Galenski v. Town of Erving

Citation28 N.E.3d 470,471 Mass. 305
Decision Date17 April 2015
Docket NumberSJC–11772.
PartiesCharlene GALENSKI v. TOWN OF ERVING & others.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Patricia M. Rapinchuk, Springfield, for the defendants.

Eric Lucentini (Sandra Lucentini with him) for the plaintiff.

Present: GANTS, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, DUFFLY, LENK, HINES, JJ.

Opinion

DUFFLY, J.

Charlene Galenski retired in 2012 after six years of service as a school principal in the town of Erving (town); she previously had been a long-time public school teacher in other municipalities in the Commonwealth. Galenski then sought continued health insurance coverage and contribution by the town to the cost of her group health insurance premiums. In 2001, the town had voted to adopt G.L. c. 32B, § 9E, which required it to contribute over fifty percent of the health insurance premiums of all of its retirees. Before employing Galenski, however, the town had enacted a policy stating that it would contribute only to the group health insurance premiums of retired employees who had

retired after a minimum of ten years of employment with the town. Although Galenski was permitted to remain a member of the town's group health insurance plan after she retired, the town determined she was not eligible for any contribution by the town to her health insurance premiums.

Galenski filed a complaint in the Superior Court contending that the town had violated her right to payment by the town of a portion of her group medical insurance premiums, as required under G.L. c. 32B, § 9E ; she sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and also raised a claim of estoppel based on detrimental reliance. A judge of the Superior Court allowed Galenski's motion for summary judgment on the first two claims, denied the town's cross motion for summary judgment, and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the town from enforcing its policy.2 The town appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We conclude that, because the town had voted to accept G.L. c. 32B, a local option statute that governs group health insurance for municipal employees, the terms of the statute govern whether and in what amounts the town must contribute to the cost of a retiree's health insurance premiums. Accordingly, the town's retirement policy imposing a minimum term of service as a prerequisite to premium contributions from the town is invalid.

1. Factual background. We recite the facts as set forth in the judge's decision, supplemented by undisputed facts in the record. In 1956, the town voted to accept G.L. c. 32B; by accepting certain local option provisions of that statute, the town was required to make group health insurance coverage available to retired employees. In 2001, the town's voters chose to accept G.L. c. 32B, § 9E.3 General Laws c. 32B, § 9E, requires municipalities to contribute to the group health insurance premiums of retired employees at a rate determined by the municipality, but that rate must exceed fifty percent of the cost of the insurance

premiums.4

In February, 2006, the town enacted a retirement policy restricting participation in its group health insurance plan to those employees who retired from the town “after a minimum of ten (10) years of employment by the [t]own.” The policy further provided that [a]n eligible retiree with less than ten (10) years of employment with the [town] may choose to continue health insurance coverage through the [t]own's carrier at [one hundred percent] of the retiree's cost.”

Galenski began employment as the principal of Erving Elementary School on July 1, 2006.5 At that time, she was a long-time educator with over thirty years of creditable service6 as a public school teacher in the Commonwealth.7 As an active employee, Galenski was enrolled in the town's health insurance plan, and the town contributed to the cost of her health insurance premiums. Galenski retired in good standing in October, 2012, after six years of service to the town.

At a meeting on October 1, 2012, the town's board of selectmen determined that Galenski, although eligible to continue to participate in the town's group health insurance plan, would be responsible for one hundred percent of her insurance premiums. After her retirement, Galenski continued to participate in the town's group health insurance plan, paying the entire amount of the monthly premiums.8

2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. DeWolfe v. Hingham Ctr., Ltd., 464 Mass. 795, 799, 985 N.E.2d 1187 (2013). See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c), as

amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).

b. Statutory framework. General Laws c. 32B is a local-option statute governing various insurance benefits for employees of municipalities and other State political subdivisions. Cioch v. Treasurer of Ludlow, 449 Mass. 690, 690 n. 2, 871 N.E.2d 469 (2007). The purpose of G.L. c. 32B “is to provide a plan of group life insurance, group accidental death and dismemberment insurance and group general or blanket hospital, surgical, medical, dental and other health insurance for certain persons in the service of counties ..., cities, towns and districts and their dependents.” G.L. c. 32B, § 1.

