Acevedo-Feliciano v. Ruiz-Hernández

Decision Date11 May 2006
Docket NumberNo. 04-1154.,04-1154.
Citation447 F.3d 115
PartiesEnrique ACEVEDO-FELICIANO, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Miguel A. RUIZ-HERNÁNDEZ, et al., Defendants, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Claudio Aliff Ortiz, with whom Pablo Landrau Pirazzi and Aldarondo & López Bras were on brief, for appellants.

Jorge Martínez-Luciano, with whom Gina Ismalia Gutiérrez-Galang, Law Offices Pedro Ortiz Alvarez, Alfredo Acevedo-Cruz, and Civil Rights Legal Task Force were on brief, for appellees.

Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, SELYA and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs and appellants are twenty-two former temporary employees of the Municipality of Aguada, Puerto Rico. Each held a contract stating that the term of employment was effective through June 30, 2001, but also stating that the employment was "by way" of a particular financial grant (a "Law 52" grant, explained further below) that the Municipality had received from the Commonwealth. Funding under that grant was exhausted on December 31, 2000, and the Municipality, under a new Mayor, terminated plaintiffs' contracts one month later on the basis of lack of Law 52 funding.

Plaintiffs sued the Municipality and individual municipal officers (in their official and personal capacities) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on two federal claims and related state claims. They alleged that the termination of their contracts before the expiration dates, without a pretermination hearing, violated their procedural due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. They also alleged that their contracts were terminated because they belonged to a different political party, the New Progressive Party (NPP), than the newly elected Popular Democratic Party (PDP) mayor of the Municipality in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, back pay, front pay, economic and punitive damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and other relief.

At trial on June 16, 2003, after the close of plaintiffs' evidence, the district court granted judgment under Rule 50, Fed. R.Civ.P., for defendants on the procedural due process claim. The court held that the plaintiffs had no property interest in further employment inasmuch as the program in which they were employed depended upon receipt of the Law 52 funding from the Commonwealth which had expired on December 31, 2000. The jury considered the First Amendment claim and returned a verdict for defendants.

On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge both the Rule 50 procedural due process ruling and the denial of a motion for mistrial based on a nearly three-month delay in the middle of the trial proceedings. They do not challenge the jury verdict. As to the denial of the motion for mistrial, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm. As to the procedural due process claim, however, we vacate and remand for further consideration.

I.

The Commonwealth established the Law 52 program more than twenty-five years ago. Under the program, see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 711c, Puerto Rico "subsidize[s] locally managed programs to ameliorate unemployment." Gomez v. Rivera Rodriguez, 344 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2003). Municipalities do not have an automatic entitlement to Law 52 grants: a municipality must submit a proposal describing how it will use the money; such proposals must be approved by the Commonwealth's Department of Labor and Human Resources (DLHR). Id. Once a grant is approved, the Commonwealth and the municipality sign a contract specifying how much money the municipality will receive, over what term, and how many jobs it will subsidize. The various Law 52 contracts between the Municipality of Aguada and the DLHR contained standard clauses stating that the Municipality "commit[ted] itself to create" the number of jobs specified, and that "[u]nder no circumstances will it be construed that people hired [by virtue of the Law 52 contract] are or act as employees of the [DLHR]."

On July 1, 2000, a new Law 52 agreement ("the Law 52 contract") between the Municipality and the DLHR took effect. Under the contract's provisions, the DLHR awarded the Municipality $295,908 to pay the salaries and benefits of the forty-five employees through December 31, 2000. The Law 52 contract required the Municipality to keep the Law 52 funds separate from other municipal funds.

The plaintiffs are among the forty-five workers hired by the Municipality in connection with this Law 52 grant. Between June 20 and September 1, 2000, each of the plaintiffs received letters ("the hiring letters") signed by then-Mayor Julio César Román, appointing them to various municipal jobs, including carpentry and labor positions. The stated starting dates for these jobs ranged from July 1 to September 6, 2000. The stated termination date for each job was the same: June 30, 2001.

