Acoustic, Insulation & Drywall, Inc. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Appeal Bd.
| Decision Date | 30 September 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 4695,4695 |
| Citation | 459 P.2d 541,51 Haw. 312 |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
| Parties | ACOUSTIC, INSULATION & DRYWALL, INC. et al., v. LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS APPEAL BOARD et al. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where evidence in claim under Workmen's Compensation Act showed that death might have been caused either by pre-existing heart condition or by occupational exertions or by both, the statutory presumption of Chapter 97, Sec. 97-57A(1), R.L.H.1955, as amended (HRS Sec. 386-85), that the claim 'comes within the provisions of this chapter' was applicable and it was error not to instruct the jury on the presumption.
2. Since the purpose of the presumption is to place both the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion upon the employer, it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that claimants had to prove every essential element of their case by a preponderance of the evidence.
3. The statutory presumption, as a provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, must be construed in relation to the Act as a whole.
4. The meaning of the presumption is that where no substantial evidence to the contrary is adduced by the employer the claimant must win; and where the employer does adduce substantial contrary evidence, the trier of fact must weigh all of the evidence to see whether the employer has sustained its burden of persuasion.
5. By substantial evidence is meant relevant and credible evidence of a quality and quantity to justify a reasonable man to reach a conclusion.
Earl Robinson, Honolulu (Barry Chung, Honolulu, on the brief; Fong, Miho, Choy & Robinson, Honolulu, of counsel), for appellants.
Donald A. Beck, Honolulu (Cades, Cox, Schutte, Fleming & Wright, Honolulu, of counsel), for respondents.
Before RICHARDSON, C. J., MARUMOTO and ABE, JJ., OGATA, Circuit Judge, for LEVINSON, J., disqualified, and WONG, Circuit Judge, for KOBAYASHI, J., disqualified.
The dependents of William E. Bailey, deceased, filed a claim under Hawaii's Workmen's Compensation Law, Chapter 97 of R.L.H.1955 (Chapter 386, Hawaii Revised Statutes), against deceased's employer, Acoustic, Insulation & Drywall, Inc., and its insurance carrier, First Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd. The Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations of the State of Hawaii granted an award which was affirmed by the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeal Board. The employer and its insurance carrier appealed therefrom.
In the trial de novo in the circuit court, the parties did not dispute that the deceased had been performing one of his usual duties of unloading gypsum boards from pulleys and carrying them for distances up to 75 feet. The load, which consisted of two boards taped together, had a total weight of about 180 pounds, and was carried with the help of a fellow employee. Deceased had been on the job for about four hours, but took rest periods of about five minutes between loads, as was the custom. At about noontime, while waiting for the delivery of a third truckload of gypsum board, deceased felt chest pains and obtained permission to go to a hospital. He died before arrival.
The parties further did not dispute medical testimony to the fact that deceased had a severe heart disease and that he had developed a blood clot about two days prior to his death. The dispute rests in the cause of deceased's death. His dependents, hereinafter called claimants, contend that the decedent was able to survive even though his blood vessels had been 90% blocked by the recent clot, but that his normal physical exertions on the day of his death aggravated or contributed to his existing heart condition so that there was an insufficient supply of blood to his heart, thereby causing death of the heart muscle. The employer and its insurance carrier, hereinafter called the employer, contends that the clot itself, which was admittedly due not to his employment but to his progressive heart condition, was the immediate and direct cause of death.
We find it necessary to consider only claimants' specifications of error numbered 6, 7 and 8, relating to the trial court's refusal to give claimants' requested instructions No. 2 and No. 5, and its giving of the employer's requested instruction No. 5. Claimants' requested instructions No. 2 and No. 5 read respectively as follows:
In the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that the claim is for a covered work injury.
To overcome the statutory presumption that Appellees have a compensable claim, Appellants must have presented substantial evidence to the contrary. Substantial evidence to the contrary must be evidence such as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a claim.
Employer's requested instruction No. 5 reads as follows:
The burden is on the dependents of William E. Bailey, to prove every essential element of their case by a preponderance of the evidence.
The instruction requested by the employer was the law prior to July 1, 1959. Estate of Ellen Yin v. Acme Mattress Co., 40 Haw. 660 (1955); D. K. Awai v. Paschoal, 43 Haw. 94 (January 15, 1959).
By Act 240, 1959 Session Laws of the Territory of Hawaii 184, a statutory presumption came into effect on July 1, 1959, which read:
Sec. 97-57A. Presumptions. In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary:
(1) That the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter;
(2) That sufficient notice of such injury has been given;
(3) That the injury was not caused by the intoxication of the injured employee; and
(4) That the injury was not caused by the willful intention of the injured employee to injure or kill himself or another. 1
In construing this provision, we are guided by the words of this court in Re Ichijiro Ikoma, 23 Haw. 291, 295 (1916):
In determining the proper meaning and construction of any one section or provision of the act (Workmen's Compensation Act) we must look to the act as a whole, determine its scope and object and general purpose, take the language used which is free from technicalities and construe that language broadly and liberally with the view of effecting the purposes of the act * * *. We must not only look at the act as a whole but must scrutinize it in all its parts; we must consider every provision, and in case of apparent conflict between two provisions we must so construe the act and each provision that effect will be given to each and every portion; we must give to the words used...
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