Cruz v. Puerto Rico Planning Bd.

• Citation: 99 F.Supp.3d 249
• Decision Date: 15 April 2015
• Docket Number: CIV. NO. 14–1016PG.
• Parties: David CRUZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PUERTO RICO PLANNING BOARD, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

99 F.Supp.3d 249

David CRUZ, et al., Plaintiffs

v.PUERTO RICO PLANNING BOARD, et al., Defendants.

CIV. NO. 14–1016PG.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed April 15, 2015.

Andres Guillemard–Noble, Monique Guillemard–Noble, Nachman & Guillemard, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Jorge M. Marquez–San Martin, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUAN M. PEREZ–GIMENEZ, Senior District Judge.

Before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in both their official and individual capacity. See Docket No. 8. For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 9, 2014, plaintiffs Davis Cruz (“Cruz”), Wanda Miranda (“Miranda”) and their Conjugal Partnership filed the above-captioned complaint against defendants the Puerto Rico Planning Board (“PRPB”), the Puerto Rico Developmental Disabilities Council (PRDDC), Myrianne Roa (“Roa”),¹ Magdalena Vazquez (“Vazquez”), and Luis Garcia–Pelatti (“Garcia–Pelatti”), in their official and individual capacities. According to the complaint, Cruz was the Executive Director at the PRDDC, and his wife, plaintiff Miranda, held the position of Confidential Secretary I. See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 3.1–3.2. Miranda was appointed to this position as part of a reasonable accommodation in favor of Cruz insofar as he has been blind since he was sixteen years old. Id. at ¶¶ 4.14, 4.23.

Both Cruz and Miranda claim they were harassed and terminated from their employment without being afforded their due process rights and because they were affiliated with the New Progressive Party (“NPP”). Id. at ¶ 3.6. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs now seek compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief for the alleged violations of their constitutional rights under the First, Fifth² and Fourteenth Amendments. See Docket No. 1. The plaintiffs also lodge claims of disability discrimination pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., The plaintiffs additionally invoke the court's supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims brought pursuant to Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico (“Articles 1802 and 1803”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141 and 5142. See Docket No. 1.

According to the allegations in the complaint, co-defendant Garcia–Pelatti was the President of the PRPB at all relevant times herein. See id. at ¶ 3.8. He was appointed to this position by the current Governor, Alejandro Garcia Padilla, from plaintiffs' opposing party, the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”). Id. Co-defendant Vazquez is the Human Resources Director of the PRPB. Id. at ¶ 3.9. The PRDDC is alleged to be an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the purpose of which is to provide assistance to individuals with developmental disabilities. Id. at ¶¶ 3.11., 4.1. The plaintiffs allege that pursuant to the Developmental Disabilities Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 15001 et seq., any state that receives federal funds under this Act must establish a Council on Developmental Disabilities and must designate a state agency to provide support to this Council. Id. at ¶ 4.2. In the case at hand, the PRPB was the designated state agency for such purposes. Id. at ¶ 4.3.

After the defeat of the NPP in the 2012 general elections, co-defendant Garcia–Pelatti was appointed President of the PRPB. On or around February of 2013, he allegedly asked plaintiff Cruz to resign. Id. at ¶ 4.15. According to the plaintiffs, Garcia–Pelatti told them that he was being pressured to get rid of those affiliated to the NPP. Id. Plaintiff Cruz refused to resign and continued serving in what he claims was a politically-charged atmosphere. Id. at ¶¶ 4.16–4.17.

Some months thereafter, on June 14, 2013, Cruz allegedly received a phone call from Garcia–Pelatti's secretary requesting his presence at the PRPB to receive a letter.Id. at ¶ 4.18. Plaintiff Cruz responded that he could not attend until June 17th, after the closing ceremony of the Youth Leadership Forum for people with Disabilities, which was taking place at the time. Id. at ¶ 4.19. However, when the plaintiffs were speaking to some Forum participants immediately following the closing ceremony, co-defendant Vazquez and Angel Valle Valle, the Administrative Director of the PRPB, approached them to hand deliver termination letters, which the plaintiffs refused to receive. Id. at ¶ 4.20. The letters were later sent to plaintiffs via certified mail, but purportedly failed to inform them of their due process right to appeal such decision. Id. at ¶ 4.38. Subsequent to his dismissal, plaintiff Cruz was replaced by Roa, who is affiliated with the PDP and is not a disabled individual. Id. at ¶ 4.23.

According to the plaintiffs, all individual defendants were aware of their political affiliation as avid supporters of the NPP. And because both Garcia–Pelatti and Vazquez acted in their official capacities, the plaintiffs aver liability attaches to the PRPB. See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 4.44.

Instead of answering the complaint, the defendants moved to dismiss all claims except for the political discrimination claims against co-defendant Garcia–Pelatti. See Docket No. 8. The plaintiffs filed a response to the defendants' request (Docket No. 10) and the defendants replied (Docket No. 14).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. “To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Garcia–Catalan v. U.S., 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir.2013) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) ). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court must “ask whether the complaint states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Cooper v. Charter Communications Entertainments I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir.2014) (citing Maloy v. Ballori–Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir.2014) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, courts “may augment these facts and inferences with data points gleaned from documents incorporated by reference into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible to judicial notice.” A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir.2013) (citing Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.2011) ).

“To cross the plausibility threshold, the plaintiff must ‘plead [ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ ” Cooper, 760 F.3d at 106 (citing Maloy, 744 F.3d at 252 ). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ..., on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)....” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

“In resolving a motion to dismiss, a court should employ a two-pronged approach. It should begin by identifying and disregarding statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions couched as fact or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.”Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuno–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, the court “need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir.2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). “A complaint ‘must contain more than a rote recital of the elements of a cause of action,’ but need not include ‘detailed factual allegations.’ ” Rodriguez–Vives v. Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps, 743 F.3d 278, 283 (1st Cir.2014) (citing Rodríguez–Reyes v. Molina–Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2013) ). “Non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint must then be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible.” Ocasio–Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664–664, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Nevertheless, when evaluating the plausibility of a legal claim, a court may not “attempt to forecast a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if. a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Ocasio–Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12–13 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). As a result, courts should read the complaint “as a whole” and be cautious not to apply the plausibility standard “too mechanically.” See Rodriguez–Vives, 743 F.3d at 283 (citing Garcia–Catalan, 734 F.3d at 101, 103 ).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983

Section 1983 “provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 924, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail in a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff “must allege facts sufficient to support a determination (i) that the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and (ii) that [the alleged] conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Cepero–Rivera v. Fagundo, 414...