (Fla.1998). Here, the lack of a definition of the term "open highway" constituted an ambiguity that cannot be cured by simply looking to the terms "highway" and "open" as defined in various dictionaries and the Florida Statutes.1 For example, Lloyd's cites section 633.021(12), Florida Statutes (2003), in support of its argument that the term "open highway" applies to a vehicle parked on the side of a street. Section 633.021(12) provides, in part:

`Highway' means every way or place of whatever nature within the state open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for purposes of vehicular traffic and includes public streets, alleys, roadways, or driveways upon grounds of colleges, universities, and institutions and other ways open to travel by the public...

The broad scope of the term "highway" as defined in this statute highlights the ambiguity created by the term "open highway" as used in the policy. Lloyd's has shown that the definition of the term "highway" may include streets and many "other ways open to travel by the public." Id. It follows that if the term "open highway" applies to streets, as Lloyd's argues, it must also apply to alleys, roadways, driveways, and similar means of travel. The result of such an interpretation would virtually eliminate coverage under the policy for the theft of a vehicle parked overnight on or at the side of a street or any other public way. "When an insurer fails to define a term in a policy, ... the insurer cannot take the position that there should be a `narrow, restrictive interpretation of the coverage provided.'" State Comprehensive...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nelson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • September 27, 2018
    ...cannot take the position that there should be a ‘narrow, restrictive interpretation of the coverage provided.’ " Abreu v. Lloyd's, London, 877 So.2d 834, 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, under Florida law, "policy provisions excluding or limiting the......
  • Barcelona Hotel Llc v. Nova Cas. Co.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 2, 2011
    ...cannot take the position that there should be a narrow, restrictive interpretation of the coverage provided.”); Abreu v. Lloyd's, London, 877 So.2d 834, 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (same). Accordingly, because an excavator falls within this definition of “mobile equipment,” and the policy uses t......
  • SC v. Department of Children and Families, 4D03-4669.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 7, 2004
  • Galston v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 8, 2006
    ...reconstruction, maintenance or repair." Section 633.021(12) is in the insurance code, not the criminal code. In Abreu v. Lloyd's, London, 877 So.2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), the Third District Court noted the "broad scope" of this definition, applying it to construe the ambiguous policy term ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT