Adams v. Clapp

• Decision Date: 07 June 1963
• Citation: 190 N.E.2d 886,346 Mass. 245
• Parties: Herbert F. ADAMS v. John B. CLAPP et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 886

190 N.E.2d 886

346 Mass. 245

Herbert F. ADAMS v. John B. CLAPP et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.

Argued May 7, 1963.

Decided June 7, 1963.

Charles F. Marsland, Jr., Hingham, for plaintiff.

James C. Heigham, Boston (Robert G. Clark, Jr., Brockton, with him), for defendants.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and CUTTER, KIRK and REARDON, JJ.

KIRK, Justice.

The plaintiff appeals from orders sustaining the defendants' demurrers to his declaration in four counts in an action of tort for libel. The averments in each count are substantially the same. ¹ They differ in the names of the defendants and, in the counts against the individual defendants, in the allegation that publication of the alleged libel was made in two weekly newspapers in Hingham as well as in The Patriot Ledger. Photostats of the alleged libellous publications are annexed to the declaration and are incorporated in the counts by reference.

One ground of demurrer raised by all of the defendants is that the declaration does not state a cause of action. We address ourselves to that contention.

Each of the counts is almost four full printed pages in length. Approximately one page consists of excerpts from a letter signed and released by the individual defendants to the local papers and published on March 22, 1962. These excerpts allegedly constitute the libel. The remainder of each count comprises a rather extentive appraisal of the plaintiff's personal and professional reputation, an innuendo or argumentative analysis of the excerpts, a reference to the fact that the individual defendants were members of the three man board of assessors of the town of Hingham who appointed the plaintiff to his position as appraiser for the town on April 14, 1960, and a claim for damages. The article complained of as it appeared in The Patriot Ledger according to the copy marked 'A,' and incorporated by reference in each count of the declaration, is set out in full in the footnote. An asterisk designates each of the paragraphs in the published letter which were extracted and set out in the declaration. ²

'The plaintiff seeks to bring himself within the well established principle that a demurrer to a declaration for libel cannot be sustained unless the words are not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning.' Aldrich v. Boyle, 328 Mass. 30, 101 N.E.2d 495, and cases cited. It is the application of this well established principle which presents the problem raised by demurrer in a given case. 'The test is whether, in the circumstances, the writing discredits the plaintiff in the minds of any considerable and respectable class of the community. A publication is defamatory when it tends to injure one's reputation in the community and to expose him to hatred, ridicule, and contempt, an imputation of crime or of bad character or an injury in one's office or business not being essential.' Muchnick v. Post Publishing Co., 332 Mass. 304, 305-306, 125 N.E.2d 137, 138, 51 A.L.R.2d 547, and cases cited.

We note the circumstance that the release of the letter by the individual defendants took place during a local political campaign in response to criticism publicly made of them by the third member of the board of assessors on several issues including the termination of the plaintiff's services as appraiser for the town. See Aldrich v. Boyle, 328 Mass. 30, 32, 101 N.E.2d 495; Poland v. Post Publishing Co., 330 Mass. 701, 704, 116 N.E.2d 860. The obvious purpose of the letter was to answer the published criticism by Whelan, the third member. It apears from the declaration as a whole that incidental to this purpose reference was made to the plaintiff's manner of performance as town appraiser during his two year term, and in connection therewith, to the magnitude of the studies involved in the pending appraisal of the shipyard located in the town. Both were matters of legitimate public interest. The individual defendants, as public officeholders, when publicly challenged, were entitled to express their views on these matters which were within their special knowledge and responsibility. Although the plaintiff, unlike the individual defendants and Whelan, was neither a candidate for nor a holder of elective office, he was a public employee whose reappointment to his position had been made a matter of public concern and rested upon the judgment of the individual defendants.

The demurrers were properly sustained. The circumstance that the statement was made during the course of a political campaign or in a controversy relating to town affairs, and the added circumstance that the plaintiff was an appointed town employee, while not necessarily decisive, are not to be overlooked on demurrer. See Sillars v. Collier, 151 Mass. 50, 53, 23 N.E. 723, 6 L.R.A. 680.

We rest our opinion on the ground that read in context the words used, 'taken in their natural sense, and without a forced or strained construction' are not defamatory. Peck v. Wakefield Item Co., 280 Mass. 451, 453, 183 N.E. 70, 71. Aldrich v. Boyle, 328 Mass. 30, 32, 101 N.E.2d 495. We think that the case falls well within the ambit of our holding in Ricci v. Crowley, 333 Mass. 26, 27, 127 N.E.2d 652, 653, that the words 'for the good of the service' as grounds for the removal of an appointive officer are not defamatory.

The words here used amount to no more than a mild bill of particulars embraced within the general phrase 'for the good of the service.' They constitute at most a statement that the plaintiff in the performance of his duties as a public employee had not measured up to the expectations of the defendants who appointed him, and that his appointment would not be renewed. The concluding words of Ricci v. Crowley, 333 Mass. at 27-28, 127 N.E.2d at 653, are apposite here. The individual defendants 'may have well determined for many reasons, none of which reflected upon the character or probity of the plaintiff, that another, perhaps more...