As a local-option statute, G.L. c. 32B “does not take effect until a governmental unit accepts it.” Connors v. Boston, 430 Mass. 31, 37, 714 N.E.2d 335 (1999). “Once accepted, however, it provides the exclusive mechanisms by which and to whom the [municipality] may provide group health insurance.” Id. See Yeretsky v. Attleboro, 424 Mass. 315, 316–317, 676 N.E.2d 1118 (1997). Where a municipality has exercised its local option to provide group health insurance for its employees through acceptance of G.L. c. 32B, “employees are automatically covered by group insurance unless the employee ‘give[s] written notice ... indicating that he is not to be insured for such coverages.’ McDonald v. Town Manager of Southbridge, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 479, 480, 657 N.E.2d 1285 (1995), S.C., 423 Mass. 1018, 672 N.E.2d 10 (1996), quoting G.L. c. 32B, § 4.

Under the “default” provision of G.L. c. 32B, § 9, if group health insurance is offered to a municipality's active employees, such insurance coverage “shall be continued [for retired employees] and the retired employee shall pay the full premium cost, subject to the provisions of [G.L. c. 32B, § 9A or 9E,] whichever may be applicable.” See Yeretsky v. Attleboro, supra at 317, 676 N.E.2d 1118. In lieu of the default provision under G.L. c. 32B, § 9, a municipality adopting G.L. c. 32B may opt to accept one of these two local options, which require contributions by the municipality to a retiree's group insurance premiums. By adopting G.L. c. 32B, § 9A, a municipality chooses to pay fifty percent of a retiree's insurance premiums; if a municipality adopts G.L. c. 32B, § 9E, the municipality then “may elect to pay ‘a subsidiary or additional rate’ greater than fifty per cent of a retiree's health insurance premium.” Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 470 Mass. 563, 565, 24 N.E.3d 552 (2015). In addition, G.L. c. 32B, § 9E, mandates that [n]o governmental unit ... shall provide different subsidiary or additional rates to any group or class within that unit.”

c. Validity of the town's term of service requirement. The town contends that its term of service policy, restricting the town's obligation to contribute to retirees' health insurance premiums to those retirees who were employed by the town for a minimum of ten years, is consistent with the language and purpose of G.L. c. 32B, § 9E. The town relies on Cioch v. Treasurer of Ludlow, 449 Mass. at 696–697, 871 N.E.2d 469, for the proposition that a town policy or regulation permissibly may limit a retiree's eligibility for insurance coverage under G.L. c. 32B, § 9E. The town construes the prohibition in G.L. c. 32B, § 9E, against affording different premium contribution rates to “any group or class” as meaning only that groups such as teachers, fire fighters, and police officers cannot, through collective bargaining, negotiate different rates of contribution for their members. The town argues that such collective bargaining by separate groups could expose a municipality to expensive administrative costs, thereby defeating what it views to be the Legislature's purpose of cost containment.

[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.” Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 139, 987 N.E.2d 1236 (2013), quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749, 840 N.E.2d 518 (2006). In interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain language. Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, supra at 138, 987 N.E.2d 1236.

Municipalities accepting G.L. c. 32B, § 9E, “shall ... in addition to the payment of fifty per cent of a premium for contributory group life, hospital, surgical, medical, dental and other health insurance for employees retired from the service of the town, and their dependents, pay a subsidiary or additional rate” that is determined by vote of the municipality. “The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily interpreted as having a mandatory or imperative obligation.” Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609, 446 N.E.2d 1387 (1983). The statute, by its terms, is mandatory, and “once accepted the municipality must comply with the statute's unambiguous mandates,” notwithstanding that the statute was adopted voluntarily. Adams...

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