Ackley-Bell v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1

Decision Date28 July 1997
Docket NumberACKLEY-BELL,No. 38308-6-I,38308-6-I
Citation940 P.2d 685,87 Wn.App. 158
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
Parties, 119 Ed. Law Rep. 1199 Pamela; Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, Respondents, v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Appellant.

William H. Beaver, Tracy M. Miller, Karr Tuttle Campbell, Seattle, for Appellant.

Dimitri Iglitzin, Schwerin Burns Campbell & French, Seattle, for Respondent.

John Wasberg, Maureen A. Mannix, Dept. of Labor and Industries, Office of Attorney General, Kathleen Barnard, for intervenor.

COLEMAN, Judge.

On October 22, 1991, Pamela Ackley-Bell was an employee of the Seattle School District on paid leave for union activities. Following a prenegotiation meeting with union representatives, Ackley-Bell fell and was injured. Ackley-Bell filed a workers' compensation claim with the Department of Labor & Industries, claiming that the District should pay for her injuries. The Department rejected the claim. Ackley-Bell appealed to the Board of Industrial Appeals, which affirmed the Department's order. Ackley-Bell then appealed to Superior Court, where the Department then argued that its order should be reversed. The Superior Court agreed and reversed the Board, holding that the District was responsible because Ackley-Bell was a worker acting in the course of her employment at the time of the accident.

The District appeals, arguing that Ackley-Bell was neither a worker nor acting in the course of employment. A "worker" is defined broadly as every person engaged in the employment of an employer. RCW 51.08.180. Ackley-Bell was thus a District employee, regardless of whether she was engaged in her normal activities that day. A worker is acting "in the course of employment" if she is acting at her employer's direction or in furtherance of her employer's business. RCW 51.08.013. Based on statutory authority, case law, and the facts of this case, we hold that Ackley-Bell's collective bargaining activity was in furtherance of her employer's business. Accordingly, the trial court properly held that Ackley-Bell was entitled to compensation from the District. We therefore affirm.

FACTS

In 1991, Ackley-Bell worked in food services for the District, generally working five and half hours per day. Local 609 of the International Union of Operating Engineers acted as the food services employees' collective bargaining representative.

Ackley-Bell was a trustee for Local 609 and received $50 per month. As a trustee, her duties included attending an executive board meeting once a month and approving any reimbursement expenses. She was also a member of the union negotiating committee. Being a trustee did not entitle or require her to be a member of the negotiating committee. Ackley-Bell did not receive pay or benefits from the Union for time spent on negotiation leave.

Each time Ackley-Bell needed to leave work for contract negotiations, Union representative Dale Daugharty would request the leave from personnel officer Patricia Jones. The District had to grant such a request as long as the proper procedures were followed. While on such leave, Ackley-Bell worked up to sixteen hours a day, although she was paid for only five and a half hours, her normal hours worked. By contrast, when Ackley-Bell performed her food services job, she was paid for all hours worked.

During the fall of 1991, the District and Local 609 were involved in collective bargaining negotiations. Thus, Ackley-Bell was granted union activity leave for the week of October 21, 1991. On October 22, 1991, Ackley-Bell went to a Local 609 strategy meeting at the Union's Labor Temple. The purpose of the meeting was to develop a strategy for the negotiating session with the District scheduled for later that day. After the strategy meeting, the representatives ate lunch and prepared to go to the joint session. As they were about to leave, Ackley-Bell went to retrieve some empty boxes from another member's car. The Union was going to use the boxes to store documents, but Ackley-Bell did not know whether the documents were related to collective bargaining. As she carried the empty boxes back to the building, she fell and was injured.

Margaret Webster, the District's labor relations administrator, testified that the separate sessions were an essential part of the collective bargaining process:

Q: Now, are the meetings that the management people held, the caucuses or the separate meetings, an essential part of the collective bargaining process?

A: Yes, they are.

Q: Do you assume that the meetings the union holds or the union people hold are an equally essential part of the collective bargaining process?

A: Would I assume?

Q: Yes.

A: I would assume that they are.

