Ojeda-Rodriguez v. Zayas

• Decision Date: 22 October 2009
• Docket Number: Civil No. 05-2332 (FAB).
• Citation: 666 F.Supp.2d 240
• Parties: Marta OJEDA-RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. Yolanda ZAYAS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

666 F.Supp.2d 240

Marta OJEDA-RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. Yolanda ZAYAS, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 05-2332 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

October 22, 2009.

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Manuel San-Juan-Demartino, Manuel San Juan Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Francisco A. Ojeda-Diez, P.R. Department of Justice — Federal Litigation, Anabelle Quinones-Rodriguez, Maymi, Rivera & Rotger, P.S.C., San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

FRANCISCO A. BESOSA, District Judge.

On December 23, 2005, plaintiff Marta I. Ojeda-Rodriguez ("Ojeda") filed a complaint against defendants Yolanda Zayas-Santana ("Zayas"), the former Secretary of the Family, in her personal and official capacity, and the Department of the Family ("DOF").¹ (Docket No. 1) Ojeda alleged two causes of action, the first for violation of her due process right to a pretermination hearing, and the second for defamation under Puerto Rico Commonwealth law. After a seven day trial, on February 6, 2008 the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ojeda finding that Zayas violated her constitutional right to due process and that Zayas made a defamatory statement concerning Ojeda. (Docket No. 92) The jury awarded Ojeda $150,000.00 in compensatory damages for her due process claim, $350,000.00 in compensatory damages for her defamation claim, and $1,000,000.00 in punitive damages. (Id.) Following the entry of judgment, defendants filed a bevy of post-judgment motions. (Docket No. 105) Ojeda opposed these motions. (Docket No. 128) She also filed a motion for attorney fees (Docket No. 99), which the defendants asked the Court to stay. (Docket No. 100)

For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES WITH PREJUDICE defendants motions pursuant to Rules 50, 59(a) and 59(e); DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ojeda's motion for attorney fees; and REDUCES Ojeda's punitive damages award from $1,000,000.00 to $500,000.00.

I. Background

This case poses two legal questions: (1) was Ojeda denied due process of law because of faulty notice and a faulty hearing prior to her termination from employment; and (2) did Zayas slander Ojeda by making public statements that reflected negatively upon Ojeda? To answer both of these legal questions, however, the Court must delve somewhat into a meta-narrative that asks a much broader question: was Ojeda made a scapegoat to assuage public anger over the DOF's handling of a boy in its custody, "the minor?"² Although this last question shall not be conclusively answered here, some part of the narrative will be provided in order to evaluate the legal questions that are posed.

The following is just a snapshot of the factual background because additional background shall be provided in subsequent sections of the opinion:

Ojeda began to work in the Legal Division of the Administration of Children and Families of the DOF ("ADFAN" by its Spanish language acronym) on June 28, 2002. At some point after June, 2002 the DOF initiated judicial proceedings with respect to the custody of the minor. The case was assigned internally to attorney Sonny M. Arroyo-Pedro ("Arroyo"), Ojeda's co-worker in the Carolina Office of ADFAN's legal division. During the month of September, 2003, Arroyo, who at all times until then had handled the minor's case, went on leave from the office for a period of approximately two months because of her parents' poor health. During this time period Ojeda took charge of all of Arroyo's cases, including the minor's case. It was during this time period that Ojeda prepared a petition for the termination of parental rights of the minor's parents. Ojeda and Arroyo both testified that the petition was prepared at the express direction of Maria de los Angeles Colom-Baez ("Colom"), who was then the Director of ADFAN's legal division. This petition was later voluntarily dismissed by Colom herself under circumstances not entirely cleared up at trial. During the pendency of the minor's case there was a great deal of media scrutiny concerning the case in general and the actions of the DOF in particular in handling the minor's case.

Months later, on July 28, 2004, following the completion of three investigations commissioned by Zayas into what had transpired in ADFAN's handling of the minor's case, Ojeda was notified by letter from Zayas that the DOF intended to dismiss her from her position. The letter, dated June 14, 2004, stated that Ojeda had been negligent in filing the petition for the termination of parental rights and that the petition had been filed based upon incomplete information. That same day Zayas issued a press release in which she said "various persons from the Carolina region failed in their duties and obligations in the handling of the Lithuanian boy's case. For this reason I have sent letters to four functionaries announcing the intention to dismiss them." Ojeda requested an administrative hearing regarding her proposed dismissal; it was held before hearing officer Angel Robles-Candelaria ("Robles") on September 3, 2004. On December 23, 2004, Ojeda received notice that DOF was in fact discharging her from her position with ADFAN.

Nearly a year later, on or about December 13, 2005, Zayas testified at a hearing held by the Commonwealth's Office of Court's Administration ("OCA") related to an investigation being carried out by the OCA into the proceedings concerning the minor. Zayas was reported as testifying that the attorneys involved in the minor's case hid the letters that came from the minor's biological family. A newspaper article reporting on Zayas's testimony specifically referred to Ojeda as one of the lawyers involved.

II. Rule 50 Standard

The Court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law once a party has been fully heard on an issue if the court "finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue[.]" Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). Where, as here, the Court does not grant a Rule 50(a) motion prior to submitting an action to the jury, the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment within 10 days after the entry of judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). Ojeda has done just that.

The United States Supreme Court has held that when "entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review all of the evidence in the record. In doing so, however, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Id. at 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A Rule 50 movant must shoulder a "heavy burden." White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, 221 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Scharon, 187 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir.1999)). Evidence supporting a verdict may be entirely circumstantial and it need not exclude every hypothesis contrary to the verdict; "that is, the fact-finder may decide among reasonable interpretations of the evidence." Id. A court may only grant judgment as a matter of law when "the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, could lead a reasonable person to only one conclusion, namely that the moving party was entitled to judgment." Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 22 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st Cir.1994)).

A. Statute of Limitations

1. Due Process Claim

Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code, which creates a private right of action for violation of federally protected rights, contains no statute of limitations. Therefore, section 1983 claims "borrow[] the appropriate state law governing limitations unless contrary to federal law." Poy v. Boutselis, 352 F.3d 479, 483 (1st Cir.2003) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)). The parties do not dispute that the relevant statute of limitations for civil rights claims in Puerto Rico is one year. P.R.Laws Ann. Tit. 31 § 5298(2); Vistamar, Inc. v. Fagundo-Fagundo, 430 F.3d 66, 69-70 (1st Cir.2005); Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2005). Federal law, however, determines the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run. Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-Cruz, 127 F.3d 172, 174 (1st Cir.1997). "The first step" in determining the commencement of accrual "is to identify the actual injury of which the plaintiff complains." Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 5 (1st Cir.1994); see also Vistamar, Inc., 430 F.3d at 70. The injury of which Ojeda complains is her termination from employment.

"As a general principle, section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which the action is based." Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2007) (citations and internal quotations omitted). A plaintiff attains this knowledge "at the time of the act itself and not at the point that the harmful consequences are felt." Id. at 6 (citing Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (citing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980))). In an employment discrimination case, "the limitations period begins to run when the claimant receives unambiguous and authoritative notice of the discriminatory act (which is another way of saying that the period begins to run when the employee learns of the adverse employment action)." Morris v. The Gov't Devel. Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746 (1st Cir.1994); see also ...