Adams v. City of Boston
| Decision Date | 07 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | SJC–10861. |
| Citation | 963 N.E.2d 694,461 Mass. 602,192 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3313 |
| Parties | Daniel ADAMS v. CITY OF BOSTON (and two consolidated cases 1). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Bryan C. Decker (Leah M. Barrault with him), Boston, for Daniel Adams & others.
Kay H. Hodge (John M. Simon with her), Boston, for city of Boston.
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
William J. Johnson, of Virginia, & Timothy R. King for Massachusetts Coalition of Police, IUPA, AFL–CIO, & another.Philip G. Boyle, Laurence J. Donoghue, Peter J. Mee, Boston, & Colin R. Boyle for City Solicitors and Town Counsel Association.Philip Collins, Norwood, for Massachusetts Municipal Association.
Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.
In this consolidated appeal, we construe the payment obligations of municipalities participating in G.L. c. 41, § 108L, popularly known as the “Quinn Bill,” a local option statute establishing a career incentive pay program for police officers. The statute provides that in participating municipalities, qualifying police officers “shall be granted” certain salary increases for furthering their education in the field of police work. Id. The statute also provides that municipalities “shall be reimbursed” by the Commonwealth for fifty per cent of payments made under the program. Id. The underlying cases arose when the Commonwealth, facing budgetary constraints, substantially cut § 108L reimbursements. The Commonwealth legally was permitted to do so because § 108L reimbursements are considered subject to appropriation by the General Court. Milton v. Commonwealth, 416 Mass. 471, 473–475, 623 N.E.2d 482 (1993). Faced with a deficient reimbursement from the Commonwealth, the city of Boston (city) in turn informed police union leaders that it would cut payments almost in half.2 THE CITY TOOK THIS action pursuant to clauses in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) it had reached with the unions regarding the city's participation in the program.3 The clauses state that, should the Commonwealth ever fail to reimburse the city its half share, the city will only owe its own half share, plus any amount actually received from the Commonwealth. The plaintiffs now contend that these clauses impermissibly conflict with the statute, which they view as requiring the city to pay one hundred per cent of benefits irrespective of reimbursement.
The plaintiff police officers, who qualify for § 108L benefits, brought three separate suits in the Superior Court seeking (1) a declaration that the CBA provisions conflict with § 108L and are thus invalid, and (2) an order that the city “make full payment.” The parties jointly petitioned to consolidate the cases and transfer them to this court. G.L. c. 211, § 4A. A single justice in the county court granted the petition, and reserved and reported the matter without decision to the full court.4 We now conclude that judgments must enter for the city.
1. Background. Section 108L is a local option statute, enacted in 1970, providing incentive salary increases to police officers for furthering their education in police work. Payment and reimbursement under the statute operate as follows. Municipalities first must obtain certification by the board of higher education (board) that a particular officer is eligible for a salary increase. Once certified, the municipality then pays the salary increase over the course of a fiscal year, July 1 through June 30. The municipality then files information with the board by a specified date, listing § 108L payments made over the prior fiscal year and requesting reimbursement.
Two provisions of the current statute are at issue in this case. The first provision, which we shall call the “payment provision,” was added in 1976; at the time, it served to reduce the percentage salary increases available to officers under the previous payment provision.5 St.1976, c. 480, § 9. See Rooney v. Yarmouth, 410 Mass. 485, 487, 573 N.E.2d 969 (1991). The payment provision lists the percentage base salary increases that officers are entitled to receive for earning various credits or degrees:
“[A]ny regular full-time police officer commencing such incentive pay program after September 1st, 1976[,] shall be granted a base salary increase of ten per cent upon attaining an associate's degree in law enforcement or sixty points earned to a baccalaureate degree in law enforcement, a twenty per cent increase upon attaining a baccalaureate degree in law enforcement, and a twenty-five per cent increase upon attaining a master's degree in law enforcement or for a degree in law” (emphasis added). G.L. c. 41, § 108L, as appearing in St.1976, c. 480, § 9.This language has remained unchanged since the provision was added in 1976.
The second provision at issue, which we shall call the “reimbursement provision,” was included in the original statute, St.1970, c. 835. The provision reads:
“Any city or town which accepts the provisions of this section and provides career incentive salary increases for police officers shall be reimbursed by the commonwealth for one half the cost of such payments upon certification by the board of higher education” (emphasis added). G.L. c. 41, § 108L.
