Ackers v. Comerica Bank & Trust, N.A., 11-18-00352-CV

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Writing for the Court: JOHN M. BAILEY, CHIEF JUSTICE
• Citation: 630 S.W.3d 292
• Parties: Larry ACKERS, Appellant v. COMERICA BANK & TRUST, N.A., TRUSTEE OF the LARRY ACKERS GENERATION SKIPPING TRUST, Appellee
• Docket Number: No. 11-18-00352-CV,11-18-00352-CV
• Decision Date: 31 December 2020

630 S.W.3d 292

Larry ACKERS, Appellant
v.
COMERICA BANK & TRUST, N.A., TRUSTEE OF the LARRY ACKERS GENERATION SKIPPING TRUST, Appellee

No. 11-18-00352-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Eastland.

Opinion filed December 31, 2020

C. Ryan Heath, Jacob T. Fain, Fort Worth, David H. Drez III, for Appellee.

Lamar D. Treadwell, New Braunfels, for Appellant.

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., and Wright, S.C.J.¹

JOHN M. BAILEY, CHIEF JUSTICE

This is a will construction case. Appellant, Larry Ackers, is the beneficiary of a testamentary trust created by his father's will. The will provided that Appellant is to receive the income from the corpus of the trust during his lifetime. Upon Appellant's death, the trust will terminate, and the trustee is directed to distribute the corpus of the trust to the "then-living descendants" of Appellant.

Appellant brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that some of his descendants should be excluded at his death. The trial court entered summary judgment to the effect that the relief sought by Appellant is not ripe for consideration. We affirm.

Background Facts

Appellant's father, Dale Ackers, executed a will in May 1993. Upon Dale Ackers's

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death, his will was admitted for probate. The will left one-half of the residual estate to Appellant's brother, Gary Ackers, outright. The will placed the other one-half of the residual estate into a trust with Appellant named as the sole lifetime income beneficiary of the trust. The relevant provision of the trust states: "Upon the death of [Appellant], this trust shall terminate and the Trustee[ ] ... shall distribute all of the remaining trust assets to the then-living descendants of [Appellant], per stirpes and not per capita[.]"

The term "descendants" was not defined in the will. Appellant had three biological children: Kimberly, Melissa, and Pepper. However, Appellant relinquished his parental rights to both Kimberly and Melissa, and both Kimberly and Melissa were adopted by other families. Kimberly died in 2013, survived by two children, Brittany and James. Pepper and Melissa are currently alive. Appellant never relinquished his parental rights to Pepper.

Appellee, Comerica Bank & Trust, N.A., is the current trustee of the trust. Appellant filed a petition for declaratory relief against Comerica, requesting the court to construe "then-living descendants" and to determine whether James and Brittany are excluded from that definition.² Comerica filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the case was not ripe for review. The trial court granted the motion, and this appeal followed.

Analysis

In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment on the basis of ripeness. Ripeness is a component of a court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc. , 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). In order for a court to have subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must have standing to sue, and the plaintiff's claim must be ripe. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch , 595 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Tex. 2020). The doctrines of standing and ripeness stem from the prohibition of advisory opinions, which in turn is rooted in the separation of powers doctrine. Patterson , 971 S.W.2d at 442. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004) (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus. , 852 S.W.2d at 446 ).

Ripeness examines when an action may be brought, while standing focuses on who may bring an action. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson , 22 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000) ; Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Eagle Supply & Mfg. L.P. , 530 S.W.3d 761, 767 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, no pet.). Ripeness "emphasizes the need for a concrete injury for a justiciable claim to be presented." Lynch , 595 S.W.3d at 683 (quoting Patterson , 971 S.W.2d at 442 ). If the plaintiff's claimed injury is based on "hypothetical facts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass," then the case is not ripe, and the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. (quoting Gibson , 22 S.W.3d at 852 ).

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) states that "[a] person interested under a ... will ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder."

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TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(a) (West 2020). The Act further provides that "[a] person interested as or through an executor ... may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect to [a]...