Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Jackson, Docket No. 35226 (Idaho App. 7/8/2009)
| Decision Date | 08 July 2009 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 35226. |
| Parties | ACTION COLLECTION SERVICE, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DONALD JACKSON and JANEEN JACKSON, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge. Hon. Christopher Bieter, Magistrate.
Order reversing magistrate's grant of summary judgment to Defendants, and ordering judgment for Plaintiff, reversed and case remanded.
Strother Law Office; Jeffrey A. Strother, Boise, for appellant. Jeffrey A. Strother argued.
Shearer & Bonney; Shaun R. Bonney, P.C., Boise, for respondent. Shaun R. Bonney argued.
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Donald and Janeen Jackson appeal from the district court's order reversing the magistrate's grant of summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In October 2001, Donald Jackson was injured in a motor vehicle accident. He and Janeen Jackson (collectively Jackson) had both automobile and health insurance at the time of the accident. On November 21, 2001, Jackson sought treatment from Intermountain Orthopaedics (Intermountain) for a shoulder injury sustained in the accident. He received treatment from Intermountain through January 30, 2002. Prior to his first treatment, Jackson signed a patient authorization and assignment. That agreement states, in relevant part:
Please remember that insurance is considered a method of reimbursing the patient for fees paid to the doctor and is not a substitute for payment. Some companies pay fixed allowances for certain procedures, and others pay a percentage of the charge. It is your responsibility to pay any deductible amount, co-insurance, any other balance not paid for by your insurance. If your insurance has not paid your account in full within sixty days of billing, we will require the balance to be paid by you. . . .
. . . .
If this account is assigned to an attorney for collection and / or suit, the practice shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs of collection.
. . . .
I request that payment of authorized benefits be made on my behalf. I assign the benefits payable to which I am entitled including medicare, private insurance and other health plans to Intermountain Orthopaedics.
This assignment will remain in effect until revoked by me in writing. . . . I understand that I am financially responsible for all charges whether or not paid by said insurance.
I hereby authorize the practice to appeal any incorrect insurance payment. I agree to the assignments and financial responsibilities shown above.
During the course of treatment, Jackson made three payments to Intermountain, and his health insurance company, Lifewise, made one in the amount of $1,112.68. In April 2002, Lifewise sent a second payment to Intermountain, which reduced the total balance due on the account to $2,274.43. In May, Intermountain recorded with the Ada County Recorder a claim of lien for medical care against Jackson and his personal injury attorney for the full amount still due plus interest, attorney fees and filing fees. Several months later, in August, Intermountain credited Jackson's account for a multi-procedure discount, reducing the outstanding balance by $825. When Jackson's lawsuit against the other driver in the accident settled in February 2003, he paid Intermountain the $1,449.43 principal still due on his account. His attorney in the personal injury case sent a letter with the check indicating that the check "represent[ed] full and final payment on behalf of Don Jackson." Intermountain filed a release of lien for medical care on May 20, 2003. The release stated:
Know all men by these presents that Intermountain Orthopaedics ("Lienor"), of the County of Ada, State of Idaho, does hereby certify and declare that a certain Claim of Lien for Medical Care, bearing the date May 14, 2002 and name Donald Allen Jackson, made and executed by Lienor and filed in the office of the County Recorder of the County of Ada, State of Idaho, on May 16, 2002 as Instrument No. 102055978, together with the debt thereby secured, is satisfied, discharged and released.
In late September 2003, Intermountain received a demand from Lifewise for the return of the $1,112.68 payment made in January 2002. Lifewise had determined that Liberty Mutual, Jackson's car insurance provider, was the primary insurer for Jackson's injuries. Intermountain returned the money to Lifewise in October 2003, and then sought payment from Jackson on the new outstanding balance. Jackson refused to pay Intermountain and the account was assigned to Action Collection Service, Inc. (Action) in April 2004; a complaint was filed the following April of 2005. Action filed a motion for summary judgment, which was partially granted following a hearing. Jackson did not contest three of Action's claims relating to debts owed to other companies; only the debt to Intermountain remained for trial. In May 2005, the parties filed stipulated facts followed by cross-motions for summary judgment. Jackson asserted that Action was precluded from collecting on the account by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, because of waiver, and in the interests of justice and fairness. Action asserted that recovery was proper based on Jackson's contract with Intermountain. The magistrate granted Jackson's motion for summary judgment, but not on grounds raised by Jackson. The magistrate rejected the doctrine of accord and satisfaction on the rationale that there was no amount in dispute at the time Jackson submitted his final check in return for Intermountain's release of its lien. The magistrate also concluded that the release of lien was not a waiver. However, the magistrate applied the doctrine of voluntary payment and determined that Intermountain was not allowed to recover money from Jackson after voluntarily refunding money to Lifewise.
Action appealed to the district court, contending that the doctrine of voluntary payment did not apply and seeking attorney fees. Jackson asserted once again that Action's claim was precluded by accord and satisfaction and waiver. The district court initially determined that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction issue was not properly before it because Jackson had not filed a cross-appeal; however in a footnote it ruled that the doctrine would not apply even if properly raised. The district court further determined that the voluntary payment rule did not apply. After comparing the purposes of the voluntary payment and officious intermeddler defenses, the district court ruled that the original contract for payment for Intermountain's services was unambiguous and enforceable against Jackson. The district court reversed the magistrate, granted summary judgment in favor of Action, and imposed attorney fees against Jackson pursuant to the contract and I.C. § 12-120(3). Jackson appeals.
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, we review the decision of the district court directly. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008). We first note that summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, we exercise free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994).
The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not change the applicable standard of review, and does not in and of itself establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 123, 206 P.3d 481, 487 (2009); Moss v. Mid-Am. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298, 302, 647 P.2d 754, 758 (1982); Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 897, 204 P.3d 532, 537 (Ct. App. 2009). This Court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits. Intermountain Eye & Laser Ctrs., P.L.L.C. v. Miller, 142 Idaho 218, 222, 127 P.3d 121, 125 (2005); Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004); Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001); Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 206, 998 P.2d 1118, 1119 (2000); Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1986). Moreover, the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not transform the court, sitting to hear a summary judgment motion, into the trier of fact. Moss, 103 Idaho at 302, 647 P.2d at 758. Where, as here, the parties have submitted stipulated facts prior to filing cross-motions for summary judgment, the only issue before the court is a matter of law. McKay v. Ireland Bank, 138 Idaho 185, 187, 59 P.3d 990, 992 (Ct. App. 2002). The standard of review on the motion for summary judgment does not change; we review the stipulated facts to determine if either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Jackson asserts that the district court erred by reversing the magistrate and granting Action's motion for summary judgment. The district court ruled in favor of Action primarily based on contract principles. Jackson's contract with Intermountain...
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