Webster also testified that before the October negotiating session, a four-day training course on collective bargaining had been provided for both management and employees. The purpose of the training was "to enhance the bargaining process ... [f]or the benefit of everyone that was involved in it." In the fall of 1991, the employees and management attempted to implement the principles of the seminar.

In February 1992, Ackley-Bell filed a workers' compensation claim with the Department of Labor & Industries for her October 22, 1991 injury, claiming entitlement from the District. The Department rejected the claim, reasoning that Ackley-Bell was not injured in the course of employment. Ackley-Bell then filed a claim alleging that she was injured while in the course of employment with Local 609. The Department rejected this claim. The cases were consolidated for appeal to the Board.

On December 18, 1992, a hearing was held. About two weeks later, Ackley-Bell moved to reopen the record to add a letter from Webster regarding the District's authority to terminate a person while on leave. The industrial appeals judge denied the motion to reopen the record.

The industrial appeals judge determined that because Ackley-Bell was not acting in the course of her employment with either the District or the Union at the time of her injury, the Department's orders were correct.

Ackley-Bell appealed to Superior Court, where the Department filed a brief urging reversal of its order. The District filed a motion to strike the Department's brief and argument for lack of standing. The court denied that motion, reasoning that the Department had authority to participate in any court proceeding involving a self-insured employer.

The Superior Court reversed the Board, holding that the District was responsible for providing workers' compensation benefits to Ackley-Bell for her injury. In a letter summarizing its ruling, the court cited the excluded Webster letter for the proposition that if Ackley-Bell had taken leave and not participated in the separate or joint meetings, the District could have disciplined her. At a subsequent hearing to discuss the proposed written findings, the District objected to the trial court's consideration of this evidence. In its revised written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court stated that it considered only the exhibits and testimony admitted before the Board and did not cite the letter.

The court held that Ackley-Bell was a worker acting in the course of her employment because the District had the right to control her physical conduct. The court reasoned that Ackley-Bell was subject to discipline if she acted in an unruly or inappropriate fashion during the collective bargaining process. The court further reasoned that the District had the right to direct that Ackley-Bell be present at the separate and joint meetings for which she had secured the leave and that she conduct herself in a prescribed and appropriate manner. Additionally, the court found that Ackley-Bell's activities were in furtherance of the District's business:

While individual bargaining sessions may be sometimes adversarial, proper and orderly negotiation of the terms and conditions of employment contributes to avoiding disruption of the District's business. Petitioner's participation in the bargaining process was necessary to achieve a labor contract that mutually benefited employer and employee.

The court further determined that the specific act that Ackley-Bell was engaged in at the time of her injury was "an incidental activity" within normal work time and did not constitute an abandonment of her employment as a participant in collective bargaining.

ANALYSIS

The main issue on appeal is whether Ackley-Bell was a worker in the course of employment when she engaged in a prenegotiation collective bargaining meeting with union representatives. The District argues that Ackley-Bell was neither a "worker" nor acting "in the course of employment" at the time of the injury and therefore should not be compensated.

"Appellate review is limited to examination of the record to see whether substantial evidence supports the findings made after the superior court's de novo review, and whether the court's conclusions of law flow from the findings." Young v. Department of Labor & Indus., 81 Wash.App. 123, 128, 913 P.2d 402, review denied, 130 Wash.2d 1009, 928 P.2d 414 (1996). The appellate court "must accord substantial weight to the agency's interpretation of the law." Littlejohn Constr. Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 74 Wash.App. 420, 423, 873 P.2d 583 (1994). Because two agencies--the Board and the Department--offer conflicting legal interpretations, we consider the expertise of both agencies. See, e.g., Flanigan v. Department of Labor & Indus., 65 Wash.App. 119, 121, 827 P.2d 1082 (1992), aff'd, 123 Wash.2d 418, 869 P.2d 14 (1994); Jackson v. Harvey, 72 Wash.App. 507, 513, 864 P.2d 975, review denied, 124 Wash.2d 1003, 877 P.2d 1287 (1994); Belnap v. Boeing Co., 64 Wash.App. 212, 216-17, 823 P.2d 528 (1992). Ultimately, however, this is a novel question of law that we review de novo. In so doing, we find the Department's position more persuasive.

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