Acustar, Inc. v. Staples
| Decision Date | 06 March 1992 |
| Citation | 598 So.2d 943 |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
| Parties | ACUSTAR, INC. v. Marcia STAPLES. 2900460. |
Dennis Riley of Morring, Schrimsher & Riley, Huntsville, for appellant.
Gary V. Conchin of Morris, Smith, Siniard, Cloud, Fees & Conchin, P.C., Huntsville, for appellee.
This is a workmen's compensation case.
Marcia Staples filed an action against Chrysler Motors Corporation (Chrysler) alleging that she incurred a compensable injury while working for Chrysler. She later amended the complaint to name Acustar, Inc., (Acustar), as her true employer and to include allegations regarding other injuries on other dates. Following the presentation of ore tenus evidence, the trial court entered a lengthy and thorough order finding, inter alia, that Staples suffered permanent, partial disability and loss of earning capacity of 50%, and awarded her compensation accordingly. Acustar's post-trial motions were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The appellant raises three issues: (1) whether a reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court's finding of 50% permanent impairment and the award for such; (2) whether the trial court committed error in allowing partial benefits to accrue from the date of the injury until the date of the judgment; and (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding alleged, unpaid medical bills and ordering the appellant to pay those bills.
The appellant's brief details a lengthy and confusing factual recitation regarding previous injuries and recoveries by Staples during her employment, which is not supported by record references and serves only to muddle the facts in the instant case. Our review reveals that Staples was employed continuously by the appellant since 1976, performing basic, assembly-type work. We find no evidence that the appellant ever disputed Staples's testimony that in the time immediately preceding this injury, she was satisfactorily performing her job. Consequently, appellant's arguments regarding any pre-existing condition fails. Blue Circle, Inc. v. Williams, 579 So.2d 630 (Ala.Civ.App.1991).
Reviewing a workmen's compensation case is a two-step process. First, the reviewing court looks to see if there is any legal evidence to support the trial court's findings. If such evidence is found, then the reviewing court determines whether any reasonable view of that evidence supports the trial court's judgment. Ex parte Eastwood Foods, Inc., 575 So.2d 91 (Ala.1991).
The law is clear that a trial court, which has the duty of determining the extent of the disability, is not bound by expert testimony but must consider all of the evidence, including its own observations, and interpret it to its own best judgment. Genpak Corporation v. Gibson, 534 So.2d 312 (Ala.Civ.App.1988); Allen v. Diversified Products, 453 So.2d 1063 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). On appellate review, we do not consider the propriety of the trial court's findings of fact, nor do we consider the weight of the evidence. Allen, supra. Furthermore, the findings of the trial court on conflicting testimony are conclusive. Suit v. Hudson Metals, Inc., 414 So.2d 115 (Ala.Civ.App.1982).
The appellant contends that no evidence supports the court's finding of 50% disability and lost earning capacity. We disagree. Our review of the record discloses that a vocational expert reported that Staples suffered a vocational disability rating of 57% to 58%. There is also medical evidence regarding the work restrictions placed on Staples by the various doctors attending her since the injury. There was testimony regarding Staples's medication, work and leisure restrictions, and pain management since the injury. There is evidence in the record that Staples has continuous pain and that the injury-induced disability affects her ability to perform routine daily tasks. The law is clear regarding the trial court's duty to determine the extent of disability and the factors it must consider. Genpak, supra. There is ample evidence in the record which clearly supports the trial court's determination of 50% disability and loss of earning capacity.
Next, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in awarding benefits from the date of the injury until the date of the judgment because maximum medical improvement had not been reached on that date. The appellant contends that because the trial court did not determine when Staples reached maximum medical improvement, there existed no basis for an award prior to the time of the trial court's judgment of such. The appellant relies on Alabama By-Products Corporation v. Lolley, 506 So.2d 343 (Ala.Civ.App.1987), to support that position. In that case, there was evidence that the extent of disability could not be determined at that time. That factually differs from the instant case in that there is evidence in this record supporting the trial court's assignment of 50% disability.
It appears that the appellant is arguing that...
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