This language appears in the paragraph before the payment provision; it has remained unchanged since 1970.6
a. The Milton case. In Milton v. Commonwealth, 416 Mass. 471, 623 N.E.2d 482 (1993) ( Milton ), this court had occasion to interpret the reimbursement provision of § 108L. There, the issue before the court was whether the Commonwealth could be ordered to reimburse municipalities when it failed to pay its fifty per cent share. Id. at 472, 623 N.E.2d 482. The case arose out of the Commonwealth's failure to appropriate sufficient sums for § 108L reimbursement for fiscal years 1988 through 1991. Id. The court held that the words “shall be reimbursed” do not create an absolute right to reimbursement; rather, the reimbursement provision creates only a conditional right subject to the “availability of funds appropriated [by the General Court] for the purpose.” Id. at 473, 623 N.E.2d 482. Since our decision, therefore, municipalities and police officers have been unable to seek judicial relief against the Commonwealth for failing to reimburse § 108L payments.
b. The collective bargaining agreements. The city accepted the provisions of § 108L in 1998, after agreeing to do so in collective bargaining agreements with police unions.7 The CBAs contain certain provisions regarding the city's participation in the program. One such provision reads: 8
“If for any fiscal year the reimbursement from the Commonwealth does not fully meet its fifty per cent (50%) share of educational incentives paid pursuant to [§ 108L], then eligible employees shall subsequently be paid educational incentives equal to 5.0% , 10.0% , or 12.5% based on the degree held and certified, plus [the amount] actually reimbursed by the Commonwealth for the prior fiscal year.”The percentages listed—five per cent, ten per cent, and 12.5 per cent—equal one-half the percentages specified in the payment provision of § 108L. The parties therefore clearly agreed that, should the Commonwealth ever fail to reimburse the city for its full half of § 108L payments, the city could subsequently cut payments in half.
c. The Commonwealth's reduced § 108L reimbursements. Consistent with the statutory procedures already described, in the fall of 2009 the city timely applied to the Commonwealth for reimbursement of § 108L payments made during FY 2009. The city's payments for FY 2009 amounted to $21,719,862. The city therefore requested reimbursement of $10,859,931—half the paid sum. The Commonwealth, however, had not appropriated sufficient money for the FY 2010 budget to cover anticipated costs for § 108L reimbursements.9 The Commonwealth only reimbursed the city $1,896,261, equal to 8.73 per cent of the city's total § 108L expenditures for FY 2009.
On December 31, 2009, having received the Commonwealth's reimbursement, the city's director of labor relations wrote to police union leaders explaining that the city planned to reduce § 108L payments, effective almost immediately.10 In accordance with the CBAs, the city reduced payments to 58.73 per cent, consisting of the “full fifty per cent” contribution from the city, plus the 8.73 per cent actually received from the Commonwealth. The letter informed the unions that the reductions were for a twelve-month period, but that the city would again reduce payments if the Commonwealth again failed to appropriate sufficient funds in the FY 2011 budget for § 108L reimbursements.
The Commonwealth appropriated $10 million in the FY 2011 budget for reimbursement of § 108L payments for FY 2010. The parties agree, however, that $58 million is needed to reimburse all § 108L municipalities for half of those payments.
The plaintiffs in the underlying cases seek a declaration that the CBA provisions are invalid because they materially conflict with § 108L. In their view, § 108L requires municipalities to pay one hundred per cent of the salary increases specified in the payment provision. This one hundred per cent figure is not contingent on later reimbursement from the Commonwealth, which the plaintiffs view as a separate and distinct obligation. The plaintiffs argue that because the CBA provisions allow less than one hundred per cent payment, they materially conflict with the statute, and are thus invalid. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 3, 458 Mass. 155, 163–165, 935 N.E.2d 1260 (2010) ( BHA ). In addition, § 108L is not one of the statutes listed in G.L. c. 150E, § 7 ( d ), that yield to CBAs; therefore, the CBAs must yield to the statute and be declared invalid.
2. Discussion. In cases involving the interplay between a statute and a CBA provision, we begin by looking to the...
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