Mayor Román was a member of the NPP, as is each of the plaintiffs. It is noteworthy that the Mayor's letter used an employment date for the plaintiffs through June 2001, despite the fact the Law 52 funding lasted only through December 2000, and that he did so in the face of an upcoming municipal election in which control of the municipal government might switch to the opposing political party. Defendants rely on this to argue that the Mayor acted ultra vires in using a termination date of June 30.

The hiring letters signed by Mayor Román varied only slightly in their terms. A typical letter, such as the one sent to plaintiff José Méndez Valle, stated:

Allow me by these means [to] appoint you to hold the post of Laborer by way of the Labor Department Proposal1 for this Municipal Administration.

The same shall be effective September 6, 2000 until June 30, 2001. You shall earn a monthly salary of $837.00.

As of the autumn of 2000, then, the twenty-two plaintiffs were all employed by the Municipality and receiving salaries paid out of Law 52 funds. On November 7, 2000, elections were held in Aguada, and a new mayor, defendant Miguel Ruiz-Hernández of the PDP, was elected. The twenty-two plaintiffs had supported the new Mayor's opponent in the mayoral race.2

Mayor Ruiz-Hernández was sworn into office on January 9, 2001. By this time, the funding provided by the Law 52 contract had expired. The Municipality nonetheless continued plaintiffs' employment through the month of January, paying their salaries out of municipal funds. On January 31, however, Mayor Ruiz-Hernández sent letters to the plaintiffs ("the firing letters") informing them that the Law 52 funds had expired a month earlier and that their jobs were therefore being terminated. A typical firing letter, this one addressed to plaintiff Edwin Acevedo Acevedo, read as follows:

I hereby inform you that your work contract through the Proposal of the Department of Labor and Human Resources (Law 52) expired on December 31, 2000. The previous administration failed in not informing you that your contract expired and that your functions ceased on the aforementioned date.

We do not have the funds that the Department of Labor and Human Resources provided for these contracts. That is why we have to dispense with your services. We regret the inconveniences this may cause you.

All of the plaintiffs' jobs were terminated on January 31; none of the plaintiffs were granted a pre-termination hearing, although each had notice (via the firing letters) that the stated reason for termination was the expiration of Law 52 funding.

On February 12, 2001, less than two weeks later, the Municipality and the DLHR entered into a new Law 52 contract, which provided funding for forty positions from February 16 through June 30, 2001. None of the plaintiffs were offered any of the jobs created by these funds, despite the fact that defendant Glenda Peña-Muñoz, the new municipal human resources director appointed by Mayor Ruiz-Hernández, had promised them they would be recalled when new Law 52 funds were procured.

The plaintiffs filed suit on April 12, 2001, against the Municipality, Mayor Ruiz-Hernández, and Human Resources Director Peña-Muñoz.3 In response to plaintiffs' political discrimination claim, defendants countered that the terminations had nothing to do with political animus, but were instead inevitable and proper given the cessation of Law 52 funding. And as to the procedural due process claim, defendants argued that Mayor Román had had no authority to offer the plaintiffs contracts that outlasted the Law 52 funding; thus the contracts were void as to a June 30 termination date, and no pre-termination hearing was required under the Due Process Clause.4

Jury trial began on March 19, 2003. On April 4, plaintiffs rested. Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) as to the political discrimination and procedural due process claims. On June 16, 2003, during an extended hiatus in the trial (discussed further below), the district court entered judgment for the defendants on the procedural due process claim but allowed the political discrimination claim to proceed. Trial resumed on July 1 on the plaintiffs' remaining claims and the jury rejected the political discrimination claim on July 18.5

II.
A. Denial of Mistrial Based on The Trial Delay

Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in not granting their motion for mistrial.

On April 4, 2003, the day the plaintiffs rested, the district court authorized the jury forewoman to take a previously scheduled vacation from April 11 through April 27 and halted the trial pending her return. None of the parties objected to this continuance, despite having had the chance to do so both on April 4 and at sidebar on April 2.

On April 24, the district court announced a date for resumption of the trial, noting that it had two additional trials scheduled for May and that another juror had told the court he would be away from May 30 to June 22. The district court decided that the trial would not reconvene until June 